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1. Introduction
This dissertation deals with econometrics of financial asset pricing models. In the following
there parts some specific asset pricing models in finance are first analyzed theoretically and
then introduced to financial data aiming to answer how investors price various types of risks
and how they incorporate those risks into their financial decisions. In particular, in the first
part the focus is on the analysis of terrorism risk via discrete-time financial asset pricing models
whereas in the second and third parts the variance swap market is studied in the continuous-
time modeling framework. Three research papers that constitute this dissertation are:
(i) The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets: An Empirical Study (with Marc Chesney,
and Ganna Reshetar),
(ii) Variance Swaps, Risk Premiums, and Expectation Hypothesis (with Yacine Aı¨t-Sahalia,
and Loriano Mancini),
(iii) Euler Approximation and Likelihood Expansion for Continuous-Time Derivative Pricing
Models: A Comparative Analysis.
2. Summary of Results
(i) The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets: An Empirical Study
The first research article of this dissertation analyzes how investors price terrorism risk in
financial markets and how they incorporate this risk into their decision making process. The
9/11 terrorist attacks and more recent attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 revealed
that terrorism risk is a new type of catastrophic risk that investors and financial institutions may
be facing. In order to study this risk, we look at the effect of 77 terrorist attacks that occurred
in 25 countries over an 11-year (from 1994 to 2005) time period. We look at global, European,
American, and Swiss stock markets as well as insurance, banking, travel, pharma/biotech,
aero/defense and oil/gas industrial stock indices. In contrast to impact studies which often
employ only event-study methodology, in this work we investigate the impact of terrorism using
other methods as well, namely a non-parametric methodology and a filtered GARCH with
the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approach. Both methods are standard econometric tools.
However, the application of them in this work is original. The analysis shows that a non-
parametric approach is the most appropriate method among the three considered for analyzing
the impact of terrorism on financial markets. The results of this work show that approximately
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two-thirds of the terrorist attacks considered lead to a significant negative impact on at least
one stock market under consideration. The insurance sector and the airline industry exhibit
the highest susceptibility to terrorism, while the banking industry is the least sensitive. This
is in contrast to financial crashes which have a strong negative impact on the banking sector.
The analysis of the possible diversification strategies considering terrorism as a risk factor for
Swiss and European investors shows that an investor would be better of if the terrorism risk is
considered in the portfolio allocation decisions.
(ii) Variance Swaps, Risk Premiums, and Expectation Hypothesis
The second research article of this dissertation studies how the term structure of equity, jump
and volatility risk premiums behave in variance swap market. In addition, forecasting power
of those rates for the future volatility levels, and possible investment strategies considering
volatility as an asset class are also analyzed. A variance swap is a forward contract on future
realized variance and it is the most direct way to achieve an exposure to or hedge against
variance risk. Similar to any other forward contract, the long position receives the floating
realized variance over a certain time horizon and pays a fixed rate, called variance swap rate. In
the first part of this paper, a model-free analysis of the variance swaps is performed in order to
understand the hidden dynamics in the data which is daily variance swap rates (not synthetic
rates) on the S&P 500 index with fixed time to maturity of 2-, 3-, 6-, 12- and 24-month from
January 4, 1996 to September 2, 2010. This analysis reveals that there are randomly-occurring
jumps in the asset returns and the volatility of the returns should include two factors to capture
observed term structures. Therefore a parsimonious way to model variance swaps is via a
two-factor stochastic volatility and stochastic jump-intensity model which is in the class of
affine models in finance. In the second part, this model is fitted to variance swap data via
the closed-form likelihood expansion scheme, a recently developed estimation technology in the
literature. Intuitively, this methodology approximates the unknown transition density of the
stochastic processes by deforming or stretching the Normal density so that it tries to capture the
required skewness, kurtosis and the higher moments of the transition density. The two-factor
stochastic volatility and stochastic jump-intensity model implies variance swap rates that are
affine functions of unobserved state variables like volatility or the long-run mean of the volatility.
Therefore, recovering those latent states is straightforward especially compared to the case with
extracting those states from option prices. The estimation results show that the term structure
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of variance risk premium is negative and generally downward sloping, while the term structure
of variance risk premium due to negative jumps is negative, downward sloping in quite times
and upward sloping during market crashes. Moreover, the forecasting power of variance swap
rates for future volatility levels is not strong for long horizons due to the variance risk premium.
However bias and inefficiency of this prediction is modest for short/medium time to maturities.
Moreover, a comparison of the trading strategy, which is based on shorting a variance swap if
the expected profit from this investment is more than a threshold level, appears to be more
profitable than investing in the S&P 500 index, over the same time horizons.
(iii) Euler Approximation and Likelihood Expansion for Continuous-Time Derivative
Pricing Models: A Comparative Analysis
The third research article of this dissertation compares estimation performance of Euler dis-
cretization and closed-form likelihood expansion methodologies for four derivative pricing mod-
els. The models studied are nested in the sense that it is possible to reduce the biggest model
to the other three with some constraints on the modeling parameters. Therefore, this paper
not only compares two different estimation schemes within different models but also analyzes
how each model performs with respect to each other to explain the data characteristics. That
is, the implied instantaneous market, jump and volatility risk premiums and pricing errors are
analyzed both within and between models. In the first part, an extensive Monte Carlo simula-
tion study shows that likelihood expansion outperforms the Euler approximation. In the second
part all models are estimated with real-data via both estimation schemes. The data used in
this study is the variance swap data. The estimations show that the power of the likelihood
expansion over the Euler approximation is more pronounced as the joint dynamics of the state
variables are further away from the multivariate normal density. This corresponds to the case
where asset returns have jumps. Since it is widely accepted that the asset prices include jumps
in addition to continuous Brownian dynamics, the method of estimation should be closed-form
likelihood expansion for such models. Moreover, the comparison of the estimates and the re-
covered quantities reveal that the stochastic-intensity two-factor model fits the variance swap
data best.
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Part II
The Impact of Terrorism on Financial
Markets: An Empirical Study
Marc Chesney, Ganna Reshetar, and Mustafa Karaman
This paper was accepted for publication in the Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 35,
Issue 2, February 2011, Pages 253 - 267.
Abstract
The main focus of this paper is to study empirically the impact of terrorism on the behavior
of stock, bond and commodity markets. We consider terrorist events that took place in 25
countries over an 11-year time period and implement our analysis using different methods: an
event-study approach, a non-parametric methodology, and a filtered GARCH-EVT approach.
In addition, we compare the effect of terrorist attacks on financial markets with the impact
of other extreme events such as financial crashes and natural catastrophes. The results of our
analysis show that a non-parametric approach is the most appropriate method among the three
for analyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. We demonstrate the robustness
of this method when interest rates, equity market integration, spillover and contemporaneous
effects are controlled. We show how the results of this approach can be used for investors’
portfolio diversification strategies against terrorism risk.
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1. Introduction
A lot of research on terrorism has been done in the fields of sociology, political science and
history. With respect to economics and finance, terrorism has not received much attention from
researchers until recently. The effect of the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on stock markets
as well as that of more recent attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 has revealed
that terrorism risk is a new type of catastrophic risk that investors and financial institutions
may be facing. In this paper we intend to provide a deeper understanding of the impact of this
risk on the behavior of various financial markets. When studying the impact, we look at global,
regional, national and industrial market levels. In addition, we compare the impact of terrorist
events on financial markets with the impact of other extreme events such as financial crashes
and natural catastrophes.
Among existing research, this empirical paper is one of the very few (see for example Arin
et al. (2008), Chen and Siembs (2004), Eldor and Melnick (2004), Karolyi and Martell (2006))
that study the link between terrorism and the behavior of stock markets. It is also the first one
that analyzes the impact on bond and commodity markets.
In contrast to impact studies which often employ only event-study methodology, in this work
we investigate the impact of terrorism using other methods as well. We use a non-parametric
methodology and a filtered GARCH with the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approach. Both
methods are standard econometric tools. However, our application of them in this work is
original.
We show that a non-parametric approach is the most appropriate method among the three
considered for analyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. In contrast to an event-
study, it does not impose strong parametric restrictions. It is also less computationally intensive
than a filtered GARCH-EVT method. Finally, a non-parametric approach allows us to analyze
the impact of events in the post-event period which is not possible with the GARCH-EVT
approach. We demonstrate the robustness of a non-parametric model when interest rates,
equity market integration, spillover and contemporaneous effects are controlled.
The findings of our empirical investigation are useful for investors, insurance and re-insurance
businesses, banks and government agencies. This study is the first one to give insights into
possible portfolio diversification strategies with respect to the risk of terrorism. We demonstrate
how Swiss and European investors can apply the results of our non-parametric model to the
construction of their investment portfolios.
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In order to study the impact of terrorism on financial markets empirically, we look at the
effect of 77 terrorist attacks that occurred in 25 countries over an 11-year time period. We look
at global, European, American, and Swiss stock markets as well as insurance, banking, travel,
pharma/biotech, aero/defense and oil/gas industrial stock indices. In relation to other markets,
we look at the US, European and World bond indices as well as at the global commodity and
gold markets. When comparing the impact of terrorist events on these financial markets with
the impact of other extreme events, we analyze the impact of 4 financial crashes and 19 natural
catastrophes which occurred during the 11-year period under consideration.
The results of our work are as follows. Approximately two-thirds of the terrorist attacks
considered lead to a significant negative impact on at least one stock market under consideration.
The Swiss stock market is affected by the highest number of attacks while the American stock
market by the lowest number. The insurance sector and the airline industry exhibit the highest
susceptibility to terrorism, while the banking industry is the least sensitive.1 This is in contrast
to financial crashes which have a strong negative impact on the banking sector. The analysis
of the impact on the aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors shows both positive and
negative reactions. These sectors behave similarly to natural disasters and financial crashes.
As with terrorist events, natural catastrophes cause both positive and negative return move-
ments in the commodity/gold and bond markets. The gold index is affected by a lower number
of events compared to the commodity index, implying less sensitivity of the former to natural
disasters. Finally, among bond markets considered, the US government bond market shows the
lowest impact from terrorist attacks, natural catastrophes and financial crashes.
As to the strength of the impact, terrorist attacks and financial crashes cause event-day
return movements that are mostly extreme, with the strength of the impact declining in the
post-event period. This implies that although markets perceive these events as unusual, they do
not see their effects as long-lasting. Regarding natural catastrophes, the negative impact is more
often observed in the post-event period. This can be attributed to the fact that markets need
more time to evaluate the long-term impact of such events. Furthermore, as natural disasters
can last for several days, the impact is more likely to be evaluated during the period following
the event.
The results of this paper suggest several diversification strategies for minimizing the terror-
ism risk. Investors concerned about this risk should consider holding two groups of assets: those
1Note that the banking sector was affected negatively by the 9/11 attacks. However, this event was exceptional
in terms of its magnitude and place of occurrence (Manhattan, the financial center).
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which are likely to react positively to terrorist attacks, or those which have little or no negative
sensitivity to this risk. In the first case, a US Government bond index is the safest choice fol-
lowed by such industry stocks as aero/defense and pharma/biotech. However, given that these
stock markets may also exhibit a negative response, investing in these industries as a diversi-
fication strategy against terrorist attacks may not always work. In the second case, a banking
stock index may be good for investment. It is important to note, however, that although a
banking stock index is least sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative return
movements associated with financial crashes.
Regarding the other financial markets, investing in a composite commodity index is prefer-
able to investing in gold only. This is because the gold market often reacts more negatively than
positively to terrorist events. In addition, when compared to the commodity market in general,
the negative impact on the gold market is more long-lasting. At the same time, the commodity
market also shows a short-term negative reaction to some terrorist events. This implies that
investing in gold and commodity markets may not always provide a good hedge.
Another possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid
investing in insurance, travel and airline stocks or to short these indices. Note that insurance
and airline industries show high negative sensitivity not only to terrorist attacks but also to
financial crashes and natural disasters. This implies that by taking long positions in these
stocks, investors may end up increasing their risk of loss if further terrorist attacks occur.
Finally, our analysis of the possible investment diversification strategies for Swiss and Eu-
ropean investors shows that an investor who uses the results of our paper and constructs an
investment portfolio in such a way that she imposes a negative correlation on the industries
that react inversely to the terrorist attacks and a positive average correlation on the rest of the
covariance matrix, would outperform other investors.
2. Related research
Analysis of existing literature on the impact of terrorism on financial markets shows that most
of the research has a descriptive character and focuses on the impact of very few terrorist events
(often only those which occurred on September 11, 2001). A recent article by Karolyi (2006)
discusses what is known and unknown about the effects of terrorist events on financial markets.
It also provides a summary of the research done in this area. According to the author, there is
still little known about the economic and financial consequences of terrorism.
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A very recent paper by Arin et al. (2008) shows interesting results regarding the effect of
terrorist events on the markets’ behavior based on evidence from six different financial markets
(Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and UK). In their work, the authors investigate the
effects of terrorism not only on the stock markets, but also on stock market volatility. They
find that the magnitude of terrorist effects is larger in emerging markets.
Johnston and Nedelescu (2005) examine cases in which financial markets are directly or
indirectly affected by terrorist acts. They review the reaction of the markets to the 9/11 attacks
in the US and the attacks in Madrid in March, 2004. The main conclusion of their study is
that financial markets are not only confronted with major disruptions caused by the massive
damage to property and communication systems, but also with high levels of uncertainty and
market volatility, especially in the case of the 9/11 attacks in New York. However, there are
some differences in the stock market reaction to these two terrorist events. While the attacks
in Madrid were perceived as mostly having a regional effect, those in New York were seen as
having repercussions on the global financial system.2 The authors view the timing of the attacks
as a possible explanation for the different impacts. Whereas the attacks in New York occurred
during a period of economic downturn, the attacks in Spain happened when the world economy
was experiencing growth. We believe that the difference in the impact can also be explained by
examining the targets of the attacks. The 9/11 attacks happened in Manhattan, the financial
center, while the bombings in Madrid were targeted at a transport system.
Further evidence of the impact of terrorism on financial markets is offered by some impact
studies. Among existing literature, this paper is most closely related to that by Chen and
Siembs (2004) which examines the US capital market reaction to 7 terrorist and 7 military
attacks over the period 1915-2001, using an event-study approach. They apply their analysis
to other capital markets as well, but focus on the impact of only two events: the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. They find that after these two events, US capital
markets rebound and stabilize quicker than other markets, and that US markets are more
resilient now than in the past, which they attribute to the strength of the banking and financial
2The major worldwide equity markets experienced sharp and rapid declines, demonstrating that market
participants perceived the 9/11 event as a global shock. In contrast, the 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid
had much less effect on the financial markets. The Dow Jones EURO STOXX fell by about 3% on March 11,
and continued to drop during the following days but had recovered almost completely by the end of the month.
Similarly, after a small decline, the S&P 500 returned to pre-March 11 levels in less than a month (Johnston and
Nedelescu (2005)).
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sectors in the US. One of the main conclusions of their paper is that financial markets are
efficient in absorbing the shocks caused by terrorist attacks and can continue to function in an
effective way. Compared with the work by Chen and Siembs (2004), this study covers a much
wider range of terrorist events (77 versus 7) and applies not only the traditional event-study
approach, but more rigorous econometric techniques such as the non-parametric methodology
and the filtered GARCH-Extreme Value Theory approach.
Eldor and Melnick (2004) study how stock and foreign exchange markets react to terrorism
in Israel. The authors consider 639 terror attacks during the period from 1990 to 2003 and
categorize the data by location, target, type of attack and number of casualties. They show
empirically that terrorism has a permanent negative effect on stock markets but not on foreign
currency markets. They conclude that these markets are efficient in incorporating news about
terrorist attacks, and that there is no evidence that markets have become desensitized to terror
over time.
Several studies consider the effects of the September 11 attacks exclusively on the stock
market. Carter and Simkins (2001) examine the impact of this event on airline stock returns.
They test whether market reaction on the first trading day after the attack is the same for each
airline or, alternatively, whether it distinguishes among airlines based on company characteris-
tics. They find that market differentiates among various airlines based on their ability to cover
short-term obligations as measured by a ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. According
to their study, airlines with low liquidity are penalized the most. No statistical significance is
found for company characteristics such as size, leverage and performance.
Other research focuses on the economic consequences and associated costs of terrorism. In
their paper, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) study the effects of terrorism on economic activity.
Karolyi and Martell (2006) analyze the long-term economic impact of terrorism. The authors
examine the impact of terrorist attacks on the stock price of targeted companies. They find that
the impact varies according to the domicile of the target company and the country in which
the attack occurs. They conclude that in countries which are wealthier and more democratic,
attacks are associated with greater share price reactions.
According to Raby (2003), airline, travel, tourism, accommodation, restaurant, postal and
insurance industries are particularly susceptible to increased terrorism risks. Regions and
economies where these industries are concentrated are likely to suffer most from falls in output
and employment.
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3. Terrorism risk
From an economic and financial standpoint, terrorism has been described as having several
negative effects such as a reduction in the human and physical capital of a country, increased
costs of financial and other counter-terrorism regulations, vulnerability of critical infrastructure
(power plants, nuclear facilities, chemical factories, bridges, pipelines and water supply), in-
creased financial instability, destruction of market infrastructure and operations and a decrease
in investor confidence (see Johnston and Nedelescu (2005), Bonturi et al. (2002)). Because of
enormous loss potential, terrorism risk may put high financial demands on insurance and rein-
surance businesses and induce high insurance premiums. Today insurance companies mostly
transfer this risk to reinsurance businesses. When dealing with terrorism risk, the main chal-
lenge for both types of financial institutions lies in its quantification. Even though some models
have been proposed to handle this problem, existing approaches are linked with catastrophe
modeling.
In many ways, terrorism risk is similar to the risk of natural hazards such as floods, earth-
quakes, hurricanes and storms. In all these events, there is enormous loss potential and these
events can affect entire economies. For example, the 9/11 attacks have evidenced that terrorism
is potentially a catastrophic risk. At the same time, there are several crucial differences between
terrorist attacks and the above-mentioned extreme events. Unlike terrorist attacks, catastro-
phes are natural events that occur without intent and their conceivable place of occupance may
be predicted with less difficulty. Terrorist events are characterized by dynamic uncertainty in
terms of their type (suicide bombing, armed assault, kidnapping etc.), their target (military,
personnel, government, facilities etc.) and place and time of occurrence. Terrorists may respond
to security measures by shifting their attention to new targets or by changing the type of ter-
rorist attack, the place or the time of its occurrence. In other words, they behave strategically.
In contrast, the actions that can be taken to reduce the damage from possible natural disasters
do not affect the probability and the place of occurrence of these events.
The main challenge is to predict the likelihood and the financial consequences of terrorist
attacks and to quantify exposure to terrorism risk. In addition, when modeling this risk, analysts
are faced with a limited availability of historical data on terrorism losses. But even if these data
were easily accessible, it would not necessarily reflect the changing expectations of planned
terrorist activities today. In contrast, probabilities and consequences of natural hazards can be
modeled and quantified more easily using well-defined methods and historical data. Because of
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the above-mentioned characteristics, it is much more difficult to manage terrorism risk than the
risk of natural hazards. This, in turn, calls for more studies on terrorism risk, and our work is
the first that analyzes differences in the impact of terrorist attacks and natural disasters on the
behavior of financial markets.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Research questions
When implementing our empirical study, we address the following research questions:
• Research Question 1: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on global, European,
American and Swiss stock markets?
• Research Question 2: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as insurance, travel, airline, oil and gas, financial and banking?
• Research Question 3: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as defense and pharmaceutical/biotechnology?
• Research Question 4: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the commodity and
gold markets?
• Research Question 5: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the bond market?
• Research Question 6: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets
on the event-day only, in the post-event window or both?
• Research Question 7: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets
which is similar to that of natural catastrophes and financial crashes?
4.2. Data
We use two types of data sets. The first data set includes daily prices of financial market indices
(see Table 1 for a list of indices). We obtain this data from DataStream and, for each index,
we consider available daily prices for the period from January 4, 1994 until September 16, 2005
(this corresponds to 3054 data points).3 We compute the logarithmic daily percentage index
3For FTSE Global Banks and FTSE Global Financials, data are available from January 2, 1996; for MSCI
Europe Insurance and MSCI Europe Airlines, from January 2, 1995; for FTSE Eurozone Bond Index from May 4,
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returns using the identity of:
Ri,t = LN(Pi,t/Pi,t−1), (1)
where Ri,t is the return on the index for period t, Pi,t is the price of the index at the end of
period t, and Pi,t−1 is the price of the index at the end of period t− 1.
The second data set includes information on terrorist events. We construct a database
of terrorist events using publicly available information on terrorism (mainly provided by the
Terrorism Research Center (TRA (2000)) and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO
(2005))). As limited availability of historical information on terrorist events is often considered
to be a restriction to modeling terrorism risk, we consider the data collection implemented in
this study to be one of the first important steps in approaching the topic.
Data cover 77 terrorist events that occurred in 25 countries4 from January 1994 to August
2005. Though our list is subjectively determined, we select those terrorist attacks that are
mentioned as significant in the aforementioned sources. Each terrorist event is characterized by
the date of attack, its type (armed assault, suicide bombing, bombing), the target, the place of
occurrence and the number of people injured, killed or kidnapped.
When comparing the impact of terrorist attacks with the effect of other extreme events, we
consider 4 financial crashes and 19 natural catastrophes that happened during the 11-year period
considered. The financial crashes include the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, the 1997 mini-crash due
to the Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the 2001 Argentina crisis.
The natural catastrophes include earthquakes, storms, floods, cyclones, typhoons, tornadoes,
tsunami and hurricanes.
4.3. Methodology
In general, the event-study methodology is the most commonly used method to study the impact
of events (see Brown and Warner (1980), Chen and Siembs (2004), Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003)). This methodology, however, imposes restrictive requirements on the behavior of indices’
returns. In this paper, we go beyond this traditional tool and implement two other approaches.
These are the non-parametric conditional distribution estimation approach and the filtered
1998; and for FTSE US Bond Index, from December 31, 1999. Regarding S&P 500 Index, data from September
12 to 19, 2001 were not available as the stock market was closed due to the 9/11 attacks.
4Argentina, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UK and
the USA.
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GARCH-EVT method. With the former, we gain the flexibility of having no assumptions about
the parametric form of the data. With the latter, we account for the volatility background,
possible dependence among returns and the fat tail nature of their distribution. Note that the
GARCH-EVT approach is quite computationally intensive and we are able to check the impact
on the event-day only.
4.3.1 The event-study approach
We use the event-study methodology to measure the magnitude of the effect of considered
extreme events on the behavior of stock, bond and commodity markets. To examine whether
an event has any impact on the market, we measure event-day abnormal returns (ARs) and
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and test their statistical significance.5 As the event-study
approach is a well-known technique, we do not provide a more comprehensive overview of this
methodology in our work.
4.3.2 Non-parametric conditional distribution approach
Non-parametric estimation is a statistical method that allows a functional form of a fit to data
to be obtained without imposing any parametric assumptions. For example, a Kernel estimation
of an economic model y = M(x) + u, requires no specification of a regression function M(x) =
E(y|x) and the distribution of error terms. This way, non-parametric estimation lets the data
speak for itself and overcomes a disadvantage of parametric econometrics when inconsistency
between data and a particular parametric specification would result in non-robustness. At
the same time, this gain in flexibility of approach is not without costs, as non-parametric
modeling has to deal with, for example, a selection of a bandwidth and a type of Kernel
function. We do not intend to give a comprehensive overview of the fundamentals of non-
parametric methodology. Rather, we want to describe an application of this powerful tool to
study the impact of terrorism on different financial markets. We view this application, compared
to event methodology, for example, as an alternative way of studying the impact. Note that
when we analyze an impact of some event by implementing the event-study approach, we check
the statistical significance of the effect of this event by means of some test statistics. The latter,
in turn, imposes some restrictions, since test statistics require some distributional assumptions
5We apply a mean-adjusted return approach to compute ARs. CARs are computed over an interval of 6-days
in the post-event window.
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with respect to the abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) which have to be
satisfied.
We apply a local polynomial regression (LPR) to time series data to get a non-parametric
conditional distribution of stock, bond and commodity index returns. We do not compute any
test statistics to check the significance of negative abnormal and/or extreme movements in the
market due to terrorism. Instead, for each index and terrorist event, we analyze the value of
conditional probability of a return - which is less than or equal to the one empirically observed
on the day of the event. The abnormality in the return corresponds to conditional probability in
the interval (0.05; 0.10]. Where this probability is 5% or less, we interpret the return as extreme.
This is our subjective approach to distinguishing between extreme and abnormal movements.
We assume that a terrorist attack has an impact on the index if it leads to negative abnormal
and/or extreme event-day returns. Since we are interested in knowing not only the immediate
reaction of the market to the event, but also the market response over some interval of time in
a post-event window, we estimate a non-parametric conditional distribution of non-overlapping
6-day CARs. We make our inference about the impact of terrorist attacks in the aftermath of
the event by looking at 6-day CARs in a way similar to the one described for returns. Below
we provide a description of the non-parametric estimation implemented in this paper.
Let us consider a conditional distribution function pi(z|x) ≡ P (Zi ≤ z|Xi = x). Since we
work in the time series context, Xi is a vector of lagged values of Zi that are returns on an
index. If we assume Yi = I(Zi ≤ z) then E(Yi | Xi = x) = pi(z|x), consequently, the problem of
estimation may be viewed as regression of Yi on Xi.
Keeping this in mind and applying a local polynomial fitting to our time series data of index
returns Ri, we minimize the following expression:
n∑
i=1
(Yi − β0 − β1(Xi − x0))2Kh(Xi − x0), (2)
where Yi = I(Ri ≤ rt) with rt standing for empirically observed (realization) return on the day
of terrorist attack t, i = (1, . . . , n), n is a sample size and n=200; Xi = Ri−1, x0 = rt−1; h is a
bandwidth; Kh is a Kernel function.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the idea of non-parametric estimation imple-
mented in this work. We take the 9/11 attacks as an example and build the conditional cu-
mulative distribution function of returns on FTSE All World when conditioning is done on the
return on September 10, 2001, a day before the 9/11 attacks. We find the conditional cumulative
probability of the return on FTSE All World, which is less than or equal to that on September
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11, 2001 to be 0.037. Since this value is less than 0.05, we conclude that this terrorist event has
an extreme event-day effect on this index.
We use a normal reference bandwidth selector (Fan and Yao (2003)), which defines an
optimal bandwidth hˆopt,n for the Epanechnikov kernel as 2.34σsn
−1/5, where σs is a standard
deviation of a sample. Implementation of this model leads to point estimates β̂0 and β̂1:
β̂ = (X′WX)−1X′WY, (3)
where W is the diagonal matrix whose ith element is Kh(Xi − x0), and X is a design matrix
with a first column of ones. Obtained this way, a point estimate β̂0 corresponds to a conditional
probability of return on index, which is less than or equal to that empirically observed on the
day of the event (a terrorist attack) and when conditioning is done on the value of return on
the previous day. The same logic applies to a sample of 200 non-overlapping 6-day CARs. We
compute the value of the CAR on which conditioning is done as
CARt−1 =
j=−6∑
j=−1
ARj , (4)
where ARj is the abnormal return on an index at time j. We also implement a non-parametric
estimation when conditioning is implemented on the average of the returns R¯. We believe that
this approach improves the inference since the average return reflects normal market conditions
better than just one return on the day before the attack.
4.3.3 GARCH filter with an extreme value theory approach
When studying the impact of extreme events on financial market behavior, one can compare
the event-day return on the index with the value at risk (VaR) predicted for this day and
computed for different levels of significance. In the case of terrorist attacks, if the return
on the day of a terrorist event is lower than the computed value of VAR, we may conclude
that a considered terrorist attack had an impact on the index. This method of studying the
impact of events relates to the tail estimation of financial time series and requires a well-
chosen way to compute the VaR that from a statistical point of view has a good predictive
performance (a good fit model). In their recent paper, Kuester et al. (2006) give an extensive and
detailed overview and comparison of alternative strategies to predict VaR. They implement their
study using the NASDAQ Composite Index and show that the hybrid method that combines
a heavy-tailed generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (GARCH) filter with an
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extreme value theory (EVT) approach performs better than other methods. More about the
VaR measurement, using GARCH and EVT theory can be found in the papers by Christoffersen
et al. (2001), Longin (2005) and Bali et al. (2008).
The GARCH method works as follows. First, we apply a time-varying volatility model to
the time series of returns. We assume the following dynamics of returns:
Xt = µt + σtZt, (5)
where Xt is a strictly stationary time series representing daily observations of negative log
returns on index, and innovations Zt are white noise process and have a marginal distribution
function FZ(z). We assume the Gaussian distribution for innovations.
We assume that µt and σt are measurable with respect to =t−1, the information about the
return process available up to time t− 1. Similar to the paper by McNeil and Frey (2000), we
use the parsimonious but effective AR(1) model for the dynamics of the conditional mean:
µt = ϕXt−1 (6)
and GARCH(1,1) process for the conditional volatility:
σ2t = α0 + α1
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1, (7)
where α0 > 0, α1 > 0 and β > 0, t = Xt − µt and α1 + β < 1.
For each terrorist attack, we take a sample from 200 to 2500 past return observations6
(starting one day before the attack) and fit this model to the data by means of the pseudo-
maximum likelihood method to get the estimates of parameters θ̂ = (ϕ̂, α̂0, α̂1, β̂). Estimates
of the conditional mean series (µ̂t−n+1, ..., µ̂t) and the conditional standard deviation series
(σ̂t−n+1, ..., σ̂t) are obtained recursively from (9) and (10) using reasonable starting values.
When correctly specified and with a good fit, this model allows us to obtain filtered residuals
(zt−n+1, ..., zt) =
(xt−n+1 − µ̂t−n+1
σ̂t−n+1
, ...,
xt − µ̂t
σ̂t
)
(8)
that are approximately iid, which is an important requirement for the EVT approach applied
below. Finally, the estimates of the conditional mean and variance for day t + 1 are given by
µ̂t+1 = ϕ̂xt and σ̂
2
t+1 = α̂0 + α̂1̂
2
t + β̂σ̂
2
t , where ̂t = xt − µ̂t.
We estimate the tail of the standardized residuals by means of the EVT, namely, by applying
the Peak-Over-Threshold methodology (POT). The latter approach focuses on the distribution
6We vary the sample size to get good backtesting results.
17
of excess returns over some threshold and applies a key result that the Generalized Pareto
Distribution (GPD) is the limit distribution of scaled excesses of iid random variables over high
threshold. This distribution has the following cdf for ξ 6= 0:
Hξ,β(y) = 1−
[
1 +
ξy
β
]−1/ξ
, (9)
where β > 0, y ≥ 0 when ξ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ y ≤ −β/ξ and when ξ < 0. When ξ = 0, the
expression in (12) gets the form of Hξ,β(y) = 1 − exp
(
−y
β
)
. When implementing the EVT
estimation, we first order the residuals z(1), ..., z(n) and fit the distribution in (12) to the data
(z(1)− z(k+1), ..., z(k)− z(k+1)), the excess amounts over the threshold z(k+1) with k standing for
the number of data in the tail. The quantile estimate ẑq for q > 1− k/n is
ẑq = z(k+1) +
β̂k
ξ̂k
((1− q
k/n
)−ξ̂k − 1). (10)
Finally, we compute the estimate of the VaR. If we denote the marginal distribution of Xt
as FX(x) and let FXt+1+...+Xt+k|=t(x) be the predictive distribution of returns over the next k
days, then the quantile of the latter distribution is given by
V aRtq = x
t
q(k) = inf{x ∈ R : FXt+1+...+Xt+k|=t(x) ≥ q}. (11)
Because FXt+1|=(x) = P{σt+1Zt+1 + µt+1 ≤ x | =t} = FZ((x − µt+1)/σt+1) we can compute
VaR as
V̂ aR
t
q = x̂
t
q = µ̂t+1 + σ̂t+1ẑq, (12)
where ẑq is the upper qth quantile of the marginal distribution of Zt obtained using (13).
Computed this way, the VaR accounts for the volatility background and fat-tail nature of the
distribution of index returns. These are two important stylized facts of most financial return
series.
To evaluate the predictive power of the above approach, we implement a backtesting pro-
cedure described in McNeil and Frey (2000). We update the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model pa-
rameters for 500 moving windows and produce 500 one-step-ahead forecasts of V̂ aR
t
q = x̂
t
q that
are subsequently compared with observed values of returns xt+1 for q ∈ {0.90, 0.95, 0.99}. We
implement this procedure when studying the impact of every terrorist attack. A violation is
said to occur when xt+1 > x̂
t
q. Finally, given that the total number of violations is binomially
distributed, we test the hypothesis that the model estimates the conditional quantiles correctly.
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4.4. Empirical results
4.4.1 Summary
Our empirical study provides the following answers to the research questions addressed in this
work (see Table 1 for a summary of the results):
• Research Question 1: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on global, European,
American and Swiss stock markets?
Yes they do. The results obtained show a significant negative impact of terrorist events
on the above mentioned markets: according to the event-study, 55 out of 77 terrorist
attacks (56 in the non-parametric case, 45 according to the GARCH-EVT method) have
a significant negative impact on the behavior of at least one of these markets. The Swiss
market is affected by the highest number of attacks while the American market is affected
by the lowest number of events. The reasons for a strong reaction by the Swiss market
to terrorist events can relate to several factors. This may be because the SMI index
is comprised of fewer companies than the S&P 500 (less broad index). In addition, the
SMI’s sensitivity may be explained by the fact that this index includes stocks of companies
that operate internationally and are potentially more sensitive to extreme events due to
the nature of their business. The results obtained for the S&P 500 are quite reasonable
given the fact that only 4 out of 77 terrorist attacks we consider took place in the US. In
addition, the resilience of the American market to terrorist attacks can be explained by
the stable banking/financial sector in the US at the time of the events, which provided
adequate liquidity to promote market stability.
• Research Question 2: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as insurance, travel, airline, oil and gas, financial and banking?
Yes they do. The empirical evidence suggests a significant negative impact of terrorist
events on the above-mentioned industries. According to the event-study 61 terrorist at-
tacks (55 in the non-parametric case, 41 according to the GARCH-EVT method) lead to
significant negative return movements in at least one industry index. Insurance and air-
line sectors exhibit the highest susceptibility to these events (the MSCI Europe Insurance
is affected by the highest number of attacks), while the banking sector is least affected.
These results are quite intuitive. Terrorist attacks often lead to fatalities and significant
damage to property which explains a high sensitivity of the insurance sector to terrorist
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risk. The results support the conclusions of several studies (see Raby (2003), Bonturi et al.
(2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Enders et al. (1992)) that identify the airline,
travel, tourism and insurance sectors as those which are particularly sensitive to terrorist
events. With respect to the lower level of impact on the banking sector, it is possible
that banks’ operations are not directly related to the businesses that suffered from the
terrorist events. Finally, the oil/gas industry shows both significant negative and positive
return response. We observe this effect at both global and European levels. We observe
a negative reaction of these indices more often than a positive, and we can explain this
reaction as a fear of possible economic slowdown and a decrease in consumer confidence.
This especially relates to the transportation sector, for example, by a drop in air travel.
In turn, this leads to a lower oil demand and a decrease in oil prices. At the same time, a
positive effect on oil prices is often related to the place of the attack (whether it can cause
a danger to oil production and transportation) and the oil market conditions at the time
of the event (if an attack occurs when the market is tight because of increasing global
demand). Importantly, in this study we analyze the impact of terrorist events on returns
on the event-day and in the post-event window of 6 days after the attacks. Therefore,
conclusions drawn from our investigation relate to the markets’ short-term reaction only.
• Research Question 3: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as defense and pharmaceutical/biotechnology?
Yes they do. The analysis of the impact shows both positive and negative reactions of
these indices across all methodologies. The pharma/biotech index is affected less often in
a negative way compared to the defense index. The former index also shows a significant
positive response to more terrorist attacks. Among the events that negatively affect at
least one of these indices are the 2002 bombing in Peru, the 2003 suicide bombings in
Israel and the 2004 bombings in Russia.
In terms of a positive response, we observe a significant positive impact on both sectors
for the 1996 suicide bombing in Israel and the 2002 bombings in Pakistan. We find
a significant positive impact on the pharma/biotech industry for the 2002 bombings in
Indonesia/Bali and the 2005 armed assault in Colombia. We identify a significant positive
impact on the defense industry for the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. Finally, when
we examine the post-event impact over a longer time window (11-day CARs and 30-day
CARs), we find a significant positive response of both indices to such terrorist attacks as
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that of 9/11, the bombings in Madrid and Egypt in 2004 and in London in 2005. One of
the explanations of the positive impact on the defense and pharma/biotec indices that we
may suggest is that terrorist events may induce an increase in government expenditures
on defense and on research in the pharma/biotech area in relation to preventive actions
against possible chemical or biological terrorist attacks.7
• Research Question 4: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the commodity and
gold markets?
Yes they do. The analysis of the impact shows both significant positive and negative
reactions of the commodity and gold market returns to terrorist events. The latter market
shows more negative sensitivity to terrorist events compared to the commodity and bond
markets. Given that gold is usually considered to be a ‘safe-haven’ asset, these empirical
results remain difficult to explain. Commodity and gold markets respond positively to
some terrorist events (the 9/11 attacks) and show no significant reaction to others (the
bombings in Egypt in 2004). Finally, some events, the 2005 bombings in London for
example, cause significant negative return movements in the commodity index and have
no effect on the gold index. Such behavior implies that investing in the commodity/gold
markets as a hedging strategy against terrorism risk may not always work because, with
terrorist events, these markets can react negatively.
• Research Question 5: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the bond market?
Yes they do. The analysis of the impact shows both significant positive and negative
reactions of the bond market returns to terrorist events. We observe the negative impact
of some attacks mostly on the event-day only. Compared to other bond indices, the
Global Government Bond Index experiences significant positive return movements more
often than negative return movements. The FTSE US Government Bond Index displays
the lowest level of impact, both positive and negative. As with commodities and gold,
investing in bonds can be a possible hedging strategy against terrorism risk. However,
one should be aware of the possibility of a significant negative response of these assets’
returns to terrorist attacks.
• Research Question 6: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets
7The OECD report also suggests the possibility of a positive reaction by the defense industry to terrorist
events (Bonturi et al. (2002)).
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on the event-day only, in the post-event window or both?
The empirical results show that terrorist events lead to a significant response in financial
market returns in all the above-mentioned cases. In most cases, the event-day stock return
movements associated with attacks are extreme and the strength of the impact declines
in the post-event period.
Regarding commodity markets, significant return movements in the gold index, both neg-
ative and positive, are extreme and often observed in the post-event period. In contrast,
we find a negative reaction by the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index in all periods, and
we observe a positive response mostly on the event-day.
Among bond indices, the global and European bond markets react negatively in all pe-
riods, while return movements are more often extreme than abnormal. Unlike these two
markets, the US bond market responds positively to terrorist events mostly on the event-
day and associated returns have an abnormal character.
All financial markets perceive terrorist attacks as unusual events. While some of them see
the effects of these events as occurring mostly on the event-day only (the US bond market),
some markets take a longer time to evaluate the impact and reveal their reaction mostly
in the post-event period (the gold market). Finally, some markets (stocks, commodities,
global and European bonds) react to terrorism either on the event-day or in the post-event
window or both.
• Research Question 7: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets
which is similar to that of natural catastrophes and financial crashes?
There are both similarities and differences between the impact of terrorist events on fi-
nancial markets and the effect of financial crashes8 and natural disasters.
While the European and Swiss markets show high susceptibility to terrorist attacks and
natural catastrophes, their response to financial crashes is less negative. At the industry
level, the insurance and airline sectors show a negative sensitivity to all types of the
extreme events. Financial crashes demonstrate a strong negative impact on the banking
and financial sectors. This is in contrast to the effect of terrorist attacks and natural
8 A recent paper by Wang et al. (2009) applies the event-study methodology and multivariate regression analy-
sis to study how a stock market crash affects individual stocks and if stocks with different financial characteristics
are affected differently.
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catastrophes that do not cause a strong negative response in the sectors mentioned above.
Similar to terrorist events, we observe both a positive and a negative impact of natural
disasters and financial crashes on such industries as oil/gas and pharma/biotech.
The event-day negative returns associated with financial crashes and terrorist events are
extreme. The sensitivity of stock markets to these events declines in the post-event win-
dow. In contrast, natural disasters are associated with extreme return movements more
in the days following the events. This result may be because markets need more time to
evaluate the long-term consequences of natural disasters on returns compared to the two
other types of events.
Both terrorist events and natural disasters cause positive and negative return movements
in the commodity/gold and bond markets. Among the latter markets, the US bond
market shows the least impact from all extreme events considered. With respect to the
impact of financial crashes, our empirical findings confirm a traditional perception of the
commodity and bond markets as those providing ‘safe-haven’ investment opportunities in
times of crises. This is because these markets react positively to financial crashes.
4.4.2 Empirical results across different methodologies
4.4.2.1. The event-study approach
Analysis of the response of four stock indices - FTSE All World, MSCI Europe, S&P 500
and SMI to terrorist attacks shows that 22 out of 77 attacks have no impact on any of these
stock markets. Among these events are not only local attacks that are characterized by very
little or no damage to property and people as for example, the bombing in Israel on May 27,
2001, but also such events as the attacks in Argentina on July 18, 1994 that are considered to
be one of the worst in terms of fatalities. The bombings in Sri Lanka/Colombo on July 24,
2001 are among the worst in terms of insured property loss during the period 1970-2001. In
other words, the impact of attacks on stock markets is not necessarily in direct relation to their
magnitude in terms of insured losses and fatalities.
Our investigation shows that 55 out of 77 terrorist events have a significant negative impact
on at least one stock index. FTSE All World and Swiss indices are affected by the highest
number of events while the S&P 500 Index is affected by the least number of attacks. The
9/11 attacks as well as the suicide bombing in Israel on June 19, 2002 and bombings in Madrid
2004, in Egypt 2004 and in the UK 2005 are good examples of events that have a negative
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impact on stock markets at both global and local levels (see Table 2). We find that the 9/11
terrorist attacks have a significant negative effect on global, European, American and Swiss
stock markets both on the event-day and in the post-event window. The S&P 500 shows the
strongest negative reaction in the post-event window compared to other indices, which reflects
a prolonged negative effect of the 9/11 event on the American market. As to the negative
impact of this event on the European market, our results find support in the empirical paper by
Chen and Siembs (2004), where the authors conclude that European capital markets experience
significant negative 6-day CARs due to the 9/11 attacks.
The empirical results for various industry indices show that 62 out of 77 terrorist events
have a significant negative effect on at least one of them. The insurance sector is affected
by the highest number of events while the banking and oil/gas industries are affected by the
lowest number of attacks. Within the insurance sector, MSCI Europe Insurance experiences the
most negative impact and is closely followed by FTSE All World Non-Life Insurance. These
results are quite intuitive since terrorist attacks often lead to fatalities and significant damage
to property that explains a high sensitivity of the insurance sector to terrorism risk. Unlike the
insurance industry, the banking sector is affected by the least number of attacks. It is possible
that banking operations are not directly related to the businesses that suffered from the terrorist
events.
We find evidence of the significant negative impact of terrorist attacks on the FTSE All
World Travel and MSCI Europe Airlines. For both, almost half of the attacks considered lead
to a significant negative reaction. While the FTSE All World Travel is affected more often in
the post-event period, we observe this type of impact for MSCI Europe Airlines less frequently.
In addition, when characterizing the impact on the airline index, we see that more than half of
the terrorist events (out of 31 that have an impact) cause significant negative return movements
on the event-day and in the post-event window, reflecting a high susceptibility of this sector to
terrorism risk. These results support conclusions of several studies (see Raby (2003), Bonturi
et al. (2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Enders et al. (1992)) that identify airline, travel,
tourism and insurance sectors as those that are particularly sensitive to terrorist events.
Analysis of the ARs and 6-day CARs shows evidence of significant negative as well as
positive impact of terrorist attacks on the aero/defense and pharma/biotech industries. The
pharma/biotech index is affected less often in a negative way compared to the aero/defense
index. It also shows a significant positive response to more terrorist attacks.
The aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors are not the only industries that experienced
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both a positive and a negative impact of terrorist attacks. An analysis of the reaction of the
oil/gas sector also reveals these two types of impact that is observed at both global and Euro-
pean levels. Some terrorist events first cause a significant negative event-day response in the
oil/gas industry and then lead to a significant positive impact in the post-event period. This
behavior is observed, for example, for the 2004 bombings in Madrid (FTSE Europe Oil/Gas).
In this case, we may possibly explain the immediate negative reaction of the market by the fact
that these bombings are targeted at the transportation system. As new information is processed
with respect to the long-term effect, the market reveals no fear.
4.4.2.2. The non-parametric approach
We obtain the results in relation to the event-day impact of attacks when conditioning is
implemented on the average return.9 Similar to the findings of the event-study approach, the
impact of attacks on the stock markets is not necessarily in direct relation to their magnitude in
terms of insured losses and fatalities. Our investigation shows that 56 out of 77 terrorist events
have an impact on at least one stock market under consideration. The Swiss and European
indices are affected by the highest number of events, while the S&P 500 Index is affected by the
least number of attacks. These results are similar to those revealed in the event-study.
For FTSE All World, MSCI Europe, S&P 500 and SMI, terrorist attacks more often lead
to an event-day negative response and less often to a prolonged negative reaction. Similar to
the results of the event-study approach, all stock indices experience extreme event-day negative
return movements more often than abnormal return movements. The strength of the impact
declines in the post-event period. This result also applies to the industry indices with the
exception of airline, aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors. Similar to the findings of the
event-study approach, the negative impact of terrorist events is found at both global and local
levels (see Table 3).
We find that 55 terrorist attacks have significant negative impact on at least one indus-
try index. This result reflects the more conservative nature of the non-parametric approach
9There are several reasons for this. First, as we mentioned before, the return on the day before the attack might
not represent normal market conditions as accurately as the average return. Secondly, analysis of the data shows
that there are quite a few terrorist attacks that have low event-day impact when conditioning is implemented on
the previous return, no impact in the post-event window and no event-day impact when conditioning is performed
on average returns. In addition, these attacks are such that their magnitude or place of occurrence suggest that
no impact on the given stock index is a reasonable result.
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compared to the event-study methodology. The latter suggests that a larger number of events
cause a negative market response. This result can be due to restrictive assumptions imposed
by test statistics used in the event studies. At the same time, the findings across different
industries are quite similar among these methodologies. The insurance and airline sectors show
high sensitivity to terrorism, while the FTSE Europe Oil/Gas, followed by the banking sector
is affected by the lowest number of attacks. Similar to the findings of the event-study approach,
the aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors exhibit both positive and negative abnor-
mal return movements associated with terrorist events. Events that cause positive reaction are
similar to those identified in the event-study (see Tables 6-7).
4.4.2.3. The GARCH filter with EVT approach
In contrast to the other two approaches, the results provided by this method describe only
the event-day impact of terrorist attacks.10 45 out of 77 terrorist events have a significant
negative impact on at least one stock index. More than half of these events cause extreme
rather than abnormal event-day returns. The Swiss stock index is most often affected. These
results are similar to those revealed in the event-study and in the non-parametric approach. At
the same time, American and European markets exhibit the lowest level of event-day impact.
At the industry level, 41 out of 77 attacks lead to significant negative event-day return
movements in at least one industry index. Similar to the findings of the other two methods, the
insurance and airline industries exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism (the MSCI Europe
Insurance is affected by the highest number of attacks). The oil and pharma/biotech sectors
exhibit the least negative event-day impact. The GARCH-EVT method suggests a greater
negative impact on the aero/defense index and a lesser negative impact on the pharma/biotech
index compared to the other two methods. At the same time, it also displays the presence of
significant positive event-day return movements in these two sectors, a result which is similar
to the findings of the other two methods.
We identify some terrorist events, namely the 1996 bombing in Sri-Lanka/Colombo, the
February 1997 armed assault in the US and the February 1997 kidnapping in Indonesia as those
causing a significant positive impact on the pharma/biotech sector. Other methods, however,
do not identify the impact of these events. With the exception of the above-mentioned events,
the list of attacks that lead to the positive event-day impact is similar across all methodologies
(see Tables 6-7). Finally, concerning the oil/gas sector, the GARCH-EVT approach shows a
10See section 4.5 that explains the limitations of the GARCH-EVT method.
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significant negative event-day impact of a smaller number of attacks and a significant positive
impact of a greater number of attacks compared to the other two methods.
4.5. Which method to use?
Tables 1-4-5-6-7 summarize the findings of our empirical work across different methodologies.
Comparing methodologies, the GARCH-EVT approach shows the least number of extreme
events that lead to significant negative event-day return movements in the indices considered.
Regarding positive impact, the event-study approach often reveals a significant effect of a lower
number of events. For indices that experience both types of impact, the GARCH-EVT method
shows more positive impact compared to other methodologies. The differences in impact across
methodologies can relate to the underlying assumptions they impose on the market returns.
The GARCH-EVT approach, for example, accounts for the volatility background, dependence
and the fat-tail nature of the market returns. These are important characteristics of financial
market returns that are not captured by the other two methodologies. However, the GARCH-
EVT approach allows us to study the event-day effect only and is computationally intensive.
These features are the significant drawbacks of the GARCH-EVT approach, and we believe,
therefore, this approach is inferior to the other two methods. The event-study approach, on
the other hand, is too simplistic since it imposes strong parametric assumptions which may
not hold in reality. In contrast, for a non-parametric approach those parametric restrictions
do not apply and it allows us to analyze post-event effects. Moreover, this approach requires
less computational work than GARCH-EVT. Non-parametric estimation lets the data speak
for itself and overcomes a disadvantage of parametric econometrics when inconsistency between
data and a particular parametric specification would result in non-robustness. Therefore, we
consider a non-parametric approach to be the most appropriate method among the three for
analyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. In the following sections we show the
robustness of this method and analyze how the results of this approach can be used for investors’
portfolio diversification strategies against terrorism risk.
4.6. An application: Portfolio diversification strategies
In this section we analyze how Swiss and European investors can use the results of the non-
parametric approach in their portfolio diversification strategies. We focus on Swiss and Euro-
pean investors because sectoral indices which are going to be used for hedging purposes against
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terrorism risk are mainly dominated by US stocks. Therefore, the impact of the hedging strate-
gies on portfolio performance will be more pronounced for Swiss and European investors than
for US investors due to the high correlation between hedging indices and the S&P 500 index.
First, we consider three Swiss investors who construct equity-only efficient portfolios one
week before the September 11 terrorist attacks. Then we check the performance of these port-
folios on the event-day, i.e. September 11, 2001, as well as one, two and three weeks after the
attacks. The first investor holds only the Swiss market portfolio (i.e. the SMI). The second
and third investors use the results of our non-parametric approach. In addition to the SMI,
they include in their portfolios sectoral indices that react negatively11 and positively12to ter-
rorist attacks. The only difference between the portfolios of the last two investors comes from
the structure of the covariance matrices of returns. The second investor applies an average-
correlation technique (see Elton et al. (1978)) to estimate the covariance matrix of the asset
returns based on historical data. She estimates the variances and a single average correlation
of the returns and then constructs a covariance matrix with these values. To some extent, this
investor constructs an international portfolio that includes indices affected by terrorist attacks.
However, she doesn’t take into consideration a possible direction of the impact of terrorist events
(positive or negative). In contrast, the third investor incorporates a possible direction of the
impact of these events. She calibrates a negative correlation to the sectoral indices which react
inversely to the terrorist attacks and a positive average correlation to the rest of the covariance
matrix.
The estimation of a covariance matrix of the returns explained above is quite simplistic.
However, the results of DeMiguel et al. (2009) show that an investor could be better off ignoring
data on asset returns and using the naive portfolio weights of 1/N . The authors claim that
“there are still many miles to go before the gains promised by optimal portfolio choice can
actually be realized out of sample.” As it is not the main focus of this study, we leave it to other
researchers to develop better estimation schemes.
The out-of-sample performances of the portfolios considered in our analysis are presented in
Table 8 via portfolio Sharpe Ratios.13 On the event-day (i.e. September 11, 2009) all portfolios
perform poorly, but the relative performance of the second investor is better than that of the
11Insurance, airline and travel indices.
12Aero/defense and pharma/biotech indices.
13A recent paper by Zakamouline and Koekebakker (2009) presents how generalised Sharpe Ratios can be used
in the portfolio performance evaluation. See also Farinelli et al. (2008) and Jha et al. (2009) for other measures
than the Sharpe Ratio in order to analyze portfolio performances.
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first one, and the relative performance of the third investor is better than that of the second
investor.14 When the performance horizon increases, we see a similar pattern where the third
investor outperforms the other two.
We follow the same steps when performing our analysis for European investors. We construct
three different portfolios one week before the September 11 terrorist attacks and then evaluate
their performance on the event-day as well as one, two and three weeks after the attacks. The
first investor holds only the European market portfolio (i.e. the MSCI Europe index). The
second investor holds the MSCI Europe index and incorporates the results of our study by
investing in the indices that are affected by terrorist attacks. However, she does not account for
the direction of the impact of these events. Finally, the third investor holds the MSCI Europe
index and indices which are sensitive to terrorist attacks. In contrast to the second investor,
she calibrates the covariance matrix in such a way that she imposes a negative correlation on
the industries that react inversely to the terrorist attacks and a positive average correlation on
the rest of the covariance matrix.
The out-of-sample performances of these portfolios are presented in Table 9. Similar to the
results for the portfolios of Swiss investors, all portfolios of European investors perform poorly
on the event-day. In relative terms, however, the third investor outperforms the second investor
and the second investor outperforms the first investor15 on the event-day and on the other days
of analysis.
The overall results across portfolio diversification strategies of Swiss and European investors
described above show that portfolios which account for a possible impact of terrorist events
demonstrate better performance than those which ignore it. Moreover, the hedged portfolios of
the Swiss investors outperform those of European investors, as the impact of the 9/11 attacks
were worse for the Swiss market than for European markets (see Table 3). The findings of our
study are useful as they reveal not only the indices which may be affected by terrorist events,
but also the direction of the impact (positive or negative). In other words, an investor who uses
the results of our paper and constructs an investment portfolio in such a way that she imposes
a negative correlation on the industries that react inversely to terrorist attacks and a positive
14Although negative Sharpe Ratios could be misleading, it is not the case in our study. This is because during
the performance evaluation period the standard deviation of the first portfolio is larger than that of the second,
and the standard deviation of the second portfolio is larger than that of the third.
15Negativity of the Sharpe Ratios does not lead to a wrong conclusion in this case either. This is because
during a performance evaluation period, the standard deviation of the first portfolio is larger than that of the
second, and the standard deviation of the second portfolio is larger than that of the third.
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average correlation on the rest of the covariance matrix, would outperform other investors who
don’t consider these inverse reactions.
4.7. Robustness of the non-parametric methodology
In order to show the robustness of the non-parametric approach, we continue our analysis with
the SMI and MSCI Europe index returns and implement controls for interest rates, equity
market integration, lagged spillovers and contemporaneous effects.16 To do so, we run the
following regressions
(RSMIt+1 −RfSwisst+1 ) = α+β1(RFTSE,Worldt+1 −RfWorldt+1 )+β2(RSMIt −RfSwisst )+β3(RS&P500t+1 −RfUSt+1)+,
(13)
(RMSCI,EUt+1 −RfEUt+1) = α+β1(RFTSE,Worldt+1 −RfWorldt+1 )+β2(RMSCI,EUt −RfEUt )+β3(RS&P500t+1 −RfUSt+1)+,
(14)
where Rt+1 stands for the log-return on a day t+ 1 and Rf is a risk-free rate. In other words,
we regress excess index returns on a constant, excess world equity index returns, lagged excess
index returns and excess S&P 500 index returns which control for equity market integration,
lagged spillovers and contemporaneous effects respectively.
Our aim is to compare the findings of a non-parametric approach when applied to the
residuals of this regression analysis with the results that are obtained before the controls for
different effects are introduced. Tables 10-11 show that the results are quite similar for the
robustified and the unrobustified index returns. That is, for the SMI, 7 out of 10 events have
an event-day impact using both robustified and unrobustified methods. For the MSCI Europe
index, the event-day results are similar for 8 out of 10 events. In terms of the post-event window
effects, 5 out of 6 events demonstrate similar results for both indices. Therefore we conclude
that for the data under consideration, our non-parametric methodology is robust with respect
to interest rates, equity market integration, spillover and contemporaneous effects.
5. Conclusions
This study shows the results regarding the global, regional, national and industrial effects of
terrorist events on stock markets as well as the impact of attacks on commodities and bonds.
Furthermore, it compares the impact of terrorist events on financial markets with the effect of
16Note that due to data restrictions we are able to perform the robustness checks from the beginning of 2000
until the end of 2005.
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natural catastrophes and financial crashes. To do so, we present three different methodologies
namely, event-study, non-parametric and filtered GARCH-EVT approaches. The results of our
analysis show that a non-parametric approach is the most appropriate method among the three
for analyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. It allows us to study both event-
day and post-event window effects, it does not impose strong parametric restrictions, and it is
not computationally intensive. We demonstrate the robustness of this method when interest
rates, equity market integration, spillover and contemporaneous effects are controlled. Finally,
we show how the results of this approach can be used for investors’ portfolio diversification
strategies against terrorism risk.
Approximately two-thirds of the terrorist attacks considered lead to significant negative
impact on at least one stock market under consideration. The Swiss stock market is affected by
the highest number of attacks, the American stock market by the lowest. The airline industry
and insurance sector exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism, while the banking industry
is the least sensitive. This is in contrast to financial crashes which demonstrate a strong negative
impact on the banking sector. The analysis of the impact on the aero/defense, pharma/biotech
and oil/gas sectors shows both a positive and a negative reaction. These indices behave similarly
in case of the natural disasters and financial crashes.
The results of our study suggest several diversification strategies against terrorism risk. If
concerned about this risk, investors should hold assets that can react positively to terrorist
attacks or, alternatively, assets that have little or no negative sensitivity to this risk. In the first
case, the US Government bond index is the safest choice followed by such industry stocks as
aero/defense and pharma/biotech. However, given that these indices can also exhibit a negative
response, investing in these industries as a diversification strategy against terrorist attacks may
not always work. In the second case, a banking stock index can be a good investment. Note
that, though this stock index is less sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative
return movements associated with financial crashes.
Regarding the other financial markets, investing in commodities is preferable to investing in
gold as the gold market reacts more often negatively than positively. In addition, compared to
the commodity market in general, the negative impact on the gold market is more long-lasting.
At the same time, the commodity market also shows a short-term negative reaction to some
terrorist events. This implies that investing in the gold and commodity markets may not always
provide a good hedge.
A possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid investing in
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the insurance, travel and airline stock markets or to short these indices. Note that the insurance
and airline industries shows high negative sensitivity not only to terrorist attacks but also to
financial crashes and natural disasters. This implies that by taking long positions in these
stocks, investors may end up increasing the risk of losses in these cases where extreme events
occur.
There are both similarities and differences between the impact of terrorist events on financial
markets and the effect of other extreme events. For example, the insurance and airline industries
show high sensitivity to all three categories of extreme events. The banking industry shows little
negative impact of natural hazards, which is similar to the impact of terrorist attacks and in
contrast to the effect of financial crashes. Terrorist attacks and natural disasters cause both
positive and negative significant return movements in the commodity and bond markets. In
contrast, financial crashes have a positive effect on these markets. Terrorist attacks and financial
crashes cause an event-day return movement that has an extreme nature in general, with the
strength of the impact declining in the post-event period. As for natural catastrophes, the
negative impact is more often observed in the post-event period, implying that markets need
more time to evaluate the long-term effect of these extreme events.
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Appendix A: Non-Parametric Approach
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Figure 1. FTSE All World Index: 9/11 Attacks.
The figure shows a non-parametric conditional cumulative distribution function of returns
on FTSE All World that we obtain based on 200 observations when conditioning is done on
the return on 10th of September 2001, a day before the 9/11 attacks. The dotted line
corresponds to an empirical unconditional cdf, dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 1. FTSE All World index: 9/11 attacks. A non-parametric conditional cumulative
distribution function of returns on FTSE All World that we obtain based on 200 observations
when conditioning is done on the return on 10th of September 2001, a day before the 9/11
attacks. The dotted line corresponds to an empirical unconditional cdf, dashed lines correspond
to 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1. Impact of terrorist attacks, financial crashes and natural disasters on financial markets
Terrorist Attacks Financial Crashes Natural Disasters
Impact Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive
FTSE All World ∨ ∨ ∨
MSCI Europe ∨ ∨ ∨
S&P 500 ∨ ∨ ∨
SMI ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Global Banks ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Global Financials ∨ ∨ ∨
MSCI Europe Insurance ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Life Insurance ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Non-Life Insurance ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Travel ∨ ∨ ∨
MSCI Europe Airlines ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Aero/Defense ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Oil/Gas ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
GSCI Commodity ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
GSCI Gold ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
J.P.Morgan GGBI ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE US Government Bond Index ∨ ∨ ∨
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Table 8. Portfolio performance analysis of the Swiss investors. The table reports the portfolio
performance measured via Sharpe Ratio of the SMI Index and two different hedged SMI port-
folios. The portfolios were constructed 1 week before the September 11 terrorist attacks and
performance is evaluated on the given dates.
11.09.2001 18.09.2001 25.09.2001 4.10.2001
First Investor -0.7161 -0.3448 -0.2360 -0.0942
Second Investor -0.5264 0.0396 0.0002 0.1830
Third Investor -0.0125 0.5982 0.3493 0.3753
Table 9. Portfolio performance analysis of the European investors. The table reports the
portfolio performance measured via Sharpe Ratio of the MSCI Europe Index and two different
hedged MSCI Europe Index portfolios. The portfolios were constructed 1 week before the
September 11 terrorist attacks and performance is evaluated on the given dates.
11.09.2001 18.09.2001 25.09.2001 4.10.2001
First Investor -0.8497 -0.4266 -0.3308 -0.1234
Second Investor -0.5506 0.0395 -0.0097 0.1852
Third Investor -0.3199 0.4796 0.2749 0.3573
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Part III
Variance Swaps, Risk Premiums, and
Expectation Hypothesis
Yacine Aı¨t-Sahalia, Mustafa Karaman, and Loriano Mancini
Abstract
We study the term structure of actual variance swap (VS) rates, which are popular volatility
derivative contracts. When time to maturity increases, level and persistence of VS rates increase,
while volatility and higher order moments decrease. A model-free approach detects a significant
jump risk component in VS rates. The term structure of variance risk premium is negative and
generally downward sloping, while the component due to negative jumps exhibit similar features
in quite times but is upward sloping in turbulent times. Theoretically, Expectation Hypothesis
does not hold but bias and inefficiency are modest for short time to maturities. Simple trading
strategies with VS’s yield significant returns.
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1. Introduction
During the last decade the interest of investors in volatility derivative products has grown
enormously. Perhaps the most manifest example of this phenomenon is the attention devoted
to the VIX volatility index of CBOE, sometimes called “market’s fear gauge”, see Whaley
(2000). In March 2004 the CBOE introduced futures and in February 2006 European options
on VIX. Nowadays these contracts are among the most actively traded contracts at CFE and
CBOE. Such demand is certainly driven by the large impact of stochastic variance on asset
returns, and thus portfolio and risk management.
Among all volatility derivative products, the variance swap (VS) contract is the most direct
way to achieve exposure to or hedge against variance risk. The long position in VS receives
the realized variance over a certain time horizon and pays a fixed rate, called VS rate. Thus
the payoff is positive when variance increases over the given time horizon. In contrast to
options, variance swap contracts do not carry additional risk exposures, such as delta exposure.
According to some financial press, e.g., Gangahar (2006), VS has become the preferred tool
by hedge funds and proprietary traders to bet on volatility directions. VS’s are traded over
the counter on various underlying assets (such as equity indices, exchange/interest rates, or
commodities), and at many different maturities (sometimes as long as 10 years). Some estimates
reported in 2006 showed that the daily trading volume in equity index VS reached USD 4–5
million vega notional; Jung (2006). This notional corresponds to payments of more than USD
1 billion per volatility percentage unit on an annual base.
Our goal is to study the risk premiums and information content embedded in term structure
of VS contracts on the S&P 500 index. Such variance swaps are among the most important
contracts in the arena. We use actual (not synthetic) daily VS rates on the S&P 500 index with
fixed time to maturity of 2-, 3-, 6-, 12- and 24-month from January 4, 1996 to September 2,
2010, and quoted by a major broker dealer in New York City.
Data-based analysis of VS rates reveals the following phenomena. When time to maturity
increases (i) level and persistence of VS rates increase while volatility, skewness and kurtosis
decrease. (ii) Large jump risk component is embedded in VS and not only during market
crashes. We use a model-free method to measure jump component in VS rates, relying on
recent theoretical results in the so-called model-free implied volatility literature. Specifically,
we compare variance swap rates and VIX-type indices calculated using SPX options for various
maturities. (iii) Principal Component Analysis shows that two factors, which can be interpreted
49
as level and slope factors, explain 99.8% of variation in VS rates.
Various aspects of the term structure of VS rates cannot be studied in a model-free way
because necessary data are either insufficient or simply unavailable. For example model-free
analysis of the term structure of priced jump risk in VS would require long lived, out-of-the-
money, SPX options with a fixed time to maturity. These options are generally unavailable.
Available options present periodic, saw-toothed patterns time to maturities. Usual interpo-
lation schemes of discrete time to maturities are likely to introduce errors. Hence to deepen
the analysis of VS term structure, we introduce a parametric model for VS rates. Empirical
features (i) and (iii) above suggest that two-factor stochastic volatility model is necessary. Em-
pirical feature (ii) suggests to include a jump component, with stochastic intensity, in the stock
price dynamic. The corresponding parametric model is a two-factor stochastic volatility with
stochastic jump intensity model, which is adopted in our subsequent analysis. Although many
estimation methods are available, accurate estimation is challenging. However, a key feature of
stochastic volatility models with affine drift is that model-based VS rates are affine in latent
state variables. This feature suggests to filter out latent states directly from VS rates. Then
we use a likelihood-based method to estimate the model. The state vector follows a multi-
variate jump-diffusion stochastic volatility process and thus its transition density is unknown.
Since jumps in stock prices are important but rare events, using Bayes rule we approximate the
transition density of the state vector with a mixture of no-jump and 1-jump densities. Such
densities are unknown as well but can be accurately approximated using the closed-form like-
lihood expansion method. The latter was introduced and developed in the univariate setting
by Aı¨t-Sahalia (2002a), Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999), and extended to the multivariate setting by Aı¨t-
Sahalia (2008), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2010). Monte Carlo
simulation shows that likelihood-based estimation is accurate at daily frequency.
Real data estimation based on time series S&P 500 index return data and cross sectional
variance swap data reveals that the two-factor stochastic volatility with stochastic jump intensity
model fits the data well. In particular, in- and out-of-sample pricing errors of VS are small.
The model allows to uncover the following features of VS rates. Term structures of (i) variance
risk premium (VRP) is negative and usually downward sloping; (ii) variance risk premium due
to negative jumps is negative, generally downward sloping in quite times but upward sloping
during market crashes; (iii) variance risk premium due to positive jumps tends to mirror the
one of negative jumps. (iv) Theoretical analysis shows that Expectation Hypothesis does not
hold because of the various risk premiums. However actual biases and inefficiencies are modest
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for short/medium time to maturities, say below one year, suggesting that VS rates are good
predictors of future realized variance. Finding (i) implies that the longer the time to maturity
the higher the variance risk premium. Ex-ante, always negative, VRP appears to be different
from ex-post, sometimes positive, VRP based on realized variances. This finding complements
model-free, single maturity results in Carr and Wu (2009) as we study model-based, term
structure of variance risk premium. Findings (ii) and (iii) suggest that the contribution of
jump component to variance risk premium is modest in quite times, but it becomes substantial
during market crashes, and mostly impacts the short-end of the term structure of VS rates.
These findings complement model-free, single maturity results in Bollerslev and Todorov (2011)
as we study model-based, term structure of variance risk premium due to jump component.
Finally, we use the estimation results for a simple but model-consistent investment strategy
on VS’s. Everyday, we short a VS if the expected profit from this strategy is larger than a
threshold level. On those days we also invest $1 to S&P 500 index and liquidate the position
when VS matures for comparison. The results show that, VS investments using the estimation
results outperform long S&P 500 investments for most of the time.
2. Variance Swaps
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P ) be a filtered probability space satisfying usual conditions (e.g., Protter
(2005)), with P denoting the objective probability measure. Let S be a semimartingale modeling
the stock price or index process with dynamic
dSt/St− = µt dt+
√
vt dW˜
P
t + (exp(J
P
t )− 1) dNPt − νPt dt (1)
where µt is the drift, vt the spot variance, dW˜
P
t the Brownian increment, dN
P
t the jump process
with stochastic intensity λt and jump size one, J
P
t the random jump size, and ν
P
t = g
Pλt the
compensator with gP = E[exp(JPt ) − 1]. When a jump occurs the induced price change is
(St − St−)/St− = exp(JPt ) − 1 which implies that log(St/St−) = JPt , hence JPt is the jump
size of the log-price. At this stage, the dynamics of drift, variance, and jump component are
left unspecified because the first part of the analysis of VS contracts will be model-free. Thus
Model (1) virtually subsumes all models commonly used in Finance. Later on we will put a
parametric structure on the model to deepen the analysis of VS contracts.
Let t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = t+τ denote the trading days for a given time period [t, t+τ ], for
e.g., six months. The annualized realized variance is the annualized sum of squared log-returns
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over the time horizon [t, t+ τ ]
RVt,t+τ =
252
n
n∑
i=1
(
log
Sti
Sti−1
)2
. (2)
A long position in a variance swap contract payoffs at time t + τ the difference between the
realized variance, RVt,t+τ , and the variance swap rate, VSt,t+τ , fixed at time t, times a notional
amount used to convert the payoff in dollar terms:
(RVt,t+τ −VSt,t+τ )× (notional amount).
The analysis of variance swap contracts is simplified when the realized variance is replaced by
the quadratic variation of the log-price process. It is known that when supi=1,...,n (ti − ti−1)→ 0
the realized variance in Equation (2) converges in probability to the quadratic variation of the
log-price, QVt,t+τ , (e.g., Jacod and Protter (1998)):
252
n
n∑
i=1
(
log
Sti
Sti−1
)2
−→ 1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds+
1
τ
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
J2u = QVt,t+τ .
This approximation is commonly adopted in practice (e.g., Egloff, Leippold, and Wu (2010))
and justified for daily sampling frequency (e.g., Broadie and Jain (2008) and Jarrow, Kchia,
Larsson, and Protter (2011)) as is the case in our dataset. If the spot variance has a jump
component the convergence above still holds and such jumps in variance are accommodated in
the time integral of vs.
As usual we assume absence of arbitrage which implies the existence of an equivalent risk-
neutral measure Q. By convention the variance swap contract has zero value at inception.
Assuming that the interest rate does not depend on the quadratic variation, which is certainly
a tenuous assumption, no arbitrage implies
VSt,t+τ = E
Q
t [QVt,t+τ ] (3)
where EQt denotes time-t conditional expectation under Q. The variance swap rate depends on
information or market conditions at time t, as well as on time to maturity τ , which produces
the term structure we are interested in.
2.1. Dataset
Our dataset consists of over the counter quotes on variance swap rates on the S&P 500 index
provided by a major broker-dealer in New York City. The data are daily closing quotes on
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variance swap rates with fixed time to maturities at 2, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months from January 4,
1996 to September 2, 2010, that are 3,624 observations for each maturity.1 Figure 1 shows the
term structure of VS rates over time and suggests that VS rates are mean-reverting, volatile,
with spikes and clustering during the major financial crisis over the last 15 years, and historically
highest values during the recent Subprime crisis. While most term structures are upward sloping
(53% of our sample), they are often ∪-shape too (23% of our sample). The remaining term
structures are roughly split in downward sloping and ∩-shape term structures.2
The bottom and pick, respectively, of the ∪- and ∩-shape term structures can be anywhere
at 3 or 6 or 12 months to maturity VS rate. The slope of the term structure (measured as
the difference between 24 and 2 months VS rates) shows a strong negative association with
the contemporaneous level volatility. Thus during high volatility periods or financial crisis, the
short-end of the term structure (VS rates with 2 or 3 months to maturity) rises more than the
long-end producing downward sloping term structures.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our data. For the sake of interpretability we follow
market practice and report variance swap rates in volatility percentage units, i.e.
√
VSt,t+τ×100.
Various features clearly emerge. The mean level and first order autocorrelation of swap rates are
slightly but monotonically increasing with time to maturity. The standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis of swap rates are strictly decreasing with time to maturity. Ljung–Box tests
strongly reject the hypothesis of zero autocorrelations, while generally Dickey–Fuller tests do not
detect unit roots,3 except for longest maturities—although it is well-known that the outcome of
standard unit root tests should be carefully interpreted with slowly decaying memory processes;
see, for instance, Schwert (1987). First order autocorrelations of swap rates range between 0.982
and 0.995, confirming mean reversion in these series. As these coefficients increase with time to
maturity, the longer the maturity the higher the persistence of VS rates with mean half-life4 of
shocks between 38 and 138 days.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) shows that the first principal component explains
about 95.4% of the total variance of VS rates and can be interpreted as a level factor, while
the second principal component explains an additional 4.4% and can be interpreted as a slope
1Various statistical analysis do not detect any week effect so we use all available daily data.
2On some occasions, the term structure is ∼-shape but the differences between the 2 and 3 months VS rates
are virtually zero and those term structures are best seen as ∪-shape.
3Under the null hypothesis of unit root the Dickey–Fuller test statistic has zero expectation.
4The half-life H is defined as the time necessary to halve a unit shock and solves %H = 0.5 where % is the first
order autocorrelation coefficient.
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factor. This finding is somehow expected because PCA of several other term structures, such as
interest rate yields, produce qualitatively similar results. Less expected is that these two factors
explain nearly all the variation in VS rates, precisely 99.8% of variance of VS rates. Repeating
the PCA for various subsamples reveals little variation in the first two factors and explained
total variance. Overall, PCA suggests that at most two factors are driving VS rates.
Table 1 also shows summary statistics of ex-post realized variance of S&P 500 index returns
for various time to maturities. All statistics of realized variance share qualitatively the same
features as those of VS rates. The main differences are that realized variances are substantially
lower and more volatile, positively skewed and leptokurtic than VS rates. These differences
highlight the large negative variance risk premiums as well as the profitability and riskiness of
shorting VS contracts. Since realized variances over various horizons are lower than VS rates on
average, the negative risk premium documented by Carr and Wu (2009) for 30-day (synthetic)
variance swap rates also extends to long maturity VS rates. Although shorting VS contracts
produces on average positive payoffs at maturity, the large variability and in particular the
positive skewness of ex-post realized variances can induce large losses to the short side of the
contract.
2.2. Model-free Jump Component in Variance Swap Rates
We use a model-free method to quantify the priced jump component in VS rates. We take
advantage of recent theoretical advances collectively described as model-free implied volatility
literature; see e.g., Carr and Madan (1998), Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), Jiang and
Tian (2005), and Carr and Wu (2009). The main result in this literature is that if the stock
price process is continuous, then the variance swap payoff at a given maturity can be exactly
replicated by dynamically trading in futures and a static position in a continuum of European
options with different strikes and same maturity. The replication is model-free in the sense
that the stock price can follow the general model (1) but with the restriction λt = 0. If indeed
the stock price has a jump component, then this replication no longer holds. Thus comparing
variance swap rates and the cost of replicating portfolio allows to gauge whether or not VS
rates embed a priced jump component. In practice, of course, only a typically small number of
options is available. Interpolation and extrapolation of strike prices are necessary to compute
the cost of the replicating portfolio. Moreover, options are available only for a few maturities
and it is unlikely that options expiring exactly on the required maturity are available. Hence
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an interpolation across maturities is required as well. Such interpolations and extrapolations
introduce an approximation error in the cost of replicating portfolio; see Jiang and Tian (2005)
for a detailed discussion of these issues.
It is known that the quadratic variation can be represented as follows
QVt,t+τ =
2
τ
[
Ft+τ
Ft
− 1− log Ft+τ
Ft
]
+
2
τ
∫ t+τ
t
[
1
Fu−
− 1
Ft
]
dFu+
2
τ
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
[
J2u
2
+ Ju + 1− exp(Ju)
]
where Ft is the time-t futures price of the underlying asset for maturity t + τ .
5 Using the
representation of the so-called “log-contract” in terms of European call and put payoffs gives[
Ft+τ
Ft
− 1− log Ft+τ
Ft
]
=
∫ Ft
0
(K − Ft+τ )+
K2
dK +
∫ ∞
Ft
(Ft+τ −K)+
K2
dK.
Plugging this expression into QVt,t+τ and taking time-t conditional Q expectation of QVt,t+τ
VSt,t+τ = E
Q
t [QVt,t+τ ]
=
2 exp(rτ)
τ
∫ ∞
0
Θt(K, t+ τ)
K2
dK +
2
τ
EQt
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
[
J2u
2
+ Ju + 1− exp(Ju)
]
= VIXt,t+τ +
2
τ
EQt
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
[
J2u
2
+ Ju + 1− exp(Ju)
]
(4)
where Θt(K, t + τ) is time-t price of an out-of-the-money option with strike K and maturity
t + τ , with obvious notation for VIXt,t+τ . The calculation of the (squared) VIX index is
based essentially on the formula VIXt,t+τ above and uses European options on the S&P 500
index (SPX), calendar day counting convention, linear interpolation of options whose maturities
straddle 30 days; see e.g., Carr and Wu (2006) for a detailed description of the VIX calculation.
The key point for our analysis is that the difference VSt,t+τ −VIXt,t+τ is a model-free measure
of the jump component in VS rates. If the jump component is zero, i.e. Ju = 0 and/or the
intensity of Nt is zero, then VSt,t+τ −VIXt,t+τ is zero as well. If the jump component is not zero
and priced, VSt,t+τ −VIXt,t+τ tends to positive. The reason is that the function in the square
brackets in (4) is downward sloping and passing through the origin. If the jump distribution
under Q is shifted to the left, suggesting jump risk being priced, the last expectation in (4)
tends to be positive.
At least two other reasons are conceivable for a non-zero difference of VSt,t+τ−VIXt,t+τ . The
first reasons is that since European options on S&P 500 index (SPX) are likely to be more liquid
5Spot and futures prices have the same quadratic variation as the drift becomes negligible when the sampling
frequency goes to zero.
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than VS contracts, a larger liquidity risk premium could be embedded in VS rates. Long position
in VS contracts should induce higher returns when compared to a perfectly liquid VS market.
However, this implies that liquidity issues would induce lower VS rates. Thus, if anything,
liquidity issues should bias downward zero an otherwise larger positive difference VSt,t+τ −
VIXt,t+τ . A second explanation could be that SPX and VS are segmented or disconnected
markets. Then comparing asset prices from the two markets would not provide any valuable
information. This is certainly not the case because VS contracts are typically hedged with SPX
options.6
Following the revised VIX methodology (http://www.cboe.com/VIX/) we calculate daily
VIX-type indices, VIXt,t+τ , for τ = 2, 3, and 6 months to maturity from January 4, 1996 to
September 2, 2010 and compute the difference VSt,t+τ −VIXt,t+τ . SPX options are downloaded
from OptionMetrics. Although it is straightforward to calculate VIX-type indices for longer
maturities, interpolation of existing maturities straddling 12 and 24 months is likely to introduce
larger approximation errors. Table 1 shows summary statistics of calculated VIX-type indices.
These indices show qualitatively the same term structure features as VS rates. However, on
average VS rates are systematically higher, more volatile, skewed, and leptokurtic than VIX-
type indices for each maturity. The difference VSt,t+τ−VIXt,t+τ increases with time to maturity.
Figure 2 shows time series plots of VSt,t+τ − VIXt,t+τ for the various time to maturities. Such
differences are mostly but not always positive, larger during market turmoils (when jumps in
stock price are more likely and investors may care more about jump risk) and can be sizeable
also in quite times. Hence a positive difference is not only a crisis phenomenon. These findings
are consistent with the presence of a jump component embedded in VS rates.
2.3. Stochastic Volatility Model
Now we parameterize model (1). Under P the stock price has the following dynamic
dSt/St− = µtdt+
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWP1t + ρ
√
vt dW
P
2t + (exp(J
P
t )− 1) dNt − νPt dt
dvt = k
P
v (mt k
Q
v /k
P
v − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW
P
2t (5)
dmt = k
P
m(θ
P
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW
P
3t
6The difficulties of carrying out this hedging even featured in The Wall Street Journal in October 2008 when
volatility was at historically high values; see Schultes (2008).
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where µt = r − δ + γ1(1 − ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt + (gP − gQ)λt, all Brownian increments, dWPit , i =
1, 2, 3, are uncorrelated,7 and ρ is the instantaneous correlation between stock returns and spot
variance changes. The random jump size JPt is independent of the filtration generated by the
Brownian motions and jump process, and normally distributed with mean µPj and variance σ
2
j ,
hence gP = exp(µPj + σ
2
j /2) − 1 is the Laplace transform of the random jump size. Similarly
gQ = exp(µQj + σ
2
j /2)− 1. The jump intensity is λt = λ0 + λ1vt, where λ0 and λ1 are positive
constants. This specification allows for more price jumps to occur during more volatile periods
with the intensity bounded away from 0 by λ0. Bates (2000), Pan (2002), Eraker (2004), Broadie,
Chernov, and Johannes (2007), among many others, assume normally distributed jump prices
and provide empirical evidence that jumps in stock returns are more likely to occur when
volatility is high, supporting model specification (5). Using alternative approaches Aı¨t-Sahalia
(2002b) and Carr and Wu (2003), among others, provide additional evidence for jumps in stock
returns. The spot variance, vt, follows a two-factor model where mt k
Q
v /k
P
v is its stochastic
long-run mean or central tendency. The speed of mean reversion is kPv under P , k
Q
v under Q
and kPv = k
Q
v − γ2σv where γ2 is the market price of risk for WP2t ; Section 2.4 motivates the
last equality. The stochastic long run mean of vt is controlled by mt which follows its own
stochastic mean reverting process and mean reverts to a positive constant θPm when the speed
of mean reversion kPm is positive. Typically, vt is fast mean reverting and volatile to capture
sudden movements in volatility, while mt is more persistent and less volatile to capture long
run movements in volatility. The square-root specification of the diffusion components σv
√
vt
and σm
√
mt is adopted to keep model (5) close to commonly used models; see e.g., Chernov
and Ghysels (2000), Pan (2002), Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2007), and Todorov (2010).8
Under Q the ex-dividend price process evolves as
dSt/St− = (r − δ) dt+
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWQ1t + ρ
√
vt dW
Q
2t + (exp(J
Q
t )− 1) dNQt − νQt dt
dvt = k
Q
v (mt − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW
Q
2t (6)
dmt = k
Q
m(θ
Q
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW
Q
3t
where r is the risk-free rate, δ the dividend yield (both taken to be constant for simplicity only),
7Note that
√
(1− ρ2) dWP1t + ρ dWP2t = dW˜Pt in model (1).
8The analyses undertaken below, except the one for the integrated equity risk premium, are based on analytical
expressions which do not require such square-root specification For instance
√
vt could be replaced by v
γv
t with
γv being one more parameter to be estimated. The level of variance swap rates is not affected by such alternative
specification, but of course the dynamic is.
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and Brownian motions WQi , i = 1, 2, 3, jump size J
Q, jump process NQ, and its compensator νQ
are governed by the measure Q. When no confusion arises superscripts P and Q are omitted.
Given the parametric model above, the VS rate can easily be calculated. In (3), interchang-
ing expectation and integration (justified by Tonelli’s theorem), and exploiting independence
between JQ and NQ
VSt,t+τ =
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
EQt [vs]ds+
1
τ
EQ[J2]EQt [Nt+τ −Nt]
= EQ[J2]λ0 + (1 + λ1E
Q[J2])[(1− φQv (τ)− φQm(τ))θQm + φQv (τ)vt + φQm(τ)mt] (7)
where EQ[J2] = EQt [J
2] as the random jump size is time-homogeneous, and
φQv (τ) = (1− exp(−kQv τ))/(kQv τ)
φQm(τ) =
(
1 + exp(−kQv τ)kQm/(kQv − kQm)− exp(−kQmτ)kQv /(kQv − kQm)
)
/(kQmτ).
Given the linearity of the variance swap payoff in the spot variance, only the drift of vt enters the
variance swap rate. The diffusion part of vt (or volatility of volatility) affects only the dynamic
of VSt,t+τ .
9 The Q-expectation of squared jump size, EQ[J2], provides a constant contribution
to the variance swap rate (independent of the time to maturity), while the stochastic intensity
provides a time-varying contribution to VSt,t+τ given by E
Q
t [Nt+τ − Nt]. Compared to a no-
jump model, e.g., λ0 = λ1 = 0, the jump component shifts the term structure of VS rates
upward.
Besides the empirical evidence on jumps in stock returns, the main motivation for introduc-
ing such a jump component is to account for a jump component in VS rates as documented
by our model-free analysis in Section 2.2. The two-factor model for the spot variance is key to
reproduce the variety of shapes of VS term structure described in Section 2.1. Indeed, according
to our model estimates, when τ → 0, φQv (τ)→ 1 and φQm(τ)→ 0 hence short maturities VS rates
are mainly determined by vt. When τ →∞, φQv (τ)→ 0 and φQm(τ)→ 0 hence long maturities
VS rates are mainly determined by θQv . As φ
Q
m(τ) is slower than φ
Q
v (τ) in approaching zero, mt
has also a relatively large impact on long maturity VS rates. In Equation (7) the last term in
square brackets is a weighted average of θQm, vt and mt. The relative level of the three compo-
nents controls the shape of the term structure. For example VSt,t+τ is monotonically increasing
in τ when vt < mt = θ
Q
m, or the term structure is hump-shape when vt < mt and mt > θ
Q
m.
9This can easily be seen by specifying some dynamic for the spot variance, such as the two-factor model
in Equation (6), calculating
∫ t+τ
t
EQt [vs]ds explicitly, i.e. the non-annualized VS rate, and then applying Itoˆ’s
formula to it.
58
Moreover, the two-factor model is consistent with the different persistence, volatility and higher
order moment features of VS rates observed empirically. According to our estimates, vt is for
example less persistence, more volatile and positively skewed than mt. Model-based short ma-
turities VS rates inherit such features when compared to long maturities rates. The empirical
Section 4 shows that Model (5)–(6) matches such features quite well. As shown in Section 2.1
two principal components virtually explain all the variation in VS rates. Thus PCA supports
the two-factor model as well. All in all, Model (5)–(6) appears to be the most parsimonious
parametric model consistent with the model-free analysis of actual VS rates.
Imposing the restriction mt = θ
Q
v for all t and λ0 = λ1 = 0 implies that the variance dynamic
in Equation (6) follows the Heston model. The VS rate becomes VSt,t+τ = (1 − φQv (τ))θQv +
φQv (τ)vt, i.e. a weighted average of vt and θ
Q
v . Hence the term structure of VS rates can only be
upward or downward sloping at each point in time, depending on whether vt < θ
Q
v or vt > θ
Q
v ,
respectively. Moreover the persistence of VS rates is the same for all maturities as only one
factor, vt, is driving all VS rates. These features of model-based VS rates are contrast with
the empirical features of actual VS rates. Egloff, Leippold, and Wu (2010) study VS rates and
optimal allocations in these contracts under the one- and two-factor stochastic volatility model
when the jump component is absent, e.g., λ0 = λ1 = 0.
Using stock and option prices, previous studies have documented that two factors are nec-
essary to describe stochastic volatility dynamics; see e.g., Andersen, Benzoni, and Lund (2002),
Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) and Chernov, Gallant, Ghysels, and Tauchen (2003), and
Todorov (2010). As in Model (5)–(6) the two factors operate at two different time scales, i.e.
one factor is fast mean reverting and volatile while the other factor is more persistent and less
volatile. Specifically, in particular for option pricing purposes, the preferred specification for
the spot variance dynamic is of the following form
dvt = k
Q
v (θ
Q
v − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW
Q
2t + J
v
t dN
v
t (8)
where Jvt is a time-homogenous positive random jump size, typically exponentially distributed,
and Nvt is a counting process of volatility jumps, often with constant intensity λ
v, independent
of Jvt ; see e.g., Eraker, Johannes, and Polson (2003), Eraker (2004) and Broadie, Chernov, and
Johannes (2007). The jump component is the fast moving factor and its main contribution is to
generate enough skewness in short maturity implied volatility smiles. Unfortunately, this kind
of models cannot generate the variety of shapes of VS term structures observed empirically. The
fundamental reason is that the volatility jump is not an autonomous state variable. Introducing
59
a state dependent jump component, for e.g., when the jump intensity is an affine function of
the spot variance, it does not alter the conclusion. Indeed, the VS rate based on Equation (8)
is exactly the same as in the Heston model when replacing θQv by (θ
Q
v + E
Q[Jv]λv/kQv ), and
assuming no jump component in stock returns.10 Thus Model (8) shares the same drawbacks
as one-factor models.
2.4. Market Price of Risks
As in Pan (2002), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007), and others, we specify the market price of
risks for the Brownian motions as
Λt = [γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt, γ2√vt, γ3√mt]′
where ′ denotes transpose. Thus, P and Q parameters controlling vt and mt are related as
kPv = k
Q
v − γ2σv, kPm = kQm − γ3σm, θPm = θQm kQm/kPm.
The jump size risk premium is (gP − gQ) = exp(µPj + σ2j /2) − exp(µQj + σ2j /2). Note that the
variance of the jump size is the same under P to Q. Although this constraint could be relaxed
without introducing arbitrage opportunities, it is implied for e.g., by the general equilibrium
model in Naik and Lee (1990).11 As e.g., in Pan (2002), Eraker (2004), Broadie, Chernov, and
Johannes (2007), we assume that the jump intensity is the same under both measures. This
assumption implies that all the jump risk premium is absorbed by the jump size risk premium,
(gP − gQ). The total jump risk premium is time-varying and given by (gP − gQ)(λ0 + λ1vt).
The main motivation for this assumption is the well-known limited ability of estimating jump
components in stock returns and the corresponding risk premium using daily data. It is so
because these jumps are rare events. According to our estimates they occur roughly four times
a year and previous studies (e.g., Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2007)) reported somehow
smaller frequencies. Even using 15 years of daily data, accurate estimation of risk premiums for
both jump-size and jump-timing appears to be challenging. Nevertheless later on we will relax
this assumption.
10When there is no jump component in stock returns, the VS rate is VSt,t+τ = τ
−1 ∫ t+τ
t
EQt [vs] ds where
EQt [vs] = e
−kQv (s−t)vt+
∫ s
t
e−k
Q
v (s−u)(kQv θ
Q
v +E
Q[Jv]λv) du. Adding a positive jump component as in Model (5)–
(6) would simply shift this VS rate upward.
11The equilibrium model is the Lucas economy with power utility over consumption or wealth. While the
assumptions behind the model are reasonable, Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2007) provide evidence that
relaxing the constraint VarP [J ] = VarQ[J ] improves options fitting.
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The jump component in the stock price makes the market incomplete with respect to the
risk-free bank account, the stock and any finite number of derivatives. Hence, the state price
density is not unique. One of such specifications is
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣Ft = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
Λ′s dW
P
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
Λ′sΛs ds
) Nt∏
u=1
exp
(µPj )2 − (µQj )2
2σ2j
+
µQj − µPj
σ2j
Ju
 . (9)
Appendix A shows that Equation (9) is a valid state price density. The first exponential function
is the usual Girsanov change of measure of the Brownian motions and the second term is the
change of measure for the jump component. It has a similar expression as the change of
measure for the Brownian motions because the jump size is normally distributed. As shown
in Equation (9), in the economy described by this model, jumps are priced because when a
jump occurs the state price density jumps as well. When µQj < µ
P
j and a negative jump occurs
(Ju < 0) the state price density jumps up giving “high” prices to (Arrow–Debreu) securities
with payoffs in bad states of the economy. In our empirical estimates we invariably find that
µQj < µ
P
j .
3. Estimation Method
Model (5)–(6) is estimated by merging the approaches in Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007, 2010).
The procedure combines time series information in stock returns and cross sectional information
in term structures of VS rates in the same spirit as e.g., Chernov and Ghysels (2000) and Pan
(2002). Hence P and Q parameters, including risk premiums, are estimated simultaneously ex-
ploiting internal consistency of the model and making inference procedure theoretically sounded
and more accurate.
Let X ′t = [log(St), Y ′t ] denote the state vector where Yt = [vt,mt]′. The spot variance and
its stochastic long run mean are not observed and will be extracted from observed VS rates.
Likelihood-based estimation requires evaluation of the likelihood function of stock returns and
term structures of variance swap rates for each parameter vector during a likelihood search.
The procedure for evaluating the likelihood function consists of four steps. First, we extract the
unobserved state vector Yt from a set of benchmark variance swap rates, assumed to be observed
without error. Second, we evaluate the joint likelihood of the stock returns and extracted time
series of latent states, using an approximation to the likelihood function. Third, we multiply
this joint likelihood by a Jacobian determinant to compute the likelihood of observed data,
namely stock returns and term structures of VS rates. Finally, for the remaining VS rates
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assumed to be observed with error, we calculate the likelihood of the observation errors induced
by the previously extracted state variables. The product of the two likelihoods gives the joint
likelihood of the term structures of all variance swap rates and stock returns. This procedure
is repeated for different values of the parameter vector until the maximum of the likelihood
function is found.
3.1. Extracting State Variables from Variance Swap Rates
Equation (6) implies that variance swap rates are affine in the unobserved state variables.
This feature suggests the following natural procedure to extract latent states and motivates
our likelihood-based approach. The unobserved part in the state vector, Yt, is ` dimensional,
where ` = 2 in Model (5)–(6). As the method can be applied for any ` ≥ 1, provided of
course that enough data are available, we describe the procedure for a generic `. Suppose that
` variance swap rates are observed without error. Thus, at each day t, the state vector Yt is
exactly identified by the ` variance swap rates. Denote by τ1, . . . , τ` their times to maturity.
The observed ` variance swap rates, VSt,t+τ1 , . . . ,VSt,t+τ` jointly follow a Markov process and
satisfy 
VSt,t+τ1
...
VSt,t+τ`
 =

a(τ1; Θ)
...
a(τ`; Θ)
+

b(τ1; Θ)
′
...
b(τ`; Θ)
′


Yt1
...
Yt`
 .
The previous equation in matrix form reads VSt,· = a(Θ) + b(Θ)Yt, where a(Θ) is the (` × 1)
vector and b(Θ) the (` × `) matrix. The current value of the unobserved state vector Yt can
easily be found by solving the equation for Yt, i.e. Yt = b(Θ)
−1[VSt,· − a(Θ)]. For example
rearranging Equation (7) gives VSt,t+τ = a(τ ; Θ) + b(τ ; Θ)
′[vt,mt]′, where
a(τ ; Θ) = EQ[J2]λ0 + (1 + λ1E
Q[J2])(1− φQv (τ)− φQm(τ))θQm
b(τ ; Θ)′ = (1 + λ1EQ[J2]) [φQv (τ), φ
Q
m(τ)].
The affine relation between VS rates and latent variables makes recovering the latter nearly
costless when compare to recovering them from, say, standard call and put options as for e.g.,
in Pan (2002) and Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007).
3.2. Likelihood of Stock Returns and Variance Swap Rates Observed Without Error
The extracted time series values of the unobserved state vector Yt at dates t0, t1, . . . , tn allows
to infer the dynamics of the state variables X ′t = [log(St), Y ′t ] under the objective probability P .
62
Since the relationship between the unobserved state vector Yt and variance swap rates is affine,
the transition density of variance swap rates can be derived from the transition density of
Yt by a change of variables and multiplication by a Jacobian determinant which depends, in
this setting, on model parameters but not on the state vector. Let pX(x∆|x0; Θ) denote the
transition density of the state vector Xt under the measure P , i.e. the conditional density of
Xt+∆ = x given Xt = x0. Let At = [log(St),VSt,t+τ1 , . . . ,VSt,t+τ` ]
′ be the vector of observed
asset prices and pA(a|a0; Θ) the corresponding transition density. Observed asset prices, At, are
given by an affine transformation of Xt
At =
 log(St)
VSt,·
 =
 log(St)
a(Θ) + b(Θ)Yt
 =
 0
a(Θ)
+
 1 0′
0 b(Θ)
Xt
and rewritten in matrix form reads At = a˜(Θ) + b˜(Θ)Xt, with the obvious notation. The
Jacobian term of the transformation from Xt to At is therefore
det
∣∣∣∣∂At∂X ′t
∣∣∣∣ = det ∣∣∣b˜(Θ)∣∣∣ = det |b(Θ)| .
In Model (5)–(6), det |b(Θ)| = (1 + λ1EQ[J2])2 (φQv (τ1)φQm(τ2) − φQv (τ2)φQm(τ1)). Since X =
b˜(Θ)−1[A− a˜(Θ)],
pA(A|A0; Θ) = det
∣∣∣b(Θ)−1∣∣∣ pX(b˜(Θ)−1[A− a˜(Θ)]|b˜(Θ)−1[A0 − a˜(Θ)]; Θ). (10)
As the vector of asset prices is Markovian, applying Bayes’ Rule, the log-likelihood function of
the asset price vector At sampled at dates t0, t1, . . . , tn has the simple form
ln(Θ) =
n∑
i=1
lA(Ati |Ati−1 ; Θ) (11)
where lA = ln pA. As usual in likelihood estimation, we discard the unconditional distribution
of the first observation since it is asymptotically irrelevant.
In our applications and Monte Carlo simulation below, models are estimated using daily
data, hence the sampling process is deterministic and ti − ti−1 = ∆ = 1/252; see Aı¨t-Sahalia
and Mykland (2003) for a treatment of maximum likelihood estimation in the case of randomly
spaced sampling times.
3.3. Likelihood of Stock Returns and All Variance Swap Rates
From the coefficients a(τ ; Θ) and b(τ ; Θ) and the values of the state vector Xt found in the first
step, we can calculate the implied values of the variance swap rates which are assumed to be
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observed with error and whose time to maturities are denoted by τ`+1, . . . , τ`+h
VSt,t+τ`+1
...
VSt,t+τ`+h
 =

a(τ`+1; Θ)
...
a(τ`+h; Θ)
+

b(τ`+1; Θ)
′
...
b(τ`+h; Θ)
′


Yt1
...
Yt`
 .
The observation errors, denoted by ε(t, τ`+i), i = 1, . . . , h, are the differences between such
model-based implied VS rates and actual VS rates from the data. By assumption, these errors
are Gaussian with zero mean and constant variance, independent of the state process and across
time, but possibly correlated across maturities. The joint likelihood of the observation errors can
be calculated from the h dimensional Gaussian density function. Since the observation errors are
independent of the state variable process, the joint likelihood of stock returns and all observed
variance swap rates is simply the product of the likelihood of stock returns and variance swap
rates observed without error, multiplied by the likelihood of the observation errors. Equivalently,
the two log-likelihoods can simply be added to obtain the joint log-likelihood of stock returns
and all variance swap rates.
3.4. Likelihood Approximation
Since the state vector X is a continuous-time multivariate jump diffusion process, its transition
density is usually unknown. Since jumps in stock returns are rare events, it is very unlikely
that more than one jump occurs on a single day ∆. This observation motivates the following
Bayes’ approximation of pX
pX(x∆|x0) = pX(x∆|x0, N∆ = 0) Pr(N∆ = 0) + pX(x∆|x0, N∆ = 1) Pr(N∆ = 1) + o(∆)
where Pr(N∆ = j) is the probability that j jumps occur at day ∆, omitting the dependence
on Θ for brevity. In Model (5)–(6), the largest contribution to the transition density of X
(hence to the likelihood) comes from the first term when conditioning on no jump occurring
during ∆, i.e. N∆ = 0. The probability of such event, Pr(N∆ = 0), is large and of the order
1− (λ0 +λ1v0) ∆. The contribution of the second term is only of the order (λ0 +λ1v0) ∆. As in
our setting ∆ is one day, the contribution of higher order terms appear to be quite modest. The
advantage of this approximation is that the leading term pX(x∆|x0, N∆ = 0) can be accurately
approximated by the likelihood expansion method. Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999, 2002b) introduces such
density approximation in closed-form in the univariate setting and Aı¨t-Sahalia (2008) extends
the method to multivariate diffusions. We refer the reader to these studies for the description of
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the method. Below we only summarize the main idea. The expansion for the transition density
of X conditioning on no jump has the form of a Taylor series in ∆ at order K
p(K)(x|x0; Θ) = ∆−(`+1)/2 exp
[
−C
(−1)(x|x0; Θ)
∆
]
K∑
k=0
C(k)(x|x0; Θ)∆
k
k!
. (12)
The series can be calculated up to arbitrary order K and the unknowns are the coefficients C(k)
corresponding to each ∆k, k = −1, 0, . . . ,K. In the present setting the continuous part of the
dynamic X is generally not reducible (Aı¨t-Sahalia, 2008). The approach is then to expand each
coefficient C(k) in a Taylor series in (x − x0) at order jk = 2(K − k). Denoting C(jk,k) such
expansions, the transition density expansion is
p˜(K)(x|x0; Θ) = ∆−(`+1)/2 exp
[
−C
(j−1,−1)(x|x0; Θ)
∆
]
K∑
k=0
C(jk,k)(x|x0; θ)∆
k
k!
. (13)
Coefficients C(jk,k) are computed by forcing the expansion (13) to satisfy, to order ∆K , the
forward and backward Kolmogorov equations. A key feature of the method is that the coeffi-
cients are obtained in closed-form by solving a system of linear equations. This holds true for
arbitrary specifications of the dynamics of the state vector X. Moreover, the coefficients need
to be computed only once and not at each iteration of the likelihood search. The density in
Equation (13) provides a virtually exact approximation of the transition density of X; see e.g.,
Jensen and Poulsen (2002). In our simulation and empirical applications we use expansions at
order K = 2 which provide already highly accurate approximation to the unknown density.12
3.5. Monte Carlo Simulation
We run a Monte Carlo simulation to check the accuracy of the previous estimation method.
Model (5)–(6) is simulated at an intraday frequency of 15 minutes. Using an Euler discretization
we simulate a long trajectory of S, v and m. Then, we pick one value every 30 values to obtain
a daily sample. VS rates are calculated for 3- and 12-month to maturity using the simulated
values. Each sample consists of N = 10,000 values of the underlying stock price and VS
rates. Each simulated path starts with variance and its stochastic long run mean at their
unconditional means and the stock price at 100. To reduce the impact of such initial values on
the simulated trajectory, an initial 500 values are generated and then discarded, taking the last
one as the starting point for the sample trajectory. Model (5)–(6) is then estimated using each
12Yu (2007) studies transition density expansions for jump-diffusion models but we do not purse this direction
further.
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simulated path. This procedure is repeated 900 times. Table 2 reports the simulation results and
shows that the estimation procedure is generally accurate. As expected, notoriously challenging
parameters, such as the risk premium γ1 or the affine jump intensity λ1, are estimated less
precisely.
4. Fitting Variance Swap Rates
Table 3 reports parameter estimates for Model (5)–(6). Overall, the model provides a good fit
to VS rates and S&P 500 returns. The spot variance is relatively fast mean reverting as kPv
implies a half-life13 of 36 days. Its stochastic long run mean is slowly mean reverting with a
half-life of almost 3 years. The volatility of vt is almost 3 times that of mt. The instantaneous
correlation between stock returns and variance changes, ρ, is −71%, confirming the so-called
leverage effect. The long-run average volatility,
√
θPm, is 21%. Both γ2 and γ3 are negative
implying negative variance risk premium. The correlation parameter for pricing error terms, ρe,
is slightly negative14 suggesting that the model does not produce any systematic pricing error.
By contrast, this correlation parameter in other nested models, such as the Heston model,
turn out to be positive which implies that variance swaps are systematically underpriced or
overpriced in nested models.
The expected jump size is positive under the objective probability measure, µPj , and slightly
negative under the risk neutral measure, µQj , suggesting a positive jump risk premium. Esti-
mates of jump intensity implies on average 6 jumps per year, a somewhat larger number than
what reported in previous studies.
Table 4 shows the pricing errors of Model (5)–(6) when fitting VS rates. For comparison,
pricing errors of the Heston model are reported as well. The pricing error is defined as the
model-based VS rate minus actual VS rate. Model (5)–(6) fits VS rates well both in- and
out-sample and significantly outperforms the Heston model. For example, its root mean square
error is 6 times smaller than that of the Heston model when fitting 24-month to maturity VS
rates. As pricing errors are small, Model (5)–(6) captures well all empirical features of VS rates
documented in Table 1.
13The half-life is defined as the time necessary to halve a unit shock and is given by − log(0.5)/kPv × 252 in
number of days.
14The determinant of the 3× 3 error term correlation matrix is 2ρ3e − 3ρ2e + 1, which is strictly positive when
ρe > −0.5.
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5. Risk Premiums
5.1. Instantaneous Risk Premiums
Model (5)–(6) features four instantaneous risk premiums: Diffusive Risk Premium (DRP), Jump
Risk Premium (JRP), Variance Risk Premium (VRP), and Long-run Mean Risk Premium
(LRMRP) which are defined as
DRPt = (γ1(1− ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt
JRPt = (g
P − gQ)(λ0 + λ1vt)
VRPt = γ2σvvt
LRMRPt = γ3σmmt
DRP is the remuneration for diffusive-type risk only (due to Brownian motions driving stock
prices), while JRP for the jump component in stock price. The Equity Risk Premium (ERP)
is the sum of the two, i.e. ERPt = DRPt + JRPt. Under P the instantaneous mean growth
rates of vt and mt are different than under Q, and the differences are given by VRPt and
LRMRPt, respectively. As γ2 and γ3 are estimated to be negative, vt and mt are higher under
Q than under P on average, and VRP and LRMRP are both negative. Table 5 shows estimated
risk premiums. During our in-sample period, January 1996 to April 2007, the average ERP is
6.8%, 5.5% of which is due to the JRP. Thus, the jump risk premium accounts for the largest
fraction of the equity risk premium. Jump prices are rare events, but arguably jump risk is
important as it cannot be hedged with any finite number of securities. The average VRP is also
substantial and around −3.4%, while the LRMRP is much lower and around −0.4%. During the
out-sample period, April 2007 to September 2010, all risk premiums almost doubled reflecting
the unprecedented turmoil in financial markets around Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
5.2. Integrated Risk Premiums
5.2.1 Integrated Equity Risk Premium
The annualized integrated Equity Risk Premium (IERP) is defined as
IERPt,t+τ = E
P
t [(St+τ − St)/St]/τ − EQt [(St+τ − St)/St]/τ
= EPt [e
∫ t+τ
t
µs ds]/τ − e(r−δ)τ/τ
and represents the expected excess return from buying and holding the S&P 500 index from
t to t + τ . The IERP can be decomposed in the continuous and jump part, i.e., IERPt,t+τ =
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IERPct,t+τ + IERP
j
t,t+τ , where
IERPct,t+τ = E
P
t [e
∫ t+τ
t
(r−δ+γ1(1−ρ2)vs+γ2ρvs) ds]/τ − e(r−δ)τ/τ
IERPjt,t+τ = E
P
t [e
∫ t+τ
t
(gP−gQ)(λ0+λ1vs) ds]/τ.
This decomposition allows to quantify how the various risks contribute to the IERP. The corre-
sponding P -expectations can be computed analytically using the transform analysis in Duffie,
Pan, and Singleton (2000).15 The analytical expressions are of the form exp(A(τ) + B(τ)vt +
C(τ)mt), where A(τ), B(τ) and C(τ) are positive coefficients. Thus, in quite times, when the
spot variance vt and its stochastic long run mean mt are low, IERPs are low as well. When
the market crashes and vt and mt increase significantly, IERPs are large, reflecting the stressed
asset prices and the large risk premium an investor might expect to earn by going long in the
S&P 500 precisely during those difficult times.
In contrast to instantaneous risk premiums, at each time t, the integrated equity risk pre-
mium depends on a time horizon τ . Such a term structure of the IERP provides information
about future asset price dynamics. For example, suppose that the term structure is downward
sloping and the 2-month IERP is significantly larger than IERP for longer horizons, as it was
the case when Lehman Brothers collapsed. This suggests that investing for a 2-month period
during those difficult times would have generated, on average, a larger annualized return than
investing for longer periods, as the market expected a fast rebound of prices, in relative terms.
Table 6 reports statistics for the integrated equity risk premium over 2-, 6-, 12- and 24-
month horizon.16 The term structure is on average upward sloping from January 1996 to April
2007, our in-sample period, and about 7%. From April 2007 to September 2010, the IERP is
significantly larger and about 9.5%, with an average term structure slightly U-shaped, reflecting
the stressed asset prices and high uncertainly around Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Figure 3
shows the evolution of the IERP over time, along with the S&P 500 index. At the end of 2008
15The expectation to be computed is of the form EPt [exp(K
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds)], where K is a given constant. To
calculate it explicitly, define ψt = E
P
t [exp(K
∫ T
0
vs ds)], which is a martingale by construction for all t ≥ 0. Guess
the following functional form ψt = exp(K
∫ t
0
vs ds) exp(A(τ)+B(τ)vt+C(τ)mt), which is exponentially affine in
the state variables and τ = T−t. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to ψt and setting its drift to zero, as ψt is a P -martingale,
give the following differential equations that A(τ), B(τ) and C(τ) must satisfy: −∂τA(τ) + C(τ)kPmθPm = 0,
K − ∂τB(τ) − B(τ)kPv + 0.5B(τ)2σ2v = 0, −∂τC(τ) + B(τ)kQv − C(τ)kPm + 0.5C(τ)2σ2m = 0, where ∂τ denotes
the derivative with respect to τ , with terminal conditions A(τ) = B(τ) = C(τ) = 0. As the system is time-
homogenous, for each time horizon τ those coefficients need to be computed only once. Thus, at each time t,
EPt [exp(K
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds)] = exp(A(τ) +B(τ)vt + C(τ)mt).
16As the IERP for the 2- and 3-month horizon are quite close, the latter is not reported in the table.
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and beginning of 2009, the term structure of the IERP is downward sloping with the 2-month
IERP significantly above 30%. These estimates match well the evolution of the S&P 500 index
during that period. From mid-September to mid-November 2008, the S&P 500 index dropped
from 1,200 to 750, loosing 37% of its value in two months.
Table 6 also shows that the jump component IERPjt,t+τ contributes significantly more than
the diffusive component IERPct,t+τ to the term structure of the IERP. For example, during our
in-sample period, the one-year IERP is 7.3%, but 6% is due to jump risk.
An advantage of studying the term structure of IERP in a parametric model is that such
risk premiums and their decompositions are exact. In other words, there is no need of using
interpolations or moving average schemes to reduce impact on risk premiums of systematically
time varying maturities, as, for e.g., in Bollerslev and Todorov (2011).
5.2.2 Integrated Variance Risk Premium
The annualized integrated variance risk premium (IVRP) is defined as IVRPt,t+τ = E
P
t [QVt,t+τ ]−
EQt [QVt,t+τ ] and represents the expected profit to the long side of a VS contract, which is en-
tered at time t and held till maturity t+τ . Table 6 reports summary statistics of the integrated
variance risk premiums and Figure 4 shows the dynamic over time. IVRPs are economically
large. For instance, average IVRP for 24-month maturity is −1.7%, during our out-sample pe-
riod, and can be as large as −5% in variance units. These are large risk premiums compared to
an average spot variance of 4% in variance units. In contrast to IVRP based on ex-post realized
variance, as e.g., in Carr and Wu (2009), ex-ante, model-based, IVRP is always negative.
The longer the time to maturity the higher in absolute value the annualized IVRP. Thus, the
term structure of IVRP is downward sloping suggesting that long maturity VS contracts carry
more remuneration for stochastic variance. Indeed, Filipovic´, Gourier, and Mancini (2011) study
optimal investment in VS and show that an optimal strategy is to go short in long maturity
VS and partially hedge the exposure by going long in short maturity VS and the underlying
stock.17
As the quadratic variation can naturally be decomposed in the continuous, QVct,t+τ , and
17Egloff, Leippold, and Wu (2010) also study optimal investment in VS, but they reach exactly the opposite
conclusion, which can be explained by the different model and market price of risks specifications used in the two
studies.
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discontinuous, QVjt,t+τ , part, i.e.,
QVt,t+τ =
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds+
1
τ
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
J2u = QV
c
t,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ
the IVRP can also be decomposed as
IVRPt,t+τ = E
P
t [QVt,t+τ ]− EQt [QVt,t+τ ]
= (EPt [QV
c
t,t+τ ]− EQt [QVct,t+τ ]) + (EPt [QVjt,t+τ ]− EQt [QVjt,t+τ ])
= IVRPct,t+τ + IVRP
j
t,t+τ .
Unreported results show that the continuous part IVRPct,t+τ contributes more than IVRP
j
t,t+τ
to IVRP, which is not surprising given that jumps are rare events. However, negative jumps may
have an important role in determining level and dynamic of IVRP. As most investors are “long
in the market” and the leverage effect is very pronounced, negative jump prices are perceived by
investors as unfavorable events and thus can carry significant risk premiums. The contribution
of negative jumps to the IVRP can be measured by
IVRP(k)jt,t+τ = E
P
t [QV
j
t,t+τ 1{J<k}]− EQt [QVjt,t+τ 1{J<k}]
where 1{J<k} is the indicator function of the event J < k. We set k = −1%, i.e., we study the
contribution of jumps below −1%.18 Similar values for the threshold k give very similar results.
Table 6 reports summary statistics about the contribution of jumps below 1% to the IVRP.
Although such jumps are quite rare events, their contribution to the IVRP is substantial, es-
pecially for the 2-month IVRP. Figure 4 shows the term structure of IVRP(k)jt,t+τ over time.
Similarly to the IVRP, the term structure of IVRP(k)jt,t+τ is generally downward sloping dur-
ing quite times. However, in contrast to IVRP, during market crases the term structure of
IVRP(k)jt,t+τ becomes suddenly upward sloping, reflecting the immediate impact of such nega-
tive returns on current variance.
Recently, Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) study the contribution of negative jump to the
IVRP using a model-free approach, but for a single, short time horizon. Our results are model-
based, but are informative about the dynamic of the term structure of the IVRP.
18From January 1996 to September 2010, daily S&P 500 returns are on average 3 times a month below −1%,
having a standard deviation of 1.4%.
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5.3. Impact of Continuous and Jump Risk on the Term Structure of VS Rates
The contribution of the continuous and jump parts of the quadratic variation to VS rates is
given by
EQt [QV
c
t,t+τ ]
EQt [QV
c
t,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ ]
,
EQt [QV
j
t,t+τ ]
EQt [QV
c
t,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ ]
respectively. Using Model (6), the ratios above can be calculated analytically for any maturity
τ , and this allows to study the impact on the term structure of VS rates of diffusive and jump
risk. Not surprisingly QVct,t+τ accounts for the largest fraction of VS rates, between 80% and
90%, and the longer the maturity the higher the contribution. The contribution of QVjt,t+τ
starts to increase in 2004 and reaches historically high values in 2006–7, almost 20%, during
historically low volatility period since 1996.
6. Expectation Hypothesis
An extensive finance literature has investigated whether term structures provide valuable in-
formation for predicting future asset prices. For example, several studies investigate whether
term structures of interest rates, exchange rates or option implied volatilities can predict future
bond yields, spot exchange rates or underlying asset volatilities. The standard approach is to
regress the variable of interest yt (e.g., bond yield at time t) on a constant and its predictor
xt (e.g., forward rate at time t − 1 with maturity t). In the regression yt = α + β xt + errort,
the hypothesis of interest is whether the predictor is unbiased, i.e., α = 0, and/or efficient, i.e.,
β = 1. In this case, the so-called Expectation Hypothesis (EH) holds.
In our setting a natural question is whether the variance swap rate provides unbiased and/or
efficient prediction of future realized variance. To simplify the notation, let yt denote the
annualized realized variance between t and t+ τ , and xt the variance swap rate at time t with
maturity t+τ . At time t, the goal is to forecast the random variable yt with the known predictor
xt.
The traditional empirical approach would be to collect data for yt and xt at different times t
and then run the regression yt = α+β xt+errort. The main advantage of this approach is that,
of course, the results are data driven. However, various issues, such as incorrectly specifying
the regression model, potential outlying observations, limited sample size or lack of statistical
power, could contaminate the regression results.
A theoretical, model-based analysis of the EH overcomes such issues. Using Model (5)–(6),
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we can calculate the theoretical values of α and β, which can be interpreted as the regression
outcome when an infinite amount of clean data points are available. It is well-known that
such population values are given by α = EP [yt] − βEP [xt], and β = CovP [xt, yt]/VarP [xt].
Additionally, we can calculate a statistic similar to a theoretical R-squared defined as R2 =
VarP [β xt]/Var
P [yt], which measures the fraction of variance of yt explained by the variance of
β xt.
Intuitively, variance and jump risk premiums imply that VS rates will not predict future
realized variances exactly. Our goal is to quantify such inaccuracies, understand the sources,
and study the impact of the time horizon on such predictions. To illustrate these issues, we
use the Heston model. Under this model, the slope, intercept and R2 have remarkably simple
expressions:
β =
CovP [VSt,t+τ ,
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t vs ds]
VarP [VSt,t+τ ]
=
φPv (τ)
φQv (τ)
α = EP [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds]− βEP [VSt,t+τ ] = θPv −
φPv (τ)
φQv (τ)
((1− φQv (τ))θQv + φQv (τ)θPv )
R2 =
β2VarP [VSt,t+τ ]
VarP [ 1τ
∫ t+τ
t vs ds]
= φPv (τ)
2/
(
2 (e−kPv τ − 1 + kPv τ)
τ2 (kPv )
2
)
where θPv = θ
Q
v k
Q
v /k
P
v , φ
P
v (τ) is defined in Section 2, and φ
Q
v (τ) is the same function as φ
P
v (τ)
with parameter kQv . Appendix B derives the expressions above. As β, α and R
2 obviously
depend on the time horizon, τ , below we use the notation β(τ), α(τ) and R2(τ).
Plugging (unreported) parameter estimates for the Heston model into β(τ), α(τ) and R2(τ),
we can discuss the impact of the time horizon on such quantities, plotted in Figure 5.19 When
τ → 0, β(τ) → 1 and α(τ) → 0. Thus, in the Heston model, for very short maturities VS
rates are efficient and unbiased predictor of future realized variance. This result is due to the
annualized realized variance, 1τ
∫ t+τ
t vs ds, converging to the spot variance vt when τ → 0. When
τ → +∞, β(τ)→ kQv /kPv and α(τ)→ 0. Hence, for very long maturities VS rates are inefficient
but unbiased predictor of future realized variance. As kQv = k
P
v + γ2σv and γ2 is estimated
to be negative, kQv /k
P
v < 1. This suggests that VS rates tend to overestimate future realized
variance. Thus, predictions based on VS rates need to be “discounted” by a slope factor, β(τ),
which is less than 1. This result is also consistent with a negative unconditional variance risk
premium, i.e., θPv − θQv < 0. As a function of τ , the theoretical R2(τ) behaves similarly to β(τ).
19Given the analytical expressions for β(τ), α(τ), and R2(τ), we can go beyond the 2- to 24-month maturity
range of VS rates available in our sample.
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The decay to zero when the time horizon increases implies that the variance of the regressors
is approaching zero faster than VarP [yt].
For the general Model (5)–(6), Appendix B provides analytical expressions for
β(τ) =
CovP [VSt,t+τ , (QV
c
t,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ )]
VarP [VSt,t+τ ]
α(τ) = EP [QVct,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ ]− β(τ)EP [VSt,t+τ ]
R2(τ) =
β(τ)2VarP [VSt,t+τ ]
VarP [QVct,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ ]
.
Expressions for nested models can be obtained by imposing the corresponding parameter re-
strictions. Unreported results show that under the two-factor model with no jump component,
β(τ), α(τ), and R2(τ) behave qualitatively the same as in the Heston model.
Allowing for the jump component changes the limit behavior of these functions completely.
For example, when τ → 0, the theoretical R2(τ) → 0, rather than 1.20 Also, when τ → 0,
β(τ) goes to (1 + λ1E
P [J2])/(1 + λ1E
Q[J2]), which is different from 1 unless the random jump
size J has the same second moment under P and Q. As this limit does not depend on λ0, for
very short maturities VS rates are still efficient predictor of realized variance when a constant
jump-intensity component is present (i.e., λ0 6= 0), but not when a stochastic jump-intensity
component (i.e., λ1 6= 0) driven by the spot variance is present. As shown in Appendix B, when
τ → 0 or ∞, the theoretical intercept α(τ) no longer tends to zero.
The analysis above shows that the Expectation Hypothesis does not hold theoretically, i.e.,
VS rates are biased and inefficient predictors of future realized variances under Model (5)–
(6). However, such bias and inefficiency might be modest in practice, suggesting that VS
rates still provide reliable predictions of future realized variances. To quantify these aspects,
Figure 5 shows β(τ), α(τ), based on our parameter estimates. The general model implies quite
different values for β(τ), α(τ), and R2(τ) than the Heston model. For the range of VS rate
maturities in our sample (up to 2 years), β(τ) decreases faster than in Heston model. Hence,
predictions of future realized variances based on VS rates appear to deteriorate more quickly
than what predicted by the Heston model. In other words, when τ increases, VS rates should
be “discounted” more heavily than what suggested by the Heston model to obtain accurate
prediction of future realized variance. When τ ≈ 6 years, β(τ) in Heston model has already
20This phenomenon is due to the variance of the non-annualized QVjt,t+τ , i.e., Var
P [τ QVjt,t+τ ], which goes to
zero at speed τ only. Thus, the variance of the annualized QVjt,t+τ , i.e., τ
−2VarP [τ QVjt,t+τ ], goes to infinity
when τ → 0, which implies that R2(τ)→ 0.
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reached its asymptotic level (kQv /k
P
v in that model) while in the stochastic jump-intensity two-
factor model it has not.
Although α(τ) has different shapes under the two models, its magnitude, plotted in per-
centage, is fairly small when compared to percentage VS rates which are around 4 in variance
percentage units. Theoretical R2(τ) turns out to be monotonically decreasing for a wide range
of relevant time to maturities. Although R2(τ)→ 0 when τ → 0, given our parameter estimates,
this phenomenon becomes important only for very short time to maturities and does not appear
to be practically relevant. The level of R2(τ) is quite different in the Heston and the general
model. For example when τ = 2 years, the R2(τ) in the Heston model is only around 35%,
while it is almost 70% in the general model. This difference suggests that the stochastic long
run mean and jump component have empirically large impact on the Expectation Hypothesis.
It also suggests that the variability in VS rates, as measured by β(τ)VSt,t+τ , reflect more the
variability in realized variances.
Using the regression notation, the IVRPt,t+τ = E
P
t [yt] − xt. If IVRPt,t+τ was zero, then
α(τ) = 0 and β(τ) = 1. If IVRPt,t+τ was constant over time, then α(τ) 6= 0 and β(τ) = 1.
Since the analysis above implies that β(τ) < 1, theoretically the IVRP is time-varying.
For completeness, we also run the regression yt = α+ β xt + errort using actual daily data,
i.e., VS rates and realized variances. We consider the time horizons of 2, 3, 6 and 12 months
to maturity. Obviously, the longer the time horizon, the larger the time overlap in the daily
regression variables. Given the strong persistence in these variables, the empirical regression
outcome should be interpreted cautiously. The slope estimates are 0.67, 0.57, 0.41 and 0.28,
respectively, and are all well below 1, in agreement with the theoretical analysis of the EH. These
values are also below the corresponding theoretical values which be due to several reasons, such
as limited sample size or other variables missing in the regression model.21 Estimates of α(τ),
in percentage, are 0.28, 0.86, 1.81 and 2.66, respectively, which are larger than corresponding
theoretical values. This might be a reflection of the relatively low estimated values for β(τ).
7. Shorting Variance Swaps
In contrast to stock returns, volatility is partially predictable because it follows a persistent
and mean reverting process. For example, if today’s volatility is high, it is likely that it will
21Since VS rates are actual market data, it is unlikely that the error-in-variable issue might explain this
phenomenon.
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remain high in the near future, but eventually will revert to lower levels. In that case, a sensible
investment might be to go short in a long-term variance swap contract or “sell volatility,”
speculating that long-term future volatility will be lower than current variance swap rate. This
strategy can be seen as a statistical arbitrage applied to variance swaps. Buyer and seller of
variance swaps are, of course, well aware of these phenomena and incorporate them in their
pricing of VS contracts. A challenge for both sides of the contract is to accurately estimate the
speed of mean reversion of the volatility, a notoriously difficult parameter, and its long run mean
level. Continuing the example above, if an investor estimates a relatively low speed of mean
reversion, it may be no longer optimal to “sell volatility,” as it will not mean revert quickly
enough to lower levels. Accurately estimating future volatility of volatility is also obviously
important to assess return profitability.
We consider a simple but robust trading strategy with VS. The trading strategy is robust in
the sense that Model (5)–(6) and corresponding estimates are used only to decide whether or not
to invest in VS, i.e., to extract a trading signal. In contrast, for example, optimal investments to
maximize some expected utility are certainly more sophisticated, but optimal portfolio weights
tend to be rather sensitive to model specifications and estimations; see Egloff, Leippold, and
Wu (2010) and Filipovic´, Gourier, and Mancini (2011).
Since realized variances are lower than VS rates on average, this suggests that shorting
VS contracts each day would generate a positive return. This simple trading strategy can be
refined as follows. At each day t, we compute the expected profit from shorting a VS contract,
i.e., VSt,t+τ − EPt [QVt,t+τ ]. Note that if the parametric model fits exactly VS rates, such a
profit is minus the IVRP, i.e., −IVRPt,t+τ = EQt [QVt,t+τ ] − EPt [QVt,t+τ ]. Then, we short the
VS contract only when the expected profit is large enough and precisely larger than, say, n
times its standard deviation. When n = 0, we short the VS contract as soon as the expected
profit is positive. When n > 0, we short the contract less often. The notional amount of the
VS is such that for each unit increase of the payoff we receive $1. When at day t the VS
contract is shorted, we compute the actual return from the investment by comparing the VS
rate and ex-post realized variance, i.e., VSt,t+τ −RVt,t+τ . Since this is a buy and hold strategy
(conditional on a model-based signal), transaction costs are unlikely to affect the results and
will not be considered. If at day t the VS is not shorted, the return from t to t+ τ is obviously
zero. We repeat this procedure for each day t in our sample. Apart from the model estimates
obtained using in-sample data, the trading strategy does not use future information. During
the out-sample period, the strategy truly uses only information up to day t.
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To assess the economic magnitude of the returns from shorting VS, we consider the following
trading strategy based on the S&P 500 index. If at time t the VS contract with maturity t+ τ
is shorted, we invest $1 in the S&P 500 index and liquidate the position at time t + τ . Thus,
the investment horizon is the same as the one for the VS strategy. The actual return is easily
computed using S&P 500 index prices. This procedure is also repeated for each day t in our
sample.
The two trading strategies, based on variance swaps and the S&P 500 index, require dif-
ferent initial capitals and thus generate dollar-returns of different magnitudes. However, their
Sharpe ratios can be meaningfully compared. Table 7 reports such Sharpe ratios. Shorting
VS appears to be significantly more profitable than investing in the S&P 500 index, over the
same time horizons. This suggests that VS contracts offer economically important investment
opportunities. It also suggests that investors are ready to pay high “insurance premiums” to
obtain protection against volatility increases.
When the threshold n increases, the VS is shorted less often22 and in particular only when
the expected payoff is significantly larger than zero, in terms of standard deviations. This
assessment relies on Model (5)–(6). As shown in Table 7, Sharpe ratios from investing in VS
are nearly uniformly increasing in the threshold n. The main exception is from shorting the
VS contract with two months to maturity in the out-sample period, as such positions suffered
large losses due the Lehman’s collapse. Overall, Model (5)–(6) seems to provide rather valuable
information to generate the trading signal.
8. Robustness Checks
The previous change of measure from P to Q for the jump component implies that the mean
jump size changes, but not the jump intensity. Now we let the jump intensity be λPt = λ
P
0 +λ
P
1 vt
under P and λQt = λ
Q
0 + λ
Q
1 vt under Q. The drift under P of the stock price process becomes
µt = r − δ + γ1(1− ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt + gP (λP0 + λP1 vt)− gQ(λQ0 + λQ1 vt)
and jump risk premiums become
JRPt = g
P (λP0 + λ
P
1 vt)− gQ(λQ0 + λQ1 vt)
22For example, the 2-month VS is shorted 23%, 9%, 3% of the times, when n = 1, 2, 3, respectively. These
figures increase to 69%, 32% and 13% for the 24-month VS contract. For the remaining VS contracts, the
corresponding figures are somewhere in between.
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IVRPjt,t+τ = E
P [J2](λP0 + λ
P
1 E
P
t [QV
c
t,t+τ ])− EQ[J2](λQ0 + λQ1 EQt [QVct,t+τ ])
Estimation results of this more general imply very similar dynamic for spot variance, stochastic
long run mean, corresponding instantaneous, jump and diffusive risk premiums, and integrated
risk premiums due to the continuous part of the quadratic variation. However, the estimated
overall risk neutral jump-intensity, λQt , turns out to be smaller than objective jump-intensity,
λPt ; Pan (2002) reports the same finding using her stochastic volatility model. These estimates
would imply positive jump-timing risk premium which would induce positive IVRPj . This
finding confirms the limited ability of estimating very flexible change of measures.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we first perform a model-free analysis of VS rates quoted by a major broker-dealer
in New York City for five different time to maturities and for approximately 14 years period
from January 4, 1996 to September 2, 2010. The implications of this model-free analysis is
then modeled parametrically via two-factor stochastic volatility and stochastic jump-intensity
model since this model captures the observed features of the data with a parsimonious way.
Model-based analysis of VS rates shows that the term structure of variance risk premium is
negative and generally downward sloping, while the term structure of variance risk premium
due to negative jumps is negative, downward sloping in quite times and upward sloping during
market crashes. Theoretically, moreover Expectation Hypothesis does not hold but bias and
inefficiency are modest for short/medium time to maturities. Our model-consistent investment
strategy on VS’s shows that the estimation results can be used to generate better investment
performance than long-only S&P 500 index investments for the same time period.
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Figure 1. Term structure of variance swap rates. Values are in volatility percentage units with
2-, 3-, 6-, 12-, and 24-month to maturity from January 4, 1996 to September 2, 2010, that are
3,624 observations for each maturity.
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Figure 2. Term structure of model-free jump component in variance swap rates. VS rates
minus calculated VIX-type indices for 2-, 3-, and 6-month to maturity from January 4, 1996 to
September 2, 2010, that are 3,624 observations for each maturity. The difference is in volatility
percentage units, i.e., (VS
1/2
t,t+τ −VIX1/2t,t+τ )× 100.
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Figure 3. Term structure of integrated equity risk premiums and S&P 500 index. Upper
graph: integrated equity risk premiums. Values are annualized and in percentage. Lower
graph: S&P 500 index. Vertical line denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007.
80
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Year
IV
R
P 
%
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
Year
IV
R
P 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
, J
 <
 −
1%
 
 
2−month
12−month
24−month
Figure 4. Term structure of integrated variance risk premiums. Upper graph: integrated
variance risk premiums. Lower graph: integrated variance risk premium due to jump price
below −1%. Values are in variance percentage units. Vertical line denotes beginning of out-
sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007.
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Figure 5. Theoretical intercept, slope and R2 for the Expectation Hypothesis. Upper graph:
theoretical α(τ), β(τ) for the Model (5)–(6) and the Heston model. Lower graph: theoretical
R2(τ) for the two models. Time horizon, τ , is expressed in years and ranges between 0.1 months
and 20 years.
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Panel A: Variance swap rates
Maturity Mean Std Skew Kurt AC1 Q22 ADF
2 22.14 8.18 1.53 7.08 0.982 62,908.97 −3.79
3 22.32 7.81 1.32 6.05 0.988 66,449.22 −3.52
6 22.87 7.40 1.10 4.97 0.992 69,499.72 −3.30
12 23.44 6.88 0.80 3.77 0.994 71,644.69 −2.82
24 23.93 6.48 0.57 2.92 0.995 72,878.68 −2.47
Panel B: Calculated VIX-type indices
2 20.68 6.14 0.71 3.38 0.988 51,361.97 −3.62
3 20.72 5.80 0.63 3.20 0.987 51,654.62 −3.40
6 20.79 5.23 0.47 2.79 0.994 55,105.72 −3.22
Panel C: Realized variance
2 18.90 12.40 4.31 28.40 0.993 64,293.09 −5.07
3 19.06 12.04 3.80 21.81 0.996 68,851.75 −4.21
6 19.46 11.33 2.93 13.17 0.998 72,697.32 −2.86
12 20.13 10.47 1.97 6.86 0.999 72,239.41 −1.98
24 20.60 8.81 1.09 3.48 0.998 66,759.84 −0.57
Table 1. Panel A: Summary statistics of the variance swap rates on the S&P 500 index at
different maturities in months from January 4, 1996 to September 2, 2010 for a total of 3,624
observations for each maturity. The table reports mean, standard deviation (Std), skewness
(Skew), excess kurtosis (Kurt), first order autocorrelation (AC1) the Ljung–Box portmanteau
test for up to 22nd order autocorrelation (Q22), 10% critical value is 30.81; the augmented
Dickey–Fuller test for unit root involving 22 augmentation lags, a constant term and time trend
(ADF), 10% critical value is −3.16. Panel B: summary statistics of the two-, three- and six-
month VIX-type indices calculated using SPX options and applying the revised CBOE VIX
methodology. Panel C: summary statistics of ex-post realized S&P 500 realized variance for
various maturities. All variables are in volatility percentage units.
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Parameter True Value Mean Bias RMSE
κPv 3.00 0.34 0.67
σv 0.25 0.02 0.02
κPm 0.30 0.11 0.25
θPm 0.10 0.03 0.81
σm 0.10 0.01 0.01
ρ −0.80 0.01 0.01
λ0 4.00 −1.17 1.47
λ1 10.00 −4.99 5.32
γ1 −7.00 6.18 8.44
γ2 −6.00 −0.85 2.25
γ3 −1.00 0.91 2.17
µPj −0.01 −0.01 0.02
µQj −0.20 −0.04 0.07
σj 0.04 0.03 0.04
Table 2. Monte Carlo simulation results. Model (5)–(6) is simulated at an intraday frequency of
15 minutes using an Euler discretization. To obtain a daily sample, one value every 30 values is
picked from the simulated trajectory. VS rates are calculated for 3- and 12-month to maturity
using the simulated values. Each sample consists of N = 10,000 data points of the underlying
stock price and VS rates. Model (5)–(6) is estimated using each simulated path and the method
described in Section 3.
84
Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
κPv 4.803 0.353
σv 0.419 0.009
κPm 0.234 0.086
θPm 0.043 0.016
σm 0.141 0.002
ρ −0.713 0.010
λ0 3.669 0.621
λ1 44.770 17.227
γ1 −2.545 4.206
γ2 −2.244 0.851
γ3 −0.673 0.610
µPj 0.010 0.008
µQj −0.001 0.009
σj 0.038 0.003
σe1 0.004 0.000
σe2 0.002 0.000
σe3 0.003 0.000
ρe −0.088 0.006
Log-likelihood 74,381.8
Table 3. Estimation results for the Model (5)–(6) using the procedure described in Section 3.
Variance swap rates with 2-, 3-, 6-, 12-, and 24-month to maturity and S&P 500 returns range
from January 4, 1996 to April 3, 2007. Variance swap rates with 3- and 12-month to maturity
are assumed to be observed without errors. Variance swap rates with 2-, 6-, and 24-month to
maturity are assumed to be observed with errors whose standard deviations are σe1 , σe2 and
σe3 , and correlation ρe.
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Mean RMSE Mean RMSE
In-sample
Heston SJSV
V̂S2m −VS2m −0.081 0.851 −0.183 0.743
V̂S6m −VS6m 0.002 1.119 0.064 0.394
V̂S24m −VS24m 1.001 2.950 0.143 0.560
Out-sample
Heston SJSV
V̂S2m −VS2m 0.259 1.420 0.218 1.005
V̂S6m −VS6m −0.258 1.403 −0.249 0.475
V̂S24m −VS24m 0.469 3.074 0.129 0.551
Table 4. Variance swap pricing errors. The pricing error is defined as the model-based VS rate
minus observed VS rate, in volatility percentage units, i.e., (EQt [QVt,t+τ ]
1/2 − VS1/2t,t+τ ) × 100.
The table reports mean, root mean square error of pricing errors for VS rate with 2-, 6- and
24-month to maturity under the Heston model and Model (5)–(6). In-sample period, used to
estimate the models, ranges from January 4, 1996 to April 2, 2007. Out-sample period ranges
from April 3, 2007 to September 2, 2010.
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In-sample Out-sample
Mean Std Mean Std
DRP 1.27 1.18 2.64 2.82
JRP 5.53 1.58 7.36 3.76
VRP −3.40 3.16 −7.06 7.54
LRMRP −0.44 0.30 −0.68 0.38
Table 5. Instantaneous risk premiums. Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1 − ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt;
Jump risk premium JRPt = (E
P [eJ ] − EQ[eJ ])(λ0 + λ1vt); Variance risk premium VRPt =
γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt = γ3σmmt. Risk premiums are based on
Model (5)–(6). In-sample period, used to estimate the model, ranges from January 4, 1996
to April 2, 2007. Out-sample period ranges from April 3, 2007 to September 2, 2010. Entries
are in percentage.
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In-sample Out-sample
Maturity Mean Std Mean Std
Equity
2 6.90 2.37 9.68 5.30
6 7.07 2.13 9.43 4.09
12 7.31 2.09 9.42 3.48
24 7.77 2.10 9.74 3.17
Jump contribution
2 5.61 1.37 7.22 3.07
6 5.76 1.25 7.14 2.41
12 5.97 1.25 7.24 2.10
24 6.39 1.31 7.62 2.00
Variance
2 −0.21 0.19 −0.43 0.44
6 −0.53 0.39 −0.96 0.75
12 −0.80 0.53 −1.33 0.86
24 −1.11 0.66 −1.71 0.94
J < −1% contribution
2 −0.15 0.04 −0.20 0.09
6 −0.16 0.04 −0.21 0.08
12 −0.17 0.05 −0.22 0.07
24 −0.18 0.05 −0.23 0.07
Table 6. Term structure of integrated equity and variance risk premiums. Integrated equity
risk premium IERPt = E
P
t [St+τ/St]/τ − EQt [St+τ/St]/τ . Integrated variance risk premium
IVRPt = E
P
t [QVt,t+τ ] − EQt [QVt,t+τ ]. Risk premiums are based on Model (5)–(6). In-sample
period, used to estimate the model, ranges from January 4, 1996 to April 2, 2007. Out-sample
period ranges from April 3, 2007 to September 2, 2010. Variance risk premiums are in variance
units. All entries are in percentage.
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In-sample
Short Variance Swap Long S&P 500
Horizon 2 3 6 12 2 3 6 12
Threshold
Always 0.56 0.59 0.67 0.84 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.27
0 0.55 0.59 0.67 0.84 0.17 0.26 0.32 0.27
1 0.60 0.71 1.15 0.94 0.20 0.24 0.62 0.08
2 0.78 1.35 1.91 1.75 0.61 0.85 1.22 0.27
3 0.98 1.60 2.14 2.71 0.79 1.52 1.72 1.36
Out-sample
Short Variance Swap Long S&P 500
Always 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.05 −0.03 −0.05 −0.18
0 0.48 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.17 −0.03 −0.05 −0.18
1 0.45 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.44 0.04 0.01 −0.12
2 0.20 1.13 1.15 1.46 0.23 0.54 0.99 0.85
3 −0.10 0.91 1.72 2.79 −0.11 0.29 1.18 1.75
Table 7. Sharpe ratios from short positions in variance swaps and long positions the S&P 500
index. For each day t in the sample, the expected profit from a short position in a VS contract is
computed, i.e., VSt,t+τ −EPt [QVt,t+τ ]. If the expected profit is n times larger than its standard
deviation, then the VS contract is shorted. Otherwise no position is taken at day t. The column
“Threshold” reports the number of standard deviations n. “Always” means the VS contracted
is always shorted. At time t + τ , the actual profit is computed, i.e., VSt,t+τ − RVt,t+τ . The
notional amount in the VS contract is such that for each unit increase of the payoff, the short
side receives $1. The investment strategy in the S&P 500 is as follows. If at day t the VS
contract with maturity t+ τ is shorted, $1 is invested in the S&P 500 at time t. The position
is held until t + τ and then liquidated. Sharpe ratios are computed using all the returns from
each investment strategy and assuming a risk free rate of 4%. VS contracts with 2-, 3-, 6-,
and 12-month to maturities are considered. The row “Horizon” reports the time to maturity.
In-sample period, used to estimate the model, ranges from January 4, 1996 to April 2, 2007.
Out-sample period ranges from April 3, 2007 to September 2, 2010.
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A. Pricing Kernel
Recall that the market price of risks for the Brownian motions are
Λt = [γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt, γ2√vt, γ3√mt]′.
The jump size risk premium is (gP − gQ) = exp(µPj +σ2j /2)− exp(µQj +σ2j /2). Note that in the
P -dynamic of the stock price
µt − νPt = r − δ + γ1(1− ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt + (gP − gQ)λt − gPλt
= r − δ + γ1(1− ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt − gQλt
the term gPλt cancels.
The pricing kernel (or Stochastic Discount Factor) is defined as
pit = e
−rt dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣Ft = exp
(
−rt−
∫ t
0
Λ′s dW
P
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
Λ′sΛs ds
) Nt∏
u=1
exp
(
aj + bjJ
P
u
)
where
aj =
(µPj )
2 − (µQj )2
2σ2j
, bj =
µQj − µPj
σ2j
.
The process pit is a valid pricing kernel when deflated bank account and deflated cum-dividend
price processes are P -martingales.
When a jump occurs the pricing kernel jumps from pit− to pit = pit−e
aj+bjJ
P
t , hence
dpit
pit
= −r dt− Λ′t dWPt + (exp(aj + bjJPt )− 1) dNPt
= −r dt− (γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWP1t + γ2
√
vt dW
P
2t + γ3
√
mt dW
P
3t) + (exp(aj + bjJ
P
t )− 1) dNPt
Let Bt = e
rt denote the bank account and Bpit = Btpit the deflated bank account. Applying
Itoˆ’s formula
d(Bpit ) = Bt dpit + pit dBt
= Bpit (−r dt− Λ′t dWPt + (exp(aj + bjJPt )− 1) dNPt ) +Bpit r dt
d(Bpit )/B
pi
t = −Λ′t dWPt + (exp(aj + bjJPt )− 1) dNPt
Hence Bpit is a P -martingale (or has zero drift) when E
P [exp(aj + bjJ
P
t )] = 1 which is the case
as shown in the following calculations:
EP [exp(aj + bjJ
P
t )] = exp(aj + bjµ
P
j + b
2
j
σ2j
2
)
90
aj + bjµ
P
j + b
2
j
σ2j
2
=
(µPj )
2 − (µQj )2
2σ2j
+
µQj − µPj
σ2j
µPj +
µQj − µPj
σ2j
2 σ2j
2
=
(µPj )
2 − (µQj )2
2σ2j
+
µQj − µPj
σ2j
µPj +
(µQj )2 + (µPj )2 − 2µQj µPj
σ2j
 1
2
=
(µPj )
2 − (µQj )2 + 2µQj µPj − 2(µPj )2 + (µQj )2 + (µPj )2 − 2µQj µPj
2σ2j
= 0
where we use JP ∼ N (µPj , σ2j ).
Let Sδ,t = Ste
δt denote the cum-dividend stock price, hence
dSδ,t
Sδ,t
=
dSt
St
+ δ dt
= (r + γ1(1− ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt − gQλt) dt+
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWP1t + ρ
√
vt dW
P
2t + (exp(J
P
t )− 1) dNPt
where St is the ex-dividend stock price. Let S
pi
δ,t be the deflated cum-dividend stock price. When
a jump occurs both pit and St jump, and S
pi
δ jumps from S
pi
δ,t− to S
pi
δ,t = S
pi
δ,t− exp(aj+bjJ
P
t +J
P
t ).
Hence at the jump time dSpiδ,t/S
pi
δ,t = exp(aj + (bj + 1)J
P
t )− 1.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula, with pict and S
c
δ,t denoting the continuous part of pit and Sδ,t, respec-
tively,
d(Spiδ,t) = Sδ,t dpi
c
t + pit dS
c
δ,t + dS
c
δ,t dpi
c
t + Sδ,tpit(exp(aj + (bj + 1)J
P
t )− 1) dNPt
= Sδ,t pit(−r dt− γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWP1t − γ2
√
vt dW
P
2t − γ3
√
mt dW
P
3t)
+pit Sδ,t((r + γ1(1− ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt − gQλt) dt+
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWP1t + ρ
√
vt dW
P
2t)
−Sδ,tpit(γ1(1− ρ2)vt + γ2ρvt) dt+ Sδ,tpit(exp(aj + (bj + 1)JPt )− 1) dNPt
d(Spiδ,t)
(Spiδ,t)
=
√
(1− ρ2)vt(1− γ1) dWP1t + (ρ− γ2)
√
vt dW
P
2t − γ3
√
mt dW
P
3t
+(exp(aj + (bj + 1)J
P
t )− 1) dNPt − gQλt dt
Hence Spiδ,t is a P -martingale (or has zero drift) when E
P [exp(aj + (bj + 1)J
P
t )− 1] = gQ which
is the case as shown in the following calculations:
EP [exp(aj + (bj + 1)J
P
t )− 1] = gQ
exp(aj + (bj + 1)µ
P
j + (bj + 1)
2
σ2j
2
)− 1 = exp(µQj +
σ2j
2
)− 1
exp(aj + bjµ
P
j + µ
P
j + b
2
j
σ2j
2
+ 2bj
σ2j
2
+
σ2j
2
) = exp(µQj +
σ2j
2
)
aj + bjµ
P
j + µ
P
j + b
2
j
σ2j
2
+ 2bj
σ2j
2
= µQj
µPj + 2bj
σ2j
2
= µQj
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µPj +
µQj − µPj
σ2j
σ2j = µ
Q
j
where we use aj + bjµ
P
j + b
2
j
σ2j
2 = 0 implied by the martingale property of the deflated bank
account.
The relation between the pricing kernel pit and the risk neutral dynamics is derived as usual.
Define the density process ξt = pite
rt. Under usual technical conditions, applying Itoˆ’s formula
dξt/ξt = −Λ′t dWPt + (exp(aj + bjJPt )− 1) dNPt
shows that ξt is a P -martingale and hence it uniquely defines an equivalent martingale mea-
sure Q. Defining the Q-Brownian motions as
dWQ1t = dW
P
1t + γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt dt
dWQ2t = dW
P
2t + γ2
√
vt dt
dWQ3t = dW
P
3t + γ3
√
mt dt
gives the risk neutral dynamic of the stock price S, spot variance v, and stochastic long run m
in (6).
B. Expectation Hypothesis
B.1. Basic Properties of Heston-type Models
We start by reviewing some basic properties of the Heston-type models. Recall that under P :
dvt = k
P
v (
kQv
kPv
mt − vt)dt+ σv√vt dW2t
dmt = k
P
m(θ
P
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW3t
and under Q:
dvt = k
Q
v (mt − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW2t
dmt = k
Q
m(θ
Q
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW3t
Under P , mt has unconditional Gamma distribution
23 with parameters a = 2kPmθ
P
m/σ
2
m and
b = σ2m/2k
P
m which implies
EP [mt] = ab = θ
P
m, Var
P [mt] = ab
2 =
σ2mθ
P
m
2kPm
23The Gamma distribution is defined as f(m) = ma−1e−m/b/(baΓ[a]), where Γ[a] is the Gamma function.
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and similarly under Q.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (ek
P
v tvt) and rearranging terms gives
vT = vte
−kPv (T−t) + kPv
∫ T
t
e−k
P
v (T−u)k
Q
v
kPv
mu du+
∫ T
t
e−k
P
v (T−u)σv
√
vu dW2u
and similarly for mT , both under P and Q measures. Conditioning on the trajectory of m
between t and T , v has a time-varying but deterministic long run mean. Such representations
of vT and mT are useful for calculating conditional expectations
EP [mT |mt] = mt e−kPm(T−t) +
∫ T
t
e−k
P
m(T−u)kPmθ
P
m du
= mt e
−kPm(T−t) + θPm(1− e−k
P
m(T−t))
EP [vT |vt, {mu, u ∈ [t, T ]}] = vt e−kPv (T−t) +
∫ T
t
e−k
P
v (T−u)kPv
kQv
kPv
mu du
EP [vT |vt,mt] = vt e−kPv (T−t) +
∫ T
t
e−k
P
v (T−u)kPv
kQv
kPv
EP [mu|mt] du
= vt e
−kPv (T−t) +
kQv
kPv
mt
[
kPv
e−kPm(T−t) − e−kPv (T−t)
kPv − kPm
]
+
kQv
kPv
θPm
[
1 +
kPme
−kPv (T−t) − kPv e−k
P
m(T−t)
kPv − kPm
]
EPt [
1
τ
∫ τ
0
vs ds] =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
EP [vt+u|vt,mt]du
= vtφ
P
v (τ) +
kQv
kPv
mtφ
P
m(τ) +
kQv
kPv
θPm(1− φPv (τ)− φPm(τ))
EP [
1
τ
∫ τ
0
vs ds] = θ
P
v
as EP [mt] = θ
P
m and θ
P
v = θ
P
mk
Q
v /k
P
v . Corresponding expressions hold under Q. Other expecta-
tions that will be used below are collected here
EQ[vt] = E
Q[mt] = θ
Q
m
EP [vt] = E
P [EP [vt|mt]] = EP [k
Q
v
kPv
mt] =
kQv
kPv
θPm = θ
P
v
EP [mt] = θ
P
m
VarP [mt] =
σ2mθ
P
m
2kPm
VarP [vt] = E
P [VarP [vt|mt]] + VarP [EP [vt|mt]] = EP [
σ2v
kQv
kPv
mt
2kPv
] + Var[
kQv
kPv
mt]
=
σ2v
kQv
kPv
θPm
2kPv
+
(
kQv
kPv
)2
σ2mθ
P
m
2kPm
=
σ2vθ
P
v
2kPv
+
(
kQv
kPv
)
σ2mθ
P
v
2kPm
EP [vtmt] = E
P [E[vtmt|mt]] = EP [k
Q
v
kPv
mtmt] =
kQv
kPv
EP [m2t ] =
kQv
kPv
(VarP [mt] + (E
P [mt])
2)
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CovP [vt,mt] = E
P [vtmt]− EP [vt]EP [mt] = k
Q
v
kPv
VarP [m] +
kQv
kPv
(θPm)
2 − k
Q
v
kPv
θPmθ
P
m =
kQv
kPv
VarP [m]
B.2. Expectation Hypothesis in Heston Model
The Heston model provides a simple framework to easily see derivations of α(τ), β(τ), and
R2(τ). We fist discuss execration hypothesis in this model, and then in the stochastic jump-
intensity two-factor model.
Recall that in the Heston model under P :
dvt = k
P
v (θ
P
v − vt) dt+ σv
√
vt dW
P
2t
and under Q:
dvt = k
Q
v (θ
Q
v − vt) dt+ σv
√
vt dW
Q
2t
where kPv = k
Q
v − γ2σv and θPv = θQv kQv /kPv .
The following quantities are used in the expectation hypothesis for the Heston model:
EP [yt] = E
P [QVt,t+τ ] = E
P [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds] = θ
P
v
EP [xt] = E
P [VSt,t+τ ] = E
P [(1− φQv (τ))θQv + φQv (τ)vt] = (1− φQv (τ))θQv + φQv (τ)θPv
CovP [xt, yt] = E
P [(VSt,t+τ − (1− φQv (τ))θQv − φQv (τ)θPv ) (QVt,t+τ − θPv )]
= EP [EPt [φ
Q
v (τ)vt − φQv (τ)θPv ) (QVt,t+τ − θPv )]]
= EP [φQv (τ)(vt − θPv )EPt [QVt,t+τ − θPv ]]
= EP [φQv (τ)(vt − θPv )[(1− φPv (τ))θPv + φPv (τ)vt − θPv ]]
= EP [φQv (τ)(vt − θPv )[φPv (τ)(vt − θPv )]]
= φQv (τ)φ
P
v (τ)E
P [(vt − θPv )2]
= φQv (τ)φ
P
v (τ)Var
P [vt]
VarP [xt] = Var
P [VSt,t+τ ] = Var
P [(1− φQv (τ))θQv + φQv (τ)vt]
= (φQv (τ))
2VarP [vt]
Hence
β(τ) =
CovP [xt, yt]
VarP [xt]
=
φQv (τ)φ
P
v (τ)Var
P [vt]
(φQv (τ))2Var
P [vt]
=
φPv (τ)
φQv (τ)
α(τ) = EP [yt]− β(τ)EP [xt] = θPv −
φPv (τ)
φQv (τ)
[(1− φQv (τ))θQv + φQv (τ)θPv ]
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where
φPv (τ) =
1− e−kPv τ
kPv τ
, φQv (τ) =
1− e−kQv τ
kQv τ
When γ2 < 0, as in our estimates, k
P
v > k
Q
v and θ
P
v < θ
Q
v . For very short maturities
lim
τ→0β(τ) = 1
which means VS rates are efficient predictor of future realized variance, which is indeed just the
spot variance vt. For very long maturities
lim
τ→∞β(τ) = limτ→∞
φPv (τ)
φQv (τ)
=
kQv
kPv
< 1
which means VS rates are inefficient, upward biased predictor of future realized variance. Given
estimated parameters (and in particular γ2 < 0), β(τ) is monotonically decreasing from 1 to
kQ/kP < 1 when τ goes from 0 to +∞.
For very short maturities
lim
τ→0α(τ) = 0
and for very long maturities
lim
τ→∞α(τ) = θ
P
v −
kQ
kP
θQv = 0
as θPv = θ
Q
v k
Q
v /k
P
v . Given our estimated parameters, α(τ) is positive and hump-shaped when
τ ∈ (0,+∞), and the hump is still pronounced when τ ∈ (0, 10) years. This means that VS
rates are biased predictor of future realized variance.
The theoretical R2 of Expectation hypothesis regression is
R2(τ) =
VarP [β(τ)xt]
VarP [yt]
=
β(τ)2VarP [VSt,t+τ ]
VarP [ 1τ
∫ t+τ
t vs ds]
The numerator of R2(τ) can be computed using expressions above. The denominator
VarP [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds] = E
P [
(
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds
)2
]− (θPv )2
involves EP [
(
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t vs ds
)2
] which can be calculated in various ways. One possibility is to see(
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t vs ds
)2
as a double integral on the square [t, t+ τ ]× [t, t+ τ ]. Then the idea is to split
this square in two parts along the 45-degree line, say u ≤ s and u ≥ s for u, s ∈ [t, t + τ ]. As
the integrand, E[vu vs], is the same in these two triangles we have
EP [
(
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds
)2
] =
1
τ2
EP [
(∫ t+τ
t
vs ds
)(∫ t+τ
t
vu du
)
] =
1
τ2
EP [
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ t+τ
t
du (vu vs)]
=
1
τ2
EP [
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ s
t
du (vu vs) +
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ t+τ
s
du (vu vs)]
=
2
τ2
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ s
t
du EP [vu vs] (14)
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Hence when u ≤ s
EP [vu vs] = E
P [EP [vu vs|vu]]
= EP [vuE
P [
(
vue
−kPv (s−u) + kPv
∫ s
u
e−k
P
v (s−l)θPv dl +
∫ s
u
e−k
P
v (s−l)σv
√
vl dW
P
2l
)
|vu]]
= EP [v2u]e
−kPv (s−u) + kPv (θ
P
v )
2
∫ s
u
e−k
P
v (s−l) dl
where
EP [v2u] = Var
P [vu] + (E
P [vu])
2 =
σ2vθ
P
v
2kPv
+ (θPv )
2
The multiple integral in (14) can be quickly calculated with Mathematica
2
τ2
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ s
t
du EP [vu vs]
=
2
τ2
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ s
t
du
(
EP [v2u]e
−kPv (s−u) + kPv (θ
P
v )
2
∫ s
u
e−k
P
v (s−l) dl
)
=
2
τ2
EP [v2u]
−1 + e−kPv τ + kPv τ
(kPv )
2
+
2
τ2
(θPv )
2 2− 2e−k
P
v τ − 2kPv τ + (kPv τ)2
2(kPv )
2
=
2
τ2
(1− e−kPv τ − kPv τ)
(kPv )
2
(−EP [v2u] + (θPv )2) + (θPv )2
= − 2
τ2
(1− e−kPv τ − kPv τ)
(kPv )
2
VarP [vu] + (θ
P
v )
2
Hence, denominator of R2(τ) is
VarP [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds] =
2
τ2
(e−kPv τ − 1 + kPv τ)
(kPv )
2
VarP [vu].
As expected
lim
τ→0 Var
P [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds] = Var
P [vt], lim
τ→∞Var
P [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds] = Var
P [θPv ] = 0.
Collecting the necessary terms
R2(τ) =
(
φPv (τ)
φQv (τ)
)2
(φQv (τ))
2VarP [vt]
2
τ2
(e−kPv τ−1+kPv τ)
(kPv )
2 Var
P [vu]
=
(
φPv (τ)
)2
2
τ2
(e−kPv τ−1+kPv τ)
(kPv )
2
which implies that
lim
τ→0R
2(τ) = 1, lim
τ→∞R
2(τ) = 0.
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B.3. Expectation Hypothesis in Stochastic Jump-intensity Two-factor Model
Recall that under P :
dvt = k
P
v (
kQv
kPv
mt − vt)dt+ σv√vt dW2t
dmt = k
P
m(θ
P
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW3t
and under Q:
dvt = k
Q
v (mt − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW2t
dmt = k
Q
m(θ
Q
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW3t
The following relationship holds between P and Q parameters:
kPv = k
Q
v − γ2σv
kPm = k
Q
m − γ3σm
θPm = θ
Q
m k
Q
m/k
P
m
According our estimates γ2 and γ3 are both negative.
B.3.1 Theoretical α(τ) and β(τ)
In the Expectation Hypothesis for the stochastic jump-intensity two-factor model, the following
definitions and quantities are used in the calculation of theoretical α(τ) and β(τ):
QVt,t+τ =
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds+
1
τ
∑
Nt≤u≤NT
J2u =: QV
c
t,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ
EP [QVt,t+τ ] = θ
P
v + E
P [J2](λ0 + λ1θ
P
v )
EPt [QV
c
t,t+τ ] = vtφ
P
v (τ) +
kQv
kPv
mtφ
P
m(τ) +
kQv
kPv
θPm(1− φPv (τ)− φPm(τ))
EPt [QV
j
t,t+τ ] = E
P [J2](λ0 + λ1E
P
t [QV
c
t,t+τ ])
EP [QVjt,t+τ ] = E
P [J2](λ0 + λ1θ
P
v )
VSt,t+τ = E
Q[J2]λ0 + [1 + λ1E
Q[J2]][vtφ
Q
v (τ) +mtφ
Q
m(τ) + θ
Q
m(1− φQv (τ)− φQm(τ))]
EP [VSt,t+τ ] = E
Q[J2]λ0 + [1 + λ1E
Q[J2]][θPv φ
Q
v (τ) + θ
P
mφ
Q
m(τ) + θ
Q
m(1− φQv (τ)− φQm(τ))]
EPt [yt − EP [yt]] = EPt [QVt,t+τ − EP [QVt,t+τ ]]
= EPt [QV
c
t,t+τ − θPv ] + EPt [QVjt,t+τ − EP [J2](λ0 + λ1θPv )]
= φPv (τ)(vt − θPv ) +
kQv
kPv
φPm(τ)(mt − θPm) + EP [J2]λ1(EPt [QVct,t+τ − θPv ])
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= [1 + λ1E
P [J2]][φPv (τ)(vt − θPv ) +
kQv
kPv
φPm(τ)(mt − θPm)]
xt − E[xt] = VSt,t+τ − EP [VSt,t+τ ]
= [1 + λ1E
Q[J2]][φQv (τ)(vt − θPv ) + φQm(τ)(mt − θPm)]
and using these expressions
CovP [xt, yt] = E
P {(xt − EP [xt])(yt − EP [yt])} = EP {(xt − EP [xt])× EPt [yt − EP [yt]]}
= EP {([1 + λ1EQ[J2]][φQv (τ)(vt − θPv ) + φQm(τ)(mt − θPm)])×
[1 + λ1E
P [J2]][φPv (τ)(vt − θPv ) +
kQv
kPv
φPm(τ)(mt − θPm)]}
= (1 + λ1E
Q[J2]) [1 + λ1E
P [J2]]{φQv (τ)φPv (τ)VarP [vt] + φQm(τ)
kQv
kPv
φPm(τ)Var
P [mt]
+
(
φQv (τ)
kQv
kPv
φPm(τ) + φ
Q
m(τ)φ
P
v (τ)
)
CovP [vt,mt]}
=: (1 + λ1E
Q[J2]) Cov[xt, yt]
twofactor
VarP [xt] = (1 + λ1E
Q[J2])2 [φQv (τ)
2VarP [vt] + φ
Q
m(τ)
2VarP [mt] + 2φ
Q
v (τ)φ
Q
m(τ)Cov
P [vt,mt]]
=: (1 + λ1E
Q[J2])2 VarP [xt]
twofactor
with obvious notation for Cov[xt, yt]
twofactor and VarP [xt]
twofactor. Hence
β(τ) =
CovP [xt, yt]
VarP [xt]
=
(1 + λ1E
P [J2])
(1 + λ1EQ[J2])
CovP [xt, yt]
twofactor
VarP [xt]twofactor
=
(1 + λ1E
P [J2])
(1 + λ1EQ[J2])
β(τ)twofactor
α(τ) = E[yt]− β(τ)× E[xt]
= (θPv + E
P [J2](λ0 + λ1θ
P
v ))− β(τ)×
{EQ[J2]λ0 + [1 + λ1EQ[J2]][θPv φQv (τ) + θPmφQm(τ) + θQm(1− φQv (τ)− φQm(τ))]}
Note that λ0 enters in α(τ), but not β(τ). Hence β(τ) is the same under the two-factor and
constant jump-intensity two-factor model (where λ1 = 0).
As expected, setting λ0 = λ1 = 0 and σm = 0 implies k
P
m = k
Q
m which implies θ
P
m = θ
Q
m =: θ
Q
which implies mt = θ
Q for all t which implies VarP [mt] = Cov
P [mt, vt] = 0, we recover β(τ)
and α(τ) in the Heston model. Limits α(τ) and β(τ) when τ → 0 or τ → ∞ can be easily
calculated using expressions above.
Recall
lim
τ→0φv(τ) = 1, limτ→0φm(τ) = 0, limτ→∞φv(τ) = 0, limτ→∞φm(τ) = 0
As for β:
lim
τ→0β(τ)
twofactor = 1
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lim
τ→∞β(τ)
twofactor =
kQmk
Q
v (k
P
mk
Q
mVar
P [vt] + (k
Q
v )
2VarP [mt] + (k
P
m + k
Q
m)k
Q
v Cov
P [vt,mt])
kPmk
P
v ((k
Q
m)2Var
P [vt] + (k
Q
v )2Var
P [mt] + 2k
Q
mk
Q
v Cov
P [vt,mt])
lim
τ→0β(τ) =
(1 + λ1E
P [J2])
[1 + λ1EQ[J2]]
lim
τ→∞β(τ) =
(1 + λ1E
P [J2])
[1 + λ1EQ[J2]]
lim
τ→∞β(τ)
twofactor
Notice that stochastic jump intensity (λ1 6= 0) and jump risk premium (EP [J2] 6= EQ[J2])
implies limτ→∞ β(τ) 6= 1.
When VarP [mt] = Cov
P [vt,mt] = 0, limτ→∞ β(τ)twofactor = kQv /kPv as in the Heston model.
As for α:
lim
τ→0α(τ) = (θ
P
v + E
P [J2](λ0 + λ1θ
P
v ))−
(1 + λ1E
P [J2])
(1 + λ1EQ[J2])
[EQ[J2]λ0 + (1 + λ1E
Q[J2])θPv ]
=
λ0(E
P [J2]− EQ[J2])
1 + λ1EQ[J2]
lim
τ→∞α(τ) = [θ
P
v + E
P [J2](λ0 + λ1θ
P
v )]− limτ→∞β(τ)[E
Q[J2]λ0 + [1 + λ1E
Q[J2]]θQm]
B.3.2 Theoretical R2(τ)
To calculate the theoretical R2(τ) we need to calculate VarP [yt]. Recall
yt =
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds+
1
τ
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
J2u := QV
c
t,t+τ + QV
j
t,t+τ
To calculate VarP [QVct,t+τ ] the following expectations are used. Recall that under P , dvt =
kPv (k
Q
v /k
P
v mt − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW2t, where k
Q
v = k
P
v + γ2σv. When u ≤ s
EP [vu vs] = E
P [vuE
P [vs|vu,mu]]
= EP [vu
{
vu e
−kPv (s−u) +
kQv
kPv
mu
[
kPv
e−kPm(s−u) − e−kPv (s−u)
kPv − kPm
]
+
kQv
kPv
θPm
[
1 +
kPme
−kPv (s−u) − kPv e−k
P
m(s−u)
kPv − kPm
]}
]
= EP [v2u]e
−kPv (s−u) + EP [vumu]
kQv
kPv
[
kPv
e−kPm(s−u) − e−kPv (s−u)
kPv − kPm
]
+EP [vu]θ
P
m
kQv
kPv
[
1 +
kPme
−kPv (s−u) − kPv e−k
P
m(s−u)
kPv − kPm
]
EP [vumu] = E
P [EP [vumu|mu]] = EP [(kQv /kPv )mumu] =
kQv
kPv
EP [m2u]
EP [m2u] = Var
P [mu] + (E
P [mu])
2 =
σ2mθ
P
m
2kPm
+ (θPm)
2.
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Plugging EP [vu vs] above into the double integral below gives, after some calculations,
VarP [
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
vs ds] =
2
τ2
∫ t+τ
t
ds
∫ s
t
du EP [vu vs]− (θPv )2
=
2
τ2(kPv − kPm)
{
−kQv
(1− e−kPmτ )CovP [v,m]
(kPm)
2
+
(1− e−kPv τ )((kPv − kPm)(−VarP [v]) + kQv CovP [v,m])
(kPv )
2
}
+
2
τ
kQv Cov
P [v,m] + kPmVar
P [v]
kPmk
P
v
When mt = θ
P
m for all t, which implies Cov
P [v,m] = 0, the expression above gives the variance
of annualized integrated variance for the Heston model.
To calculate VarP [QVjt,t+τ ] the following calculations are used. Let QV
c
t,t+τ =
∫ t+τ
t vs ds
denote the non-annualized continuous part of the quadratic variation, and similarly QV
j
t,t+τ for
the jump part. Conditional on QVct,t+τ , the counting process (Nt+τ −Nt) has inhomogeneous
Poisson distribution which implies
EP [(Nt+τ −Nt)|QVct,t+τ ] = VarP [(Nt+τ −Nt)|QVct,t+τ ] = λ0τ + λ1QVct,t+τ
The following calculations and definitions lead to the analytic expression for VarP [yt], omitting
subscript t,t+τ ,
QV
j
=
Nt+τ∑
u=Nt
J2u = J
2
Nt + . . .+ J
2
Nt+τ
EP [QVc] = θPv
EP [(QVc)2] = VarP [QVc] + (θPv )
2
EP [QV
j |QVc] = EP [J2](λ0 τ + λ1QVc)
EP [QVj ] = EP [J2](λ0 + λ1E
P [QVc]) = EP [J2](λ0 + λ1θ
P
v )
VarP [QV
j |QVc] = VarP {EP [QVj |Nt+τ ,QVc]|QVc}+ EP {Var[QVj |Nt+τ ,QVc]|QVc}
= Var{(Nt+τ −Nt)EP [J2]|QVc}+ EP {(Nt+τ −Nt)VarP [J2]|QVc}
= (EP [J2])2(λ0τ + λ1QV
c
) + VarP [J2](λ0τ + λ1QV
c
)
= EP [J4](λ0τ + λ1QV
c
)
VarP [QV
j
] = VarP {EP [QVj |QVc]}+ EP {Var[QVj |QVc]}
= VarP {EP [J2](λ0 τ + λ1QVc)}+ EP {EP [J4](λ0τ + λ1QVc)}
= (EP [J2])2λ21Var{QVc}+ EP [J4](λ0τ + λ1EP [QVc])}
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VarP [QVj ] =
1
τ2
VarP [QV
j
] = (EP [J2])2λ21Var
P {QVc}+ EP [J4](λ0
τ
+
λ1
τ
EP [QVc])}
EP [J4] = (µPj )
4 + 6(µPj )
2σ2j + 3σ
4
j , J ∼ N (µPj , σ2j )
EP [QVc QVj ] = EP [J2][λ0E
P [QVc] + λ1E
P [(QVc)2]] = EP [J2][λ0θ
P
v + λ1E
P [(QVc)2]]
CovP [QVc,QVj ] = EP [QVcQVj ]− EP [QVc]EP [QVj ]
= EP [J2](λ0θ
P
v + λ1E
P [(QVc)2])− θPv EP [J2](λ0 + λ1EP [QVc])
= EP [J2]λ1E
P [(QVc)2]− θPv EP [J2]λ1θPv = EP [J2]λ1Var[QVc]
VarP [yt] = Var
P [QVc] + VarP [QVj ] + 2CovP [QVc,QVj ]
Note that
Var[
1
τ
(Nt+τ −Nt)] = VarE[ 1
τ
(Nt+τ −Nt)|QVct,t+τ ] + EVar[
1
τ
(Nt+τ −Nt)|QVct,t+τ ]
= Var[λ0 + λ1QV
c
t,t+τ ] +
1
τ2
E[λ0τ + λ1QV
c
t,t+τ ]
= λ21Var[QV
c
t,t+τ ] +
λ0
τ
+
λ1
τ
E[QVct,t+τ ]
hence Var[ 1τ (Nt+τ −Nt)]→ 0 when τ →∞.
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Part IV
Euler Approximation and Likelihood
Expansion for Continuous-Time Derivative
Pricing Models: A Comparative Analysis
Mustafa Karaman1
Abstract
An extensive Monte Carlo study is performed to compare the estimation performance of Euler
discretization and closed-form likelihood expansion (LE) methodologies for four nested deriva-
tive pricing models, the most general of which is the stochastic intensity jump diffusion two-
factor stochastic volatility model. The estimation of models with real data is also performed
using variance swap (VS) rates. The results show that LE produces lower standard errors than
Euler approximation. Moreover, both methods generate similar point estimates when models
are not too far away from the multivariate normal density. However, when there are jumps in
the stock price dynamic then those methods are producing diverging results with LE’s superi-
ority. Therefore, for more realistic derivative pricing models which feature a jump component,
LE should be the method of estimation.
1I thank EPFL for providing the computing resources at Greedy Pool.
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1. Introduction
Estimation of the continuous-time models in finance is essential whenever those models are used
for derivatives pricing purposes, portfolio allocation decisions, risk management intentions, or
even taking “bet” type of statistical arbitrage positions. However this estimation possesses
some challenges because the continuous-time data cannot be observed in the market even at the
highest frequency available. In the literature there is a big number of contributions to tackle
with this issue via for example, generalized method of moments, nonparametric techniques, or
simulation based estimations (see, Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999) and the references therein).
Whenever applicable maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) makes the best use of data
in hand in the sense that the estimates would be consistent and the standard errors of the
estimates reach the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound. Therefore, MLE produces (asymptotically)
efficient estimates. The basic requirement of the MLE on the other hand is that the transition
density of the process should be known for time horizons larger than infinitesimal distance, e.g.
daily, weekly or monthly, since the data is available for such time intervals. Models in Black
and Scholes (1973), Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), and Cox (1975) all have
known closed-form transition densities.
Most of the recent continuous-time derivatives pricing models in finance literature this den-
sity is unknown in closed-form and needs to be approximated. In this paper, I perform this
approximation by Euler discretization and LE where the first one is basically the normal density,
and the second one is a “deformed” or “stretched” normal density. In LE, by stretching the
normal density, the dynamics-implied skewness, kurtosis and the higher moments are aimed to
be captured.
In the next section, I present the most general model that is developed in the previous
part of the dissertation and show how it nests four different derivatives pricing models that
are commonly used in finance. Using those models, I perform an extensive simulation exercise
and study the estimation performance with simulated data where I know precisely the data
generating process. The simulation study shows that filtering latent variables from observed
VS data has no significant impact on the estimation performance. Moreover, it also shows
that although Euler discretization is sufficiently accurate for models not far away from the
multivariate normal density for the daily time interval, its accuracy is decreasing while the
dynamics of the state variables become more complex. The real data estimation part, where
I use VS data, also reveals that LE outperforms the Euler approximation while the dynamics
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of the state variables include jumps. That is, when the transition density of the state vector
is further away from the multivariate normal density, the method of estimation should be LE.
Finally, the cross-comparison of the model estimates shows that the appropriate parametric
model for VS data is the stochastic-intensity two-factor volatility model.
2. The Model
In this section I briefly develop stochastic intensity two-factor volatility model which is presented
Aı¨t-Sahalia, Karaman, and Mancini (2012). I start with historical, P -dynamics and then move
into risk-neutral, Q-dynamics by assuming no-arbitrage and specifying the market prices of
risks. Then, I show how this model nests, Heston, Two-Factor Volatility (without jumps) and
Constant Intensity Two-Factor Volatility Models.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P ) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions (see
Protter (2005)), with P denoting the objective probability measure. Let S be a semimartingale
modeling the stock price or index process, v be the stochastic volatility1 and m be a Feller’s
square root process modeling the long-run mean of the volatility, v, with the following dynamics
dSt/St− = µtdt+
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWP1t + ρ
√
vt dW
P
2t + (exp(J
P
t )− 1) dNt − νPt dt
dvt = k
P
v (mt k
Q
v /k
P
v − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW
P
2t (1)
dmt = k
P
m(θ
P
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW
P
3t
where µt = r− δ+γ1(1−ρ2)vt+γ2ρvt+(gP −gQ)λt, all Brownian increments are uncorrelated,
ρ is the instantaneous correlation between stock returns and spot variance, kQv = k
P
v +γ2σv, and
γ2 determines the market price of risk for W
P
2t . The spot variance, vt, follows a two-factor model
with mt k
Q
v /k
P
v being the stochastic long-run mean level, in turn mt mean reverts to θ
P
m, and k
P
v
and kPm are positive speed of mean reversions. Using stock and option prices, previous empirical
work documented that two factors are necessary to describe stochastic volatility dynamics; see
e.g. Andersen, Benzoni, and Lund (2002), Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) and Chernov,
Gallant, Ghysels, and Tauchen (2003). One factor is fast mean reverting and volatile to capture
sudden movements in volatility, the other factor is persistent and less volatile to capture long
run movements in volatility. The square-root specification of the diffusion parts is adopted to
keep the model close to commonly adopted specifications (e.g. Todorov (2010) ). The methods
developed below do not require such specification. For example
√
vt could be replaced by, say,
1Note that it is indeed stochastic variance, however I follow the convention to call it volatility.
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vγvt with γv being one more parameter to be estimated. The level of variance swap rates will
not be affected by such specification, but of course the dynamic is. The random jump size
JPt is independent of the filtration generated by the Brownian motions and jump process, and
normally distributed with mean µPj and variance σ
2
j , hence g
P = exp(µPj + σ
2
j /2) − 1, as for
instance in Bates (2000) and Pan (2002). gQ is similarly defined with µPj replaced by µ
Q
j . The
jump intensity is λt = λ0 + λ1vt, where λ0 and λ1 are positive constants. This specification
allows more price jumps to occur during more volatile periods, as often observed empirically,
with the intensity bounded away from 0 by λ0.
At this stage I specify the market price of risks for the Brownian motions as
Λt = [γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt, γ2√vt, γ3√mt]′.
The jump size risk premium is (gP − gQ) where gP = exp(µPj + σ2j /2) − 1 and gQ is similarly
defined. Hence (gP − gQ)(λ0 + λ1vt) is the time-varying (total) jump risk premium.
P - and Q-Brownian motions are related as follows:
dWP1t = dW
Q
1t − γ1
√
(1− ρ2)vt dt
dWP2t = dW
Q
2t − γ2
√
vt dt
dWP3t = dW
Q
3t − γ3
√
mt dt.
The relationship between P and Q parameters are
kPv = k
Q
v − γ2σv
kPm = k
Q
m − γ3σm
θPm = θ
Q
m k
Q
m/k
P
m
As in Pan (2002) I assume that the jump intensity is the same under both measures and
only the average jump size changes from µPj to µ
Q
j when changing measure from P to Q. This
assumption implies that all the jump risk premium is absorbed by the jump size risk premium,
(gP − gQ). Given typical sample sizes, accurate estimation of risk premiums for both jump-size
and jump-timing is obviously challenging and I will not relax this assumption in this paper.
The jump component in the stock price makes the market incomplete with respect to the
risk-free bank account, the stock and any finite number of derivatives. Hence, the state price
density is not unique 2.
2See Aı¨t-Sahalia, Karaman, and Mancini (2012) for a possible specification of the state price density
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Given the market prices of risks above, under Q the ex-dividend price process follows
dSt/St− = (r − δ) dt+
√
(1− ρ2)vt dWQ1t + ρ
√
vt dW
Q
2t + (exp(J
Q
t )− 1) dNQt − νQt dt
dvt = k
Q
v (mt − vt)dt+ σv
√
vt dW
Q
2t (2)
dmt = k
Q
m(θ
Q
m −mt)dt+ σm
√
mt dW
Q
3t
where r is the risk-free rate, δ the dividend yield (both taken to be constant for simplicity only),
and the Brownian motions WQ1 and W
Q
2 , jump size J
Q, jump process NQ, and its compensator
νQ are all governed by the measure Q. When no confusion arises superscripts P and Q are
omitted.
In the parametric model above I assume the existence of an equivalent risk-neutral measure
Q. By the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (see Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994)),
absence of arbitrage is therefore maintained and VS rates can be calculated easily. By convention
the variance swap contract has zero value at inception. Assuming that the interest rate does
not depend on the quadratic variation, no arbitrage implies
VSt,t+τ = E
Q
t [QVt,t+τ ] (3)
where EQt denotes time-t conditional expectation under Q, and QVt,t+τ is the annualized
quadratic variation of the log-price process under Q-dynamics. Interchanging expectation and
integration (justified by Fubini’s theorem), and exploiting independence between JQ and NQ
VSt,t+τ =
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
EQt [vs]ds+
1
τ
EQ[J2]EQt [Nt+τ −Nt]
= EQ[J2]λ0 + (1 + λ1E
Q[J2])[(1− φQv (τ)− φQm(τ))θQm + φQv (τ)vt + φQm(τ)mt] (4)
where EQ[J2] = EQt [J
2] as random jump size is time-homogeneous, and
φQv (τ) = (1− exp(−kQv τ))/(kQv τ)
φQm(τ) =
(
1 + exp(−kQv τ)kQm/(kQv − kQm)− exp(−kQmτ)kQv /(kQv − kQm)
)
/(kQmτ).
Given the linearity of the variance swap payoff in the spot variance, only the drift of vt enters the
variance swap rate. The diffusion part of vt (or volatility of volatility) affects only the dynamic
of VSt,t+τ .
3 The Q-expectation of squared jump size, EQ[J2], provides constant contribution
to the variance swap rate (independent of the time to maturity), while the stochastic intensity
provides time-varying contribution to VSt,t+τ .
3This can easily be seen by specifying some dynamic for the spot variance, such as Heston model, calculating∫ t+τ
t
EQt [vs]ds explicitly and then applying Itoˆ’s formula to it.
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In the simulation and real-data analysis, the model in (1) is reduced to Heston, Two-Factor
Volatility (without jumps) and Constant Intensity Two-Factor Volatility Model via the restric-
tions below:
1. Heston model, obtained setting λ0 = λ1 = 0 and mt = θ
P
v for all t in (1)
2. Two-Factor Volatility model, obtained setting λ0 = λ1 = 0 in (1)
3. Constant jump-intensity two-factor model, obtained setting λ1 = 0 in (1)
4. Stochastic jump-intensity two-factor model as in (1).
Restricting the variance dynamic in (2) to the Heston model by setting mt = θ
Q
v for all t
and λ0 = λ1 = 0, the VS rate becomes VSt,t+τ = (1 − φQv (τ))θQv + φQv (τ)vt, i.e. a weighted
average between vt and θ
Q
v . When τ → 0, φQv (τ) → 1 and VSt,T → vt. Eliminating the jump
component, imposing the restriction λ0 = λ1 = 0 for all t in (2), the VS rate is immediately seen
by plugging this restriction into (4). VS rates can now exhibit various degrees of persistence
and volatility and the induced term structure can take a variety of shapes depending on the
relative levels of vt, mt and θ
Q
m. This two-factor model can reproduce, at least qualitatively,
previous feature of VS rates but cannot accommodate the priced jump component in VS rates.
Egloff, Leippold, and Wu (2010) study VS rates under the previous diffusion one- and two-factor
stochastic volatility model.
3. Estimation Method
In order to estimate the model in (1) and (2) I need time series data for the underlying S&P
500 index and at least two more time series to recover the unobserved volatility and the long-
run mean of the volatility. The key feature of stochastic volatility models with affine drift is
that model-based VS rates are affine in latent state variables. This feature suggests to filter
out latent states directly from VS rates. Then I use likelihood-based methods namely Euler
approximation and LE to estimate the models. The state vector follows a multivariate jump-
diffusion stochastic volatility process and thus its transition density is unknown. Since jumps
in stock prices are rare events, using Bayes rule I approximate the transition density of the
state vector with a mixture of no-jump and 1-jump. Such densities are unknown as well but
can be approximated. I approximate the transition density in case of no-jump first by Euler
approximation and second by LE methods. The latter was introduced and developed in the
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univariate setting by Aı¨t-Sahalia (2002a), Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999), and extended to the multivariate
setting by Aı¨t-Sahalia (2008), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2010),
Aı¨t-Sahalia, Karaman, and Mancini (2012). The reason of focusing on these two estimation
methodologies is to compare the one of the sophisticated methodologies (i.e. the LE) with the
one of the most easily applicable techniques of estimation (i.e. Euler approximation).
The transition density pX can be written by the Bayes’ formula as follows
pX(x∆|x0) = pX(x∆|x0, N∆ = 0) Pr(N∆ = 0) + pX(x∆|x0, N∆ = 1) Pr(N∆ = 1) + o(∆)
where Pr(N∆ = j) is the probability that j jumps occur at day ∆, omitting the dependence on
Θ for brevity. In Model (1)–(2), the largest contribution to the transition density of X (hence to
the likelihood) comes from the first term when conditioning on no jump occurring during ∆, i.e.
N∆ = 0. The probability of such event, Pr(N∆ = 0), is large and of the order 1− (λ0 +λ1v0) ∆.
The contribution of the second term is only of the order (λ0 + λ1v0) ∆. As in the setting ∆ is
one day, the contribution of higher order terms appear to be quite modest. The advantage of
this approximation is that the leading term pX(x∆|x0, N∆ = 0) can be approximated by both
Euler approximation and the LE methods.
4. Monte Carlo Simulation
I run a Monte Carlo simulation to check the accuracy of the two estimation methods, namely
Euler and LE. I simulate four models
1. Heston model, obtained setting λ0 = λ1 = 0 and mt = θ
P
v for all t in (1)
2. Two-Factor Volatility model, obtained setting λ0 = λ1 = 0 in (1)
3. Constant jump-intensity two-factor model, obtained setting λ1 = 0 in (1)
4. Stochastic jump-intensity two-factor model as in (1).
Each model nests its preceding models, with the last one being the most general model
considered here. The simulated sample size is N = 10000 data points sampled at daily frequency
(∆ = 1/252). Each day interval is divided into 30 sub-intervals, which corresponds to roughly
a 15-minute interval. States variables are simulated at such intraday frequency using an Euler
discretization of the corresponding dynamics. In practice, on each simulated day, 29 out 30
simulated data points are discarded to obtain the daily sample of Sti , vti , and mti . VS rates are
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calculated for various maturities using simulated values and the various models. Each simulated
path is initialized with variance and its stochastic long run mean at their unconditional means
and the stock price at 100. To reduce the impact of such initial values on the simulated
trajectory, an initial 500 values are generated and then discarded, taking the last one as the
starting point for the sample trajectory. For each model I simulate 1000 trajectories. Since
latent variables are known in the simulation exercise, I can study the accuracy of the various
estimation methods when using directly the latent variables (though they are unobservable in
practice) and when recovering them from simulated VS rates, hence quantifying the impact of
filtering latent states.
Overall, simulation results suggest that likelihood-based methods are all fairly accurate,
although there are some differences across various methods as discussed below.
4.1. Heston Model
Tables 1 and 2 show simulation results for the Heston model using latent variance and filtered
variance via 3 months to maturity VS rates, respectively, as well as simulated underlying stock
returns. Both LE and Euler methods deliver fairly accurate results. LE produces slightly
better results in terms of bias and standard errors of the estimates for most parameters. The
reason of this similar performance is that for the daily interval the Euler approximation works
well for those models with transition density not too far from the multivariate normal density.
Comparing the two tables shows that the impact on estimates of recovering latent variance
from observed variance swap rates is small. Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007) report a similar
simulation study but when latent variance is recovered via European options. The deterioration
of estimation results seems to be less pronounced when using VS, consistent with the feature
that VS rates have a more direct link to latent variance than European options.
4.2. Two-Factor Stochastic Volatility Model
Tables 3 and 4 report simulation results for the two-factor model using latent variance and its
stochastic long run mean and 3-month and 12-month to maturity VS rates, respectively, as well
as stock returns. Again, both LE and Euler methods deliver fairly accurate results. However,
compared to the Heston model, the first method produces relatively more accurate results than
the second one, as transition densities of state variables are now more far away from normality.
Similar to the case with Heston model, the deterioration of estimation results when recovering
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latent state variables from observed VS rates is negligible.
At this stage we see that using underlying stock returns and observed VS rates, instead of
latent variables directly, has no impact on estimation performance. Moreover we also realize
that the power of LE is getting superior as the dynamics of the state variables move further
away the multivariate normal density (see also Jensen and Poulsen (2002)). For this reason
in the rest of the simulations I only analyze the LE technology using simulated variance swap
rates and the index.
4.3. Constant Jump Intensity Two-Factor Stochastic Volatility Model
Table 5 reports simulation results for the constant jump-intensity two-factor model using LE
technique. Latent state variables are filtered using 3- and 12-month to maturity VS rates.
Despite the presence of jumps in stock price, the LE method provides quite accurate estimation
results for most of the parameters. However the market price of risks, the speed of mean
reversion and jump intensity parameters posses some difficulties in estimation as they have
relatively higher mean bias and root mean squared error.
4.4. Stochastic Jump Intensity Two-Factor Stochastic Volatility Model
Table 6 report simulation results for the the stochastic jump-intensity two-factor model using
LE methodology. The simulation setting is the same as in the previous model. Again, the
method is fairly accurate for most of the parameters while estimating market price of risks, the
speed of mean reversion and jump parameters is a bit more challenging.
5. Estimation with Variance Swap Data
In this section I report parameter estimates of the four models discussed above, namely Heston,
two-factor volatility, constant jump-intensity, and stochastic jump-intensity models, using the
likelihood-based procedures namely Euler, and LE methods using VS data. As each model
nests preceding models, I can assess empirically whether each extra layer of flexibility is actually
relevant for fitting data and economically important for generating risk premiums. Since there
are more VS rates than latent state variables, for each model I perform 3 estimations for each
method considered:
i) Only ` VS rates assumed to be observed without error (and used to recover the ` latent state
variables, and ` = 1 or 2 depending on the model);
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ii) All 5 VS rates of which ` are observed without error and 5−` are observed with uncorrelated
errors;
iii) All 5 VS rates of which ` are observed without error and 5− ` are observed with potentially
correlated errors.
The error is defined as observed VS rate minus model-based rate, see Aı¨t-Sahalia, Karaman,
and Mancini (2012) for further details. In the Tables 8 - 11, I report these estimates under the
columns “VS without errors”, “VS with uncorrelated errors”, and “VS with correlated errors”,
respectively.
5.1. Dataset
I estimate the four nested models listed above by using over the counter quotes on variance swap
rates on the S&P 500 index and the index itself. The database, whose descriptive statistics can
be seen at Table 7, is provided by a major broker dealer in New York City. The data are daily
closing quotes on variance swap rates with fixed time to maturities at two, three, six, twelve, and
twenty four months from January 4, 1996 to September 2, 2010. There are 3, 624 observations
for each maturity.
The in sample period where I perform the estimations of the models is from January 4, 1996 to
April 2, 2007. Therefore the out of sample period is from April 3, 2007 to September 2, 2010.
5.2. Heston Model
Table 8 reports parameter estimates for the Heston model. In this model the latent state
variable is the spot variance only, hence ` = 1. Euler and LE method provide quite similar
point estimates, especially for the correlated errors case that is the case where I make use of
all available data. However, standard errors for the second method tend to be smaller. The
long-run mean volatility,
√
θPv , is firmly around 20%, and the correlation, ρ, around −70%.
As it is usually the case, market price of risk parameters are estimated less precisely, but γ2
is always negative implying a negative variance risk premium, see also Tables 12 - 13. The
mean reversion speed parameter, kPv , changes significantly from “VS without errors” to “VS
with uncorrelated errors” estimations, and implied half-life4 ranges from about 90 to 190 days
for the estimates. The correlation parameter for error terms, ρe, is positive suggesting that the
Heston model is systematically underpricing or overpricing variance swaps.
4Half-life is defined as the time necessary to halve a unit shock and here is given by − log(0.5)/kPv × 252 in
number of days.
115
5.3. Two-Factor Stochastic Volatility Model
Table 9 reports parameter estimates for the two-factor model based on Euler and LE methods.
All parameter estimates are quite inline with each other, especially in the last two sets of
estimates, i.e. last 8 columns. However in terms of standard errors LE is superior. The long-run
average volatility,
√
θPm, is around 23%. The estimates of correlation parameter, ρ is around
−74% and both γ2 and γ3 are negative implying negative variance risk premium, see also Tables
14 - 15. Compared to the Heston model, estimates of kPv are larger, implying much faster mean
reversion of spot variance, while estimates of kPm are about 1/20 of k
P
v implying a much slower
mean reversion of stochastic long-run mean. These estimates suggest that the two-factor model
releases the “tension” in kPv in Heston model. The correlation parameter for error terms, ρe, is
slightly negative5 suggesting that the two-factor model fits variance swap rates better than the
Heston model without any systematic pricing error.
5.4. Constant Jump Intensity Two-Factor Stochastic Volatility Model
Table 10 shows estimation results for constant jump-intensity two-factor model using Euler and
LE methods. The point estimates of this model are not always inline with each other. In
particular the jump and market prices of risk parameters are estimated quite differently via
both methods. In terms of standard errors on the other hand LE is performing better. The
long-run average volatility is around 22%. The estimates of correlation parameter, ρ is around
−72% and both γ2 and γ3 are negative implying negative variance risk premium, see Tables 16
- 17. The expected jump size is positive under the objective probability measure, µPj > 0, and
negative under the risk neutral measure, µQj < 0, which implies a positive jump risk premium.
The correlation parameter estimated for error terms, ρe, is negative suggesting that the model
has no systematic pricing error.
5.5. Stochastic Jump Intensity Two-Factor Stochastic Volatility Model
Table 11 shows estimation results for stochastic-intensity two-factor model using Euler and LE
methods. Similar to the constant intensity jumps case, there are slight differences in the point
estimation results of the parameters like mean-reversion speed, market prices of risks and jump
parameters. However still the standard errors are less in case of LE for most parameters. The
5The determinant of the 3× 3 error term correlation matrix is 2ρ3e − 3ρ2e + 1 which is strictly positive as long
as ρe > −0.5.
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long-run average volatility is around 21%. All market price of Brownian risks are negative,
the equity risk premium which is sum of diffusive and jump risk premiums is positive and the
variance risk premium is negative, see Tables 18 - 19. Expected jump size is positive under
the objective measure, µPj , and negative under the risk neutral measure, µ
Q
j , implying positive
jump risk premium6. The correlation parameter for error terms, ρe, is negative suggesting that
the model does not make any systematic pricing error.
5.6. Comparison Across Different Models Estimates
For each model, estimation based on all available variance swap rates has significantly higher
log-likelihood when compared to other estimations. Moreover, LE is producing less standard
errors for the estimates. Therefore, the analysis below will be based on such estimates. The
Heston Model has low log-likelihood compared to other models and systematically misprices VS
rates, confirming that the model is misspecified. Excluding the Heston model, all other model
estimates based on “VS with uncorrelated errors” and “VS with correlated errors” are close in
the sense that they imply similar dynamics of variance, stochastic long-run mean and recovered
instantaneous risk premiums, see Figures 1 - 8 and Tables 12 - 19. Moreover, standard deviations
and correlations of model-based error terms are also similar. Focusing on the last two models
with jumps they both have quite similar mean and volatility of jump size estimates. Estimates
of jump intensity implies on average 5 jumps per year for both models. Finally comparing log-
likelihoods of last two models with jumps suggests that the last model is significantly better. The
gain in log-likelihood of having a stochastic jump intensity parameter in the form of λ0 + λ1vt
is large.
5.7. Pricing Error of Variance Swap Rates
Pricing error of VS rate is defined as model-based VS rate, V̂S, minus actual VS rate. To save
space I report in- and out-sample pricing errors only for Heston and stochastic jump-intensity
two-factor models in Tables 20 - 23 also see Figures 9 - 12. Pricing error for the other models
are available upon request. The stochastic jump-intensity two-factor model fits VS rates well
both in- and out-sample and significantly outperforms the Heston model for example in terms
of root mean square error (RMSE).
6Except for the Euler with the correlated pricing errors case. However this still implies positive jump risk
premium.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper I compare the estimation performance of Euler approximation and LE. I study
four different derivatives pricing models that are commonly used in finance. In the first part of
the paper, I perform an extensive simulation study and show that filtering latent variables from
observed VS data has no significant impact on the estimation performance. Moreover, I also
show that although Euler discretization is sufficiently accurate for models not far away from
the multivariate normal density for the daily time interval, its accuracy is decreasing while the
dynamics of the state variables become more complex. For the real data estimation I use VS
rates written on S&P 500 index quoted by a major broker dealer. This part also reveals that LE
outperforms the Euler approximation while the dynamics of the state variables include jumps.
That is, when the transition density of the state vector is further away from the multivariate
normal density, the method of estimation should be LE. Finally, the cross-comparison of the
model estimates shows that the appropriate parametric model for VS data is the stochastic-
intensity two-factor volatility model.
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Figure 1. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for Heston Model - Euler. Vertical line denotes
beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1 −
ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt.
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Figure 2. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for Heston Model - LE. Vertical line denotes
beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1 −
ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt.
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Figure 3. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for 2-Factor Model - Euler. Vertical line denotes
beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1 −
ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt =
γ3σmmt.
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Figure 4. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for 2-Factor Model - LE. Vertical line denotes
beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1 −
ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt =
γ3σmmt.
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Figure 5. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for Constant Intensity Model - Euler. Vertical
line denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt =
(γ1(1−ρ2)+γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ]−EQ[eJ ])(λ0); Variance risk premium
VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Figure 6. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for Constant Intensity Model - LE. Vertical line
denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt =
(γ1(1−ρ2)+γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ]−EQ[eJ ])(λ0); Variance risk premium
VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Figure 7. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for Stochastic Intensity Model - Euler. Vertical
line denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt =
(γ1(1 − ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ] − EQ[eJ ])(λ0 + λ1vt); Variance risk
premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Figure 8. Instantaneous Recovered Quantities for Stochastic Intensity Model - LE. Vertical line
denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007. Diffusive risk premium DRPt =
(γ1(1 − ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ] − EQ[eJ ])(λ0 + λ1vt); Variance risk
premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Figure 9. Difference between Recovered and Quoted Variance Swap Rates (in volatility units)
for Heston Model - Euler. Vertical line denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3,
2007.
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Figure 10. Difference between Recovered and Quoted Variance Swap Rates (in volatility units)
for Heston Model - LE. Vertical line denotes beginning of out-sample period, i.e., April 3, 2007.
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Figure 11. Difference between Recovered and Quoted Variance Swap Rates (in volatility units)
for stochastic intensity JD 2F-SV Model - Euler. Vertical line denotes beginning of out-sample
period, i.e., April 3, 2007.
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Figure 12. Difference between Recovered and Quoted Variance Swap Rates (in volatility units)
for stochastic intensity JD 2F-SV Model - LE. Vertical line denotes beginning of out-sample
period, i.e., April 3, 2007.
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Table 1. Monte Carlo Simulation Heston Model: estimation results using stock prices and latent
variance (N = 10000)
Parameter True Value Euler LE
Mean Bias Root MSE Mean Bias Root MSE
κPv 3.0000 0.0250 0.2537 0.0412 0.2582
θPv 0.1000 −0.0001 0.0043 −0.0001 0.0044
σv 0.2500 −0.0013 0.0019 0.0000 0.0014
ρ −0.8000 0.0002 0.0030 −0.0000 0.0030
γ1 −7.0000 −0.0773 0.5432 −0.0912 0.5445
γ2 −6.0000 −0.0516 0.4532 −0.0526 0.4640
Table 2. Monte Carlo Simulation Heston Model: estimation results using stock prices and
variance swaps (N = 10000)
Parameter True Value Euler LE
Mean Bias Root MSE Mean Bias Root MSE
κPv 3.0000 −0.0067 0.1712 0.0203 0.1726
θPv 0.1000 −0.0002 0.0047 −0.0000 0.0046
σv 0.2500 −0.0022 0.0075 0.0007 0.0073
ρ −0.8000 0.0003 0.0037 0.0000 0.0037
γ1 −7.0000 −0.1838 1.1314 −0.0251 1.1193
γ2 −6.0000 −0.1104 0.7027 −0.0283 0.6804
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Table 3. Monte Carlo Simulation Two-Factor Model: estimation results using stock prices and
latent state variables (N = 10000)
Parameter True Value Euler LE
Mean Bias Root MSE Mean Bias Root MSE
κPv 3.0000 0.0236 0.2772 0.0213 0.2810
σv 0.2500 −0.0014 0.0019 0.0000 0.0013
ρ −0.8000 0.0004 0.0032 −0.0000 0.0031
κPm 0.3000 0.1269 0.2048 0.1273 0.2053
θPm 0.1000 0.0013 0.0159 0.0013 0.0159
σm 0.1000 −0.0001 0.0007 −0.0000 0.0007
γ1 −7.0000 −0.1538 1.4726 −0.0889 1.4937
γ2 −6.0000 −0.1047 0.8632 −0.0651 0.8550
γ3 −1.0000 −0.0293 0.3376 −0.0173 0.3191
Table 4. Monte Carlo Simulation Two-Factor Model: estimation results using stock prices and
variance swaps (N = 10000)
Parameter True Value Euler LE
Mean Bias Root MSE Mean Bias Root MSE
κPv 3.0000 0.0021 0.1940 0.0008 0.1927
σv 0.2500 −0.0015 0.0021 −0.0002 0.0015
ρ −0.8000 0.0001 0.0033 −0.0004 0.0033
κPm 0.3000 0.0158 0.0602 0.0153 0.0608
θPm 0.1000 0.0013 0.0161 0.0014 0.0159
σm 0.1000 0.0005 0.0021 0.0005 0.0020
γ1 −7.0000 −0.0439 1.2425 0.0362 1.2468
γ2 −6.0000 −0.0465 0.7768 0.0015 0.7630
γ3 −1.0000 −0.0726 0.5494 −0.0846 0.5563
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Table 5. Monte Carlo Simulation Constant Jump-Intensity Two-Factor Model: estimation
results using stock prices and variance swaps, and LE estimation method (N = 10000)
Parameter True Value LE
Mean Bias Root MSE
κPv 3.0000 0.1850 0.4051
σv 0.2500 -0.0060 0.0062
ρ -0.8000 0.0260 0.0265
κPm 0.3000 0.0420 0.1487
θPm 0.1000 -0.0059 0.0884
σm 0.1000 0.0011 0.0049
γ1 -7.0000 5.5661 7.2405
γ2 -6.0000 -0.9059 1.7150
γ3 -1.0000 0.5954 1.6650
λ 6.0000 -1.3604 1.6328
µPj -0.0100 -0.0041 0.0123
µQj -0.2000 -0.0272 0.0374
σj 0.0400 0.0198 0.0209
Table 6. Monte Carlo Simulation Stochastic Jump-Intensity Two-Factor Model: estimation
results using stock prices and variance swaps, and LE estimation method (N = 10000)
Parameter True Value LE
Mean Bias Root MSE
κPv 3.0000 0.3372 0.6688
σv 0.2500 0.0169 0.0202
ρ -0.8000 0.0111 0.0146
κPm 0.3000 0.1111 0.2460
θPm 0.1000 0.0312 0.8054
σm 0.1000 0.0107 0.0144
γ1 −7.0000 6.1806 8.4395
γ2 −6.0000 −0.8454 2.2510
γ3 −1.0000 0.9085 2.1713
λ1 10.0000 −4.9889 5.3182
µPj −0.0100 −0.0067 0.0178
µQj −0.2000 −0.0438 0.0693
σj 0.0400 0.0272 0.0419
λ0 4.0000 −1.1651 1.4749
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Variance swap rates
Maturity Mean Std Skew Kurt AC1 Q22 ADF
2 22.14 8.18 1.53 7.08 0.982 62,908.97 −3.79
3 22.32 7.81 1.32 6.05 0.988 66,449.22 −3.52
6 22.87 7.40 1.10 4.97 0.992 69,499.72 −3.30
12 23.44 6.88 0.80 3.77 0.994 71,644.69 −2.82
24 23.93 6.48 0.57 2.92 0.995 72,878.68 −2.47
Table 7. Summary statistics of the variance swap rates on the S&P 500 index at different ma-
turities (in months) from January 4, 1996 to September 2, 2010 for a total of 3,624 observations
for each maturity. The table reports mean, standard deviation (Std), skewness (Skew), excess
kurtosis (Kurt), first order autocorrelation (AC1) the Ljung–Box portmanteau test for up to
22nd order autocorrelation, Q22, 10% critical value is 30.81; the augmented Dickey–Fuller test
for unit root involving 22 augmentation lags, a constant term and time trend, ADF, 10% critical
value is −3.16.
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Table 12. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from Heston Model via Euler
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
√
v̂t 20.1722 7.2315 0.6653 0.6141 8.5512 51.8260
DRP 7.2203 5.2753 1.8662 5.9201 1.1498 42.2332
VRP -1.6566 1.2104 -1.8662 5.9201 -9.6899 -0.2638
Out of Sample
√
v̂t 27.2188 10.3313 1.2800 1.5473 11.0325 66.8261
DRP 13.3253 11.2317 2.1180 4.4362 1.9139 70.2184
VRP -3.0573 2.5770 -2.1180 4.4362 -16.1107 -0.4391
Table 13. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from Heston Model via LE
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
√
v̂t 20.2218 7.1119 0.6816 0.6492 8.8870 51.5181
DRP 7.3609 5.2972 1.8662 5.9201 1.2653 42.5191
VRP -1.6497 1.1872 -1.8662 5.9201 -9.5291 -0.2836
Out of Sample
√
v̂t 27.1662 10.2119 1.2891 1.5640 11.2638 66.3947
DRP 13.4913 11.2784 2.1180 4.4362 2.0325 70.6205
VRP -3.0236 2.5276 -2.1180 4.4362 -15.8271 -0.4555
Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1−ρ2)+γ2ρ)vt; Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt.
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Table 14. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from 2-Factor Volatility Model via Euler
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max√
v̂t 19.5696 7.4057 1.1796 1.8590 4.8686 60.1068√
m̂t 22.2696 6.6548 0.6652 0.0512 12.2137 50.5925
DRP 7.1906 5.9925 2.4526 8.6494 0.3893 59.3391
VRP -4.4069 3.6726 -2.4526 8.6494 -36.3671 -0.2386
LRMRP -0.5046 0.3088 -1.3892 2.6226 -2.3907 -0.1393
Out of Sample√
v̂t 26.8830 11.6522 1.7012 2.6264 12.0338 75.3682√
m̂t 27.5180 7.6822 0.0705 -0.5851 12.4737 45.1535
DRP 14.0972 14.3834 2.5130 6.3082 2.3785 93.2975
VRP -8.6397 8.8152 -2.5130 6.3082 -57.1791 -1.4577
LRMRP -0.7623 0.4041 -0.6280 -0.3261 -1.9043 -0.1453
Table 15. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from 2-Factor Volatility Model via LE
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max√
v̂t 19.6288 7.3507 1.1615 1.8207 6.8673 59.6100√
m̂t 22.3377 6.6411 0.6772 0.0621 12.3428 50.5445
DRP 7.4564 6.1347 2.4300 8.5308 0.8005 60.3115
VRP -4.2339 3.4834 -2.4300 8.5308 -34.2461 -0.4545
LRMRP -0.4598 0.2805 -1.3924 2.5905 -2.1629 -0.1290
Out of Sample√
v̂t 26.9068 11.5457 1.6904 2.5924 12.4979 74.8550√
m̂t 27.5343 7.6288 0.0487 -0.6135 12.5738 44.7227
DRP 14.5479 14.6735 2.4982 6.2295 2.6512 95.1051
VRP -8.2606 8.3319 -2.4982 6.2295 -54.0027 -1.5054
LRMRP -0.6911 0.3627 -0.5931 -0.4002 -1.6933 -0.1339
Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1−ρ2)+γ2ρ)vt; Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt;
Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Table 16. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from Constant Intensity Model via Euler
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
√
v̂t 17.8758 7.9541 0.9606 1.3288 2.0873 58.7799
√
m̂t 21.0105 7.0636 0.6129 -0.0667 9.9583 50.0551
DRP 1.4678 1.3758 2.4158 8.4578 0.0167 13.2481
JRP 6.3849 6.3849 6.3849
VRP -3.6670 3.4373 -2.4158 8.4578 -33.0986 -0.0417
LRMRP -0.4407 0.2989 -1.3951 2.5658 -2.2474 -0.0890
Out of Sample
√
v̂t 25.6478 11.8580 1.6179 2.3916 10.0679 74.1004
√
m̂t 26.4528 7.9882 -0.0369 -0.5909 10.2188 43.8352
DRP 3.0608 3.2835 2.4892 6.1816 0.3887 21.0541
JRP 6.3849 6.3849 6.3849
VRP -7.6470 8.2034 -2.4892 6.1816 -52.6009 -0.9710
LRMRP -0.6848 0.3830 -0.5659 -0.4562 -1.7236 -0.0937
Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1− ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ]−
EQ[eJ ])(λ0); Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt =
γ3σmmt.
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Table 17. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from Constant Intensity Model via LE
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
√
v̂t 17.8645 7.9599 0.9548 1.3168 2.5859 58.7255
√
m̂t 21.0174 7.0523 0.6153 -0.0638 9.9947 50.0178
DRP 0.7662 0.7184 2.4126 8.4414 0.0134 6.9090
JRP 7.4618 7.4618 7.4618
VRP -3.3982 3.1861 -2.4126 8.4414 -30.6407 -0.0594
LRMRP -0.4032 0.2731 -1.3955 2.5618 -2.0527 -0.0820
Out of Sample
√
v̂t 25.6421 11.8533 1.6153 2.3843 10.0267 74.0503
√
m̂t 26.4460 7.9720 -0.0387 -0.5946 10.2498 43.7523
DRP 1.5984 1.7137 2.4871 6.1708 0.2014 10.9854
JRP 7.4618 7.4618 7.4618
VRP -7.0886 7.6000 -2.4871 6.1708 -48.7190 -0.8932
LRMRP -0.6259 0.3494 -0.5616 -0.4650 -1.5706 -0.0862
Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1− ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ]−
EQ[eJ ])(λ0); Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium LRMRPt =
γ3σmmt.
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Table 18. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from Stochastic Intensity Model via
Euler
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
√
v̂t 17.1606 7.4845 0.9843 1.3793 3.0256 55.8867
√
m̂t 20.0851 6.6387 0.6226 -0.0489 9.7615 47.5054
DRP 3.3684 3.1129 2.4154 8.4557 0.0880 30.0173
JRP 4.9781 1.9843 2.4154 8.4557 2.8870 21.9653
VRP -6.4566 5.9668 -2.4154 8.4557 -57.5372 -0.1686
LRMRP -0.2844 0.1902 -1.3948 2.5680 -1.4345 -0.0606
Out of Sample
√
v̂t 24.4874 11.2276 1.6248 2.4097 9.8166 70.4346
√
m̂t 25.2100 7.5225 -0.0253 -0.5965 10.0025 41.6478
DRP 6.9729 7.4286 2.4889 6.1802 0.9261 47.6790
JRP 7.2758 4.7353 2.4889 6.1802 3.4213 33.2236
VRP -13.3656 14.2392 -2.4889 6.1802 -91.3911 -1.7752
LRMRP -0.4399 0.2439 -0.5684 -0.4512 -1.1026 -0.0636
Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1− ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ]−
EQ[eJ ])(λ0 + λ1vt); Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium
LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Table 19. Instantaneous Recovered quantities (in %’s) from Stochastic Intensity Model via LE
In Sample
Mean Std Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
√
v̂t 17.4006 7.6698 0.9672 1.3427 3.0934 56.8958
√
m̂t 20.4281 6.8054 0.6200 -0.0560 9.8209 48.4616
DRP 1.2691 1.1808 2.4118 8.4376 0.0336 11.3618
JRP 5.5314 1.5757 2.4118 8.4376 3.8827 18.9996
VRP -3.3964 3.1599 -2.4118 8.4376 -30.4062 -0.0899
LRMRP -0.4414 0.2972 -1.3956 2.5611 -2.2358 -0.0918
Out of Sample
√
v̂t 24.9025 11.4589 1.6187 2.3930 9.8461 71.7357
√
m̂t 25.6686 7.6972 -0.0351 -0.5983 10.0637 42.3886
DRP 2.6369 2.8162 2.4867 6.1684 0.3403 18.0617
JRP 7.3566 3.7581 2.4867 6.1684 4.2919 27.9402
VRP -7.0567 7.5367 -2.4867 6.1684 -48.3361 -0.9106
LRMRP -0.6836 0.3801 -0.5607 -0.4668 -1.7106 -0.0964
Diffusive risk premium DRPt = (γ1(1− ρ2) + γ2ρ)vt; Jump risk premium JRPt = (EP [eJ ]−
EQ[eJ ])(λ0 + λ1vt); Variance risk premium VRPt = γ2σvvt; Long run mean risk premium
LRMRPt = γ3σmmt.
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Table 20. Pricing Errors (in volatility %’s units) from Heston Model via Euler
In Sample
Mean RMSE Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
V̂ S2m − V S2m -0.0934 0.8530 -0.4111 2.2968 -4.7736 3.0354
V̂ S6m − V S6m 0.0235 1.1375 -1.2178 3.2298 -4.6151 4.9912
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.9350 3.0767 -0.9065 0.0665 -8.0448 7.1408
Out of Sample
V̂ S2m − V S2m 0.2774 1.4121 -3.5967 19.6498 -10.4229 3.2534
V̂ S6m − V S6m -0.3134 1.3909 1.5269 7.0353 -2.9798 10.3361
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.1022 3.0224 0.3366 -0.2379 -6.8087 11.8545
Table 21. Pricing Errors (in volatility %’s units) from Heston Model via LE
In Sample
Mean RMSE Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
V̂ S2m − V S2m -0.0808 0.8508 -0.5148 2.4388 -4.8256 2.9651
V̂ S6m − V S6m 0.0018 1.1190 -1.0708 3.3361 -4.5599 5.0923
V̂ S24m − V S24m 1.0014 2.9503 -0.9457 0.2279 -7.8017 8.5185
Out of Sample
V̂ S2m − V S2m 0.2594 1.4204 -3.6314 19.7978 -10.5395 3.2285
V̂ S6m − V S6m -0.2581 1.4034 1.6553 7.5622 -2.9267 10.6361
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.4690 3.0741 0.4664 0.2638 -6.4846 13.3749
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Table 22. Pricing Errors (in volatility %’s units) from Stochastic Intensity Model via Euler
In Sample
Mean RMSE Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
V̂ S2m − V S2m -0.1831 0.7434 -0.5063 2.1194 -4.1869 2.9676
V̂ S6m − V S6m 0.0633 0.3947 -1.7668 14.2941 -3.6369 2.4515
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.1519 0.5601 -0.5073 1.8494 -3.0744 3.3492
Out of Sample
V̂ S2m − V S2m 0.2195 1.0026 -4.7349 30.8543 -8.5755 3.0098
V̂ S6m − V S6m -0.2517 0.4759 3.1368 34.3960 -1.5872 4.5505
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.1427 0.5563 -0.4892 1.6882 -2.2120 1.9287
Table 23. Pricing Errors (in volatility %’s units) from Stochastic Intensity Model via LE
In Sample
Mean RMSE Skew. Exc. Kurt. Min Max
V̂ S2m − V S2m -0.1828 0.7429 -0.5108 2.1308 -4.1932 2.9636
V̂ S6m − V S6m 0.0639 0.3944 -1.7645 14.2417 -3.6271 2.4630
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.1428 0.5603 -0.5231 1.8533 -3.1328 3.3393
Out of Sample
V̂ S2m − V S2m 0.2181 1.0046 -4.7387 30.8483 -8.5946 2.9979
V̂ S6m − V S6m -0.2494 0.4750 3.1959 34.9625 -1.5709 4.5776
V̂ S24m − V S24m 0.1287 0.5511 -0.5258 1.7237 -2.2251 1.8900
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